AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 25706/94
by Hubert M.J.H. ROESTENBURG
against the Netherlands
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 19 October 1995, the following members being present:
MM. H. DANELIUS, President
G. JÖRUNDSSON
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
F. MARTINEZ
L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
Ms. M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 14 November 1994
by Hubert M.J.H. ROESTENBURG against the Netherlands and registered on
18 November 1995 under file No. 25706/94;
Having regard to :
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
10 August 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 29 August 1995;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1935, and residing in
Haaren, the Netherlands. Before the Commission he is represented by Mr.
G. Spong, a lawyer practising in the Hague, the Netherlands.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
On 19 September 1990, the applicant was arrested. He was
subsequently detained on remand. He was released on 17 October 1990.
On 30 January 1991, the applicant was summoned to appear before
the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of 's-Hertogenbosch. The
Regional Court heard the case on 10 May 1991. Both the applicant and
his lawyer were present.
On 24 May 1991, the Regional Court convicted the applicant of
fraud and incitement to commit perjury and sentenced him to two years'
imprisonment, less the time spent in detention on remand.
The applicant filed an appeal against the judgment with the Court
of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of 's-Hertogenbosch.
On 12 January 1993, the Court of Appeal examined the case. The
applicant did not appear. His lawyer, however, was present. The
applicant's lawyer stated that he had not been in contact with his
client before the Court of Appeal's session. The Court of Appeal
declared the applicant in default of appearance and continued its
examination of the case. It heard one witness. The applicant's lawyer
was not given the opportunity to conduct the applicant's defence.
On 26 January 1993, the Court of Appeal quashed the Regional
Court's judgment for technical reasons, convicted the applicant of
fraud and incitement to commit perjury and sentenced him to two years'
imprisonment, less the time spent in detention on remand.
The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court
(Hoge Raad). He complained, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had
not allowed his lawyer to conduct his defence in his absence. He
invoked Article 6 of the Convention. He argued that it is not required
that a lawyer must explicitly request permission to conduct the defence
of an absent client. Moreover, he added, when a lawyer appears at a
court session, it is obvious that he intends to conduct the defence of
his client.
On 15 March 1994, the Advocate General (Advocaat-Generaal) to the
Supreme Court submitted his written conclusions. He advised the Supreme
Court to reject the applicant's appeal in cassation because the minutes
of the hearing before the Court of Appeal did not indicate that the
applicant's lawyer had requested the Court of Appeal's permission to
conduct the defence of his client.
In its judgment of 17 May 1994, the Supreme Court rejected the
applicant's appeal in cassation.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
The Netherlands Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van
Strafvordering) does not ensure the right of a lawyer to conduct the
defence of an accused before a court, where the latter has been
declared in default of appearance.
There are, however, according to the Netherlands Supreme Court's
case-law, two situations in which a court must allow a lawyer to
conduct the defence in the absence of the accused:
- in cases concerning nationals of EU member states in which civil
liability issues arise (Hoge Raad, judgment of 17 November 1981, N.J.
1982 nr. 269), and
- in cases where there are compelling reasons (klemmende redenen)
preventing the appearance of an accused at the hearing of his case
(Hoge Raad, judgment of 26 February 1988, N.J. 1988 nr. 794) and where
a lawyer has made an explicit request to that effect to the court (Hoge
Raad, judgment of 14 November 1986, N.J. 1987 nr. 862 and judgment of
18 September 1989, N.J. 1990 nr. 145).
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) of the
Convention that at the hearing before the Court of Appeal of
's-Hertogenbosch, his lawyer was not allowed to conduct his defence in
his absence and that he was therefore deprived of a fair trial in the
determination of the criminal charges against him.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 14 November 1994 and registered
on 18 November 1994.
On 18 May 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government and to invite them to submit
written observations on its admissibility and merits.
The Government's observations were submitted on 10 August 1995.
The applicant replied on 29 August 1995.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that in the determination of the criminal
charges against him he did not receive a fair hearing as the Court of
Appeal did not allow his lawyer to conduct the defence in his absence.
The applicant invokes Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c)
(Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant,
provide:
"1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by a ...
tribunal ... .
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
...
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing ... ."
The Government submit that the facts in the case at issue are
similar to those in the cases of Lala and Pelladoah in which the Court
found a violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of
the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Lala and Pelladoah judgments of
22 September 1994, Series A nos. 297-A and 297-B respectively).
Following these judgments, counsel for an accused who has not appeared
in court is now always given the opportunity to speak in his client's
defence. The Government are also considering amending the law on this
point.
In view of the above, the Government defer to the opinion of the
Commission.
The applicant contends that a change in practice and a possible
change of the law following the Lala and Pelladoah judgments do not
detract from the fact that he did not receive a fair trial.
The Commission notes that this application raises the same issues
as the cases of Lala and Pelladoah (above-mentioned judgments of 22
September 1994).
Having regard to the parties' submissions and the case-law of the
Convention organs, the Commission considers that the complaint under
Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the Convention raises
questions of fact and law which require an examination of the merits.
This part of the application cannot, therefore, be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other grounds for
inadmissibility have been established.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the
merits of the case.
Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber
(M.-T. SCHOEPFER) (H. DANELIUS)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy