ROKHLINA v. RUSSIA

FIRST SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 54071/00
by Tamara ROKHLINA
against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 9 September 2004 as a Chamber composed of:

MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrsS. Botoucharova,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky, judges,
andMrS. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 21 December 1999,

Having regard to the decision to grant priority to the above application under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Ms Tamara Pavlovna Rokhlina, is a Russian national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Moscow. She is represented before the Court by Mr A. Kucherena, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The respondent Government are represented by Mr P. Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. The applicant’s arrest, pre-trial detention and release

(a) Arrest of the applicant

On 3 July 1998 the applicant was arrested on the suspicion of murdering her husband, Lieutenant-General Lev Rokhlin, and an investigator of the Moscow Region prosecutor’s office authorised her detention on remand. The applicant was placed in detention facility IZ-49/9 in the Moscow Region.

On the same day Mr Ye., an assistant to the Prosecutor General, who visited the scene of the crime informed journalists that this had been a “domestic crime”. Also, a deputy spokesman of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation Mr N. asserted on television that the applicant had been implicated in the murder. The exact wording of his statements has not been made available to the Court.

(b) Questioning of the applicant

On 4 July 1998 the applicant was questioned as a suspect and she confessed to having shot her husband. The applicant submits that she was interrogated in the absence of a legal aid counsel, although she had never given her explicit consent to be questioned without a lawyer. The printed transcript of the questioning contains a hand-written note “I do not need [the services of a lawyer]” followed by the applicant’s signature. The questioning was recorded on a video tape.

On 6 July 1998 the applicant retained Messrs M. Burmistrov and B. Vankovich as her lawyers. On 6, 7 and 8 July Mr Burmistrov submitted requests to study the case-file and to be given a renewable permit to visit the applicant.

On 8 July 1998 the applicant was charged with murder under Article 105 § 1 of the Criminal Code and questioned as an accused in the presence of Mr Vankovich. The applicant chose to remain silent on the merits of the charge against her and requested that the investigator be replaced because he had allegedly intimidated her and showed lack of respect for her and her family. On an unspecified date the applicant’s request was rejected.

On 11 July 1998 the applicant was questioned again in the presence of Mr Burmistrov; she denied having committed the murder and claimed that the crime had been perpetrated by a group of unidentified men. The questioning was recorded on a video tape.

On 11 July and 18 September 1998 and on other unspecified dates the applicant’s lawyers filed several requests to have witnesses questioned and to put supplementary questions to experts. They also complained that on 28 September 1998 and 14 January 1999 the investigators “attempted” to question the applicant in the absence of her lawyers. On 3 February 1999 a deputy Prosecutor General sent his response to the applicant’s lawyers. He wrote that certain actions of the investigators had been “miscalculated” from the tactical and logistical points of view, however, this fact had not had any bearing on the lawfulness of the investigation. The deputy Prosecutor General also noted that there had been delays in the making available of decisions on ordering expert examinations. He advised the lawyers that it was still open to them to put questions to experts. Finally, he explained that on 28 September 1998 the applicant had been escorted to the investigator’s office “erroneously” and no questioning had taken place.

On 16 July 1998 the State Duma of the Russian Federation (the lower chamber of the legislature) established a special commission to monitor the progress of the investigation into Lieutenant-General Rokhlin’s death (“the Duma commission”).

(c) Extension of the applicant’s detention on remand

On 21 August 1998 the applicant’s detention on remand was extended until 3 December 1998. The applicant did not appeal against the extension order.

On 14 October 1998 the investigator ordered an in-patient psychiatric examination of the applicant.

(d) First appeal against an extension of the detention on remand

On 1 December 1998 the applicant’s detention was extended until 3 April 1999, i.e. for a total of nine months starting from the day of her arrest. On 9 December 1998 the applicant’s lawyers appealed to a court against the extension order. They complained, in particular, about unreasonable delays in the investigation of the charge against their client and pointed to her frail health. The applicant submitted a supplementary complaint against the extension order; she indicated that her prolonged separation from her mentally disturbed son was detrimental for his health.

On 21 December 1998 the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow rejected the appeals against the extension order. The District Court held that the detention on remand had been imposed and extended “without any substantial violations of the law of criminal procedure” and that the detention was justified “because [the applicant] was charged with an especially serious criminal offence”. The court found no grounds to release the applicant on bail. On 21 December 1998 and 10 and 13 January 1999 the applicant’s lawyers appealed against the decision of the District Court. They submitted that the court had not taken into account the applicant’s deteriorating health, long periods of inactivity of the team of eight investigators, discrepancies in the applicant’s confessions. They also alleged that the court had failed in its duty to give relevant and sufficient reasons for the continued detention. On 13 January 1999 the Moscow City Court heard the appeal and ruled that the suspicion against the applicant that she had committed an especially serious criminal offence was, pursuant to Article 96 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, a sufficient ground for her detention on remand.

On 13 January 1999 the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted a special address to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The MPs noted that the investigation was lingering, while the applicant remained in custody. On 15 December 1998 the Duma commission members had met the applicant in prison and found her health unsatisfactory. In view of the applicant’s poor health and adverse effects of her long separation from her mentally disturbed son and given that she was not a public danger, the Duma requested the Prosecutor General to consider the applicant’s release from custody on humanitarian grounds.

(e) New charge against the applicant

On 18 March 1999 the applicant was charged with aggravated murder under Article 105 § 2 (v) of the Criminal Code. She was alleged to have known that her husband had not been able to defend himself because he had been sleeping. The charge was served on the applicant in the presence of her lawyers, Messrs Vankovich and Khayretdinov; the applicant refused to countersign the charge.

(f) Second appeal against an extension of the detention on remand

On 18 March 1999 the applicant’s detention on remand was extended until 3 July 1999, i.e. for a total of twelve months. The applicant’s lawyers appealed against the extension. They requested that the applicant be released, citing her poor health and excessive delays in the investigation.

On 6 April 1999 the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow found that the applicant’s detention had been extended lawfully and no substantial violations of the laws of criminal procedure had occurred. The court held that, pursuant to Article 96 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, the suspicion of an especially serious criminal offence was a sufficient ground for holding in custody and that there were no grounds to release the applicant. The court also stated that the applicant’s state of health permitted her stay in custody.

On 11 May 1999 by the Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant’s lawyers’ appeal against the District Court decision. The court confirmed that the District Court had correctly interpreted the existence of a suspicion of an especially serious criminal offence as a sufficient ground for the applicant’s continuing detention on remand. The court examined the medical certificates submitted by the applicant’s defence and held that in the absence of any life-threatening medical condition and given that the applicant’s adult daughter was taking care of her brother, the applicant should remain in custody.

(g) Subsequent extensions of the detention and a third appeal against an extension of the detention on remand

On 23 June 1999 an extension of the detention on remand was authorised until 3 November 1999. The applicant did not appeal against the extension order.

On 8 October 1999 the acting Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation authorised the applicant’s detention until 3 January 2000, i.e. for a total of eighteen months. On 15 and 19 October 1999 the applicant and her lawyer appealed against the extension order. They complained about unjustified delays in the investigation and submitted that the applicant’s health and that of her son were steadily deteriorating. On 25 October 1999 the Lefortovskiy District Court fixed a hearing on the appeal for 27 October and ordered the applicant to be escorted to the court. On 27 October 1999 the applicant was not brought to court because she was ill. The prosecutor and Mr Burmistrov (the applicant’s counsel) objected to a hearing in the applicant’s absence. The court adjourned the hearing until 1 November 1999.

On 1 November 1999 the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the appeal against the extension order. The court held that “the imposition of a preventive measure in the form of placement in custody and [subsequent] extension of the detention in respect of the applicant were lawful and justified”. As to the defence’s arguments about the applicant’s medical condition and adverse effects of her separation from her son, the court found that these arguments were not “the grounds that would render the preventive measure applied to [the applicant] unlawful or unjustified”. The court also added that it was not competent to impose a different “preventive measure” on the applicant, such decision being in the exclusive competence of investigators and prosecutors.

On 1, 7 and 25 November 1999 the applicant’s lawyers appealed against the decision of 1 November. They submitted that the court did not take into account significant changes in the applicant’s situation after fifteen months of detention, including the worsening health of her son, and that it did not give any relevant reasons corroborating the need for the continuing detention.

On 25 November 1999 by the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 1 November 1999. The court confirmed the conclusions of the first instance court to the effect that “the placement in custody as a preventive measure could be imposed on the sole ground of gravity of the [committed] offence”. On the basis of a medical certificate issued by the detention facility on 4 November 1999 the court determined that the applicant could remain in custody.

(h) Release from custody

On 23 December 1999 the acting Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation applied to the Moscow City Court for an authorisation to extend the applicant’s detention until 3 July 2000.

On 29 December 1999 the Moscow City Court refused the Prosecutor General’s application. The court established that on 28 December 1999 the applicant and her lawyers had finished studying the case-file and, accordingly, there were no lawful grounds to extend the applicant’s detention beyond the maximum eighteen-months’ period.

On 30 December 1999 the prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release from custody on the condition that she sign an undertaking not to leave the city.

2. The trial

(a) First examination of the charge against the applicant

On 16 November 2000 the Naro-Fominsk Town Court of the Moscow Region convicted the applicant of premeditated murder and sentenced her to eight years’ imprisonment in a correctional colony. The court ruled out the record of the questioning of 4 July 1998 as inadmissible evidence on the grounds that the applicant had been questioned in the absence of a lawyer, her rights had not been explained to her, she had not been notified of video-recording and, finally, because there were substantial discrepancies between the videotaped statements and the printed transcript.

On 21 December 2000 the Moscow Regional Court established mitigating circumstances in the applicant’s case and reduced the sentence to four years’ imprisonment.

On 28 March 2001 the applicant’s request for supervisory review was refused by the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court.

(b) Quashing of the applicant’s conviction

On 7 June 2001 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, by way of supervisory review proceedings, quashed the conviction of 16 November 2000 and the decision of 21 December 2000 and remitted the case to the Naro-Fominsk Town Court of the Moscow Region for a new examination.

(c) Second examination of the charge against the applicant

Since 11 October 2001 the criminal case against the applicant has been pending before the Naro-Fominsk Town Court of the Moscow Region.

On 25 March 2002 the proceeding were stayed because of the applicant’s illness. They were resumed on an unspecified date.

On 22 April 2003 the applicant was taken to a hospital after she had a heart attack in the courtroom.

On 20 August 2003 the proceeding were stayed again because of the applicant’s illness. They were resumed on an unspecified date.

On 15 September 2003 the applicant attempted suicide.

On 15 April 2004 the proceedings were adjourned until 16 May 2004 at the applicant’s daughter’s request.

According to the respondent Government, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending.

B. Relevant domestic law

For a summary of relevant provisions of the Russian law on pre-trial detention and time-limits for trial see Panchenko v. Russia (dec.), no. 45100/98, 16 March 2004.

C. Reservation of the Russian Federation

The instrument of ratification of the Convention deposited by the Russian Federation on 5 May 1998 contains the following reservation:

“In accordance with Article 64 of the Convention, the Russian Federation declares that the provisions of Article 5 paragraphs 3 and 4 shall not prevent ... the temporary application, sanctioned by the second paragraph of point 6 of Section Two of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation, of the procedure for the arrest, holding in custody and detention of persons suspected of having committed a criminal offence, established by Article 11 paragraph 1, Article 89 paragraph 1, Articles 90, 92, 96, 96-1, 96-2, 97, 101 and 122 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure of 27 October 1960, with subsequent amendments and additions...”

Article 11, paragraph 1 - Personal inviolability

“No one may be arrested otherwise than on the basis of a judicial decision or a prosecutor’s order...”

Article 89, paragraph 1 - Application of preventive measures

“When there are sufficient grounds for believing that an accused person would evade an inquiry, preliminary investigation or trial or will obstruct the establishment of the truth in a criminal case or will engage in criminal activity, as well as in order to ensure execution of a sentence, the person conducting the inquiry, the investigator, the prosecutor and the court may apply one of the following preventive measures in respect of the accused: a written undertaking not to leave a specified place; a personal guarantee or a guarantee by a public organisation; placing in custody.”

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention that she was placed in custody, despite the fact that she suffered from many diseases requiring consistent medical treatment; that she had to eat “coarse food” in the detention facility; that the investigator humiliated, intimidated and attempted to debase her; and that separation from her son was painful to her.

2. The applicant complains under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that the lawfulness of her detention was not examined speedily. She indicates that (i) the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow examined the appeal submitted on 9 December 1998 only on 21 December 1998; and (ii) the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow did not examine the appeals lodged on 15 and 19 October 1999 until 1 November 1999.

3. The applicant complains under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that her detention on remand was authorised by a prosecutor rather than a judge.

4. The applicant complains, without invoking any Convention provisions, about the excessive length of pre-trial detention.

5. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 about the unreasonable length of criminal proceedings in her case and excessive delays in the investigation of the charge against her.

6. The applicant complains, without invoking any Convention provisions, that during the first examination of the charge against her the domestic courts wrongly evaluated statements by witnesses and material evidence.

7. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that the statements by the prosecutor and the FSB spokesman were prejudicial to her presumption of innocence.

8. The applicant complains, without invoking any Convention provisions, about a violation of her right to defend herself through legal assistance of her choosing. She complains that on 4 July 1998 she was questioned in the absence of a lawyer; that her lawyers appointed at 10 a.m. on 6 July 1998 had to wait for 30 hours before they could see her; that the investigators attempted to question her in the absence of her lawyers on 28 September 1998 and 14 January 1999.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention about rudeness of the investigator and poor quality of food and inadequate medical assistance in the detention facility. Article 3 reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

The Government indicate that the applicant was detained in facility no. IZ-49/9 of Moscow (presently no. IZ-50/9, “facility no. 9”) from 3 July to 26 October 1998 and from 1 December 1998 to 29 April 1999. Between 26 October and 2 December 1998 the applicant was in the Serbskiy State Academic Centre for Social and Forensic Psychiatry for an in-patient psychiatric expert examination. Between 29 April and 30 December 1999 the applicant was detained in the Lefortovo investigatory ward of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.

As regards facility no. 9, the Government submit that the applicant had an individual sleeping berth and her cell met the general sanitary requirements. The applicant could walk outside for one hour a day. She could purchase food from the facility shop and receive parcels from relatives. In November 1998 the Russian Ombudsman visited facility no. 9 in order to examine the applicant’s conditions of detention. The applicant made no complaints either to him or to mass-media at the press-conference that was held after the visit with the applicant’s participation. On the contrary, she thanked the facility administration for the high level of medical assistance. The applicant did not lodge any complaints concerning the conditions of her detention throughout the entire period of the detention.

As regards the Lefortovo facility, the Government submit that the cells where the applicant was detained had no less than 4 sq. m per inmate. The cells were equipped with a toilet, a sink and ventilation, as well as with a fridge, TV set, radio, shelf, mirror and a dustbin. The applicant had an individual sleeping berth and bedding. She received food three times a day and walked outside for one hour a day. When necessary, she was provided with medical assistance. The applicant never complained about her conditions of detention in the Lefortovo facility.

The Government consider that the conditions of the applicant’s pre-trial detention were not in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

The applicant broadly refers to conclusions of international human rights organisations, such as the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which considered that the conditions of detention in many Russian detention facilities amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. She further alleges that, since the Lefortovo facility is run by the Federal Security Service and not by the Ministry of Justice as all other detention centres, the conditions of detention of persons accused of offences against the State power were harsher than elsewhere. Finally, as regards the exhaustion requirement, she submits that as a widow of a war general, she spent over thirty years in remote military garrisons and therefore she is not used to complaining. She considers that Article 3 was breached as the conditions of her detention were “extremely harsh” and “sufficiently different from those in [other] European prisons”.

The Court is not called upon to decide whether the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies in respect of her complaint under Article 3 because it is in any event inadmissible for the following reason.

The Court recalls that the absolute prohibition of degrading or inhuman treatment enshrined in that Convention provision applies when a “minimum level of severity is attained” (see Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394/96, § 24, ECHR 2001‑VII). Measures depriving a person of his or her liberty may often involve inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. Yet it cannot be said that detention on remand in itself raises an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as the specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II).

In the instant case the applicant’s complaints are extremely vague and generic. The applicant does not contest the Government’s detailed submissions concerning the conditions of detention. The Court cannot accept the reports by international human rights organisations on which she seeks to rely as conclusive evidence because these reports contain no information on the conditions in the specific detention facilities and cells where the applicant was held. The allegation of harsher conditions for detainees held in the facility run by the Federal Security Service appears to be conjecture not substantiated with any specific information about that facility.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

2. The applicant complained that her detention on remand was unreasonably long. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 5 of the Convention which reads, in the relevant parts, as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

...

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

The Government submit that Article 96 § 2 of the then Code of Criminal Procedure permitted placement in custody on the sole ground of dangerousness of the committed offence. As the investigative authorities had a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed manslaughter, her placement in custody was lawful. In any event, she did not appeal against the arrest warrant to a court. As regards the subsequent detention on remand, its overall length was one year, five months and 27 days and it did not exceed therefore the maximum permissible period of eighteen months authorised by Article 97 § 2 of the then Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of grave and especially grave offences. Moreover, the lawfulness of the extensions was confirmed on several occasions by the domestic courts.

The applicant disagrees. She indicates that deprivation of liberty is the most severe measure of restraint that should not have been applied to her in view of her age and permanent residence in Moscow where she had lived with her mentally disturbed son requiring constant care and supervision. Due to her late husband’s position and fame, the applicant enjoyed a high social status and the need to prevent her from committing new offences could not be considered reasonably necessary. In the subsequent periods, the domestic courts failed to indicate any evidence showing that the applicant had an intention to abscond, to exert pressure on witnesses or to continue criminal activities. As the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation held on 13 June 1996 and 25 December 1998, dangerousness of the charge was not sufficient in itself to justify continued detention on remand. Finally, the period of eighteen months for the investigation of one episode of manslaughter involving one accused (the applicant) cannot be considered reasonable by any means.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

3. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that she had not been brought before a judge for an authorisation of her arrest and remand in custody.

The Court notes Russia’s reservation in respect of the provisions of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. It observes that the reservation refers, inter alia, to Articles 11 § 1 and 89 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in force at the material time), under which a person may be detained on a decision of a public prosecutor without there being any requirement for judicial supervision of the detention. The Court has examined the validity of the reservation at issue and found it to be compatible with the requirements of Article 57 of the Convention (see Labzov v. Russia (dec.), no. 62208/00, 28 February 2002).

Having regard to the terms of the reservation, Russia was therefore under no Convention obligation to guarantee the applicant the right to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power for the purpose of reviewing the legality of the custodial measure.

It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention pursuant to Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.

4. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 that her appeals against the extensions of her pre-trial detention of 9 December 1998 and
15 and 19 October 1999 had not been considered speedily by the district courts. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under
Article 5 § 4 that reads as follows:

“4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

(a) The Court notes that it can deal with the above complaint only insofar as it concerns the proceedings which ended with the final decision of the Moscow City Court of 25 November 1999. As regards all earlier proceedings, the application was lodged more than six months after the final decisions in those proceedings had been made (cf. Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, Commission decision of 20 October 1997).

It follows that this part of the application is introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

(b) As regards the appeals of 15 and 19 October 1999, the Government indicate that the hearing on these appeals, initially fixed for 27 October 1999, had to be adjourned because of the applicant’s illness. On 1 November 1999 the district court heard and dismissed the appeal. On
1, 4, 9 and 12 November 1999 the applicant and her lawyers challenged the decision of the district court to the city court. The hearing before the city court was scheduled for 17 November 1999 and subsequently adjourned to 25 November 1999 because the applicant requested to be present in person. On 25 November 1999 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 1 November 1999. The Government consider that the requirements of Article 5 § 4 have been complied with.

The applicant submits that Article 220-2 § 2 of the then effective Code of Criminal Procedure required examination of a complaint concerning the lawfulness of an extension of the pre-trial detention within three days upon receipt of all materials. This requirement has not been complied with in her case.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

5. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the criminal charge against her had not been determined within a “reasonable time”. Article 6 § 1, in the relevant part, provides as follows:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government submit that this complaint is premature because the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the trial court. They make no comments on the merits of the complaint.

The applicant disagrees.

The Court recalls the Convention organs’ constant case-law to the effect that complaints concerning length of procedure can be brought before it before the final termination of the proceedings in question (see,
e.g., Todorov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 39832/98, 6 November 2003, with further references). It follows that the Government’s objection must be dismissed.

The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established by its case-law on the question of “reasonable time”, and having regard to all the material in its possession, that an examination of the merits of the complaint is required.

6. Finally, the applicant made a number of complaints about the assessment of evidence by the domestic courts and about alleged prejudice to her presumption of innocence and to her right to defend herself.

The Court notes that the applicant’s conviction was quashed and the merits of the criminal charge against her are yet to be examined by the domestic courts. It is open to the applicant to raise these issues in the course of the pending proceedings.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaints that her detention on remand was excessively long, that the examination of the lawfulness of her pre-trial detention was not conducted “speedily” and that the length of the criminal proceedings against her is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement;

Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.

Søren NielsenChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident

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