Published on 26 May 2025
FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 25356/23
Ana ROMANCHENKO
against Georgia
lodged on 13 June 2023
communicated on 6 May 2025
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns the freezing of the applicant’s immovable property in the context of ongoing fraud proceedings, with the freezing order having been in effect since 6 February 2021. On 22 January 2023, following a number of legislative amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Tbilisi City Court, acting at the request of the prosecutor’s office, issued a new freezing order in respect of the applicant’s property for the period of twelve months. The applicant appealed claiming that the freezing order was entirely unsubstantiated; that she had been a bona fide possessor of the impugned property long before the alleged criminal act took place; that the investigative authorities had two years to establish the relevant circumstances, but instead, the criminal proceedings were stalled and no one was ever charged; and that in view of its overall length, the freezing order had a disproportionate effect on her property rights. On 7 February 2023 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal confirmed the freezing order.
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, alleging that the interference with her possessions was unlawful and lacked justification.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, on account of the freezing of her immovable property?
2. If so, was that interference lawful? In particular, was the applicable legislation sufficiently precise regarding the legal grounds and conditions for freezing, and was the freezing order compliant with the latter? The parties are invited to respond to this question with reference to the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 25 February 2022 in the case of Otar Marshava and Mikheil Nozadze v. The Parliament of Georgia, no. 2/1/1434, 1466.
3. Was the interference necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest? Did that interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant (see, for general principles, Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, nos. 21392/08 and 2 others, §§ 142-52; see also Filkin v. Portugal, no. 69729/12, 3 March 2020)?