Communicated on 8 September 2014
FIRST SECTION
Application no. 32141/10
Olgica ROMEVA
against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
lodged on 2 June 2010
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Ms Olgica Romeva, is a Macedonian national, who was born in 1947 and lives in Skopje.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 23 May 2000 the State Pension and Disability Fund (“the Fund) found that the applicant had fulfilled the statutory requirements and recognised her right to pension as of 5 May 2000 in the amount of around 100 euros (EUR) per month.
On 18 October 2007 the Fund, relying on Sections 249 and 258 of the General Administrative Proceedings Act, ex officio reopened the proceedings, annulled its decision of 23 May 2000 and decided the case anew. Taking into consideration the applicant’s file and the original documentation of her former employer, the Fund established that the applicant had not fulfilled the pension requirements since she had not been employed between 1963 and 1967, as initially calculated with the decision of 23 May 2000.
On 17 April 2008 the Government Appeal Commission (“the second-instance commission”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the Fund’s decision of 18 October 2007.
On 12 June 2008 the Fund initiated civil proceedings against the applicant for unjust enrichment (стекнување без основ) claiming around EUR 10,500 plus interest for the pension instalments paid to her in the period between 5 May 2000 and 30 September 2007. No information is available about the outcome of these proceedings.
On 6 November 2008 the Administrative Court accepted the applicant’s administrative action, annulled the second-instance commission’s decision of 17 April 2008 and remitted the case for fresh consideration. The Administrative Court found inter alia that the provisions on reopening contained in the General Administrative Proceedings Act had incorrectly been applied and that the provisions on reopening in the Pension and Disability Insurance Act should have been applied instead.
On 15 March 2009 the second-instance commission again confirmed the Fund’s decision. It found that despite the findings contained in the judgment of the Administrative Court, the Fund lawfully reopened the proceedings on the basis of the General Administrative Proceedings Act. It added that the pension request was granted on the basis of “false documents” and that by filing a pension request the applicant consented to their use.
On 15 November 2009 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s administrative action and confirmed the second-instance commission’s decision. The Administrative Court found that the attestation of the applicant’s employment (образец М-7) for the period between 1963 and 1967 had been false since it had been illegible and incomplete, that the reopening on the basis of the General Administrative Proceedings Act had been lawful and that the pension request had been correctly dismissed.
On 30 November 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court reiterating her earlier submissions that the principles of legal certainty and rule of law had been violated. She argued that she could not have used any false documents since the collection of pension data and maintenance of pension records had been statutory obligation of the Fund under the Pension Insurance Records Act (Закон за матична евиденција за осигурениците и корисниците на правата од пензиското и инвалидското осигурување). Relying on the provisions of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act she also submitted that the annulment of the initial decision had been unlawful and that any amendment to it could not have been made to her detriment.
On 26 April 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention about legal certainty. She also complains about the pecuniary damage sustained with the annulment of her pension right.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, was the principle of legal certainty embodied in Article 6 of the Convention respected when the final decision of 2000 was annulled upon the reopening of the proceedings in 2007 (see Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 52, ECHR 2003‑IX)?
2. Was the interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions lawful and justified within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Moskal v. Poland, no. 10373/05, §§ 73-76, 15 September 2009, Khrykin v. Russia, no. 33186/08, § 56, 19 April 2011)?
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