FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 31450/03
by Steffen ROMMEL
against Germany
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 13 May 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Rait Maruste,
Karel Jungwiert,
Mark Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges,
Otto Mallmann, ad hoc judge,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 14 February 2004,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together.
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Steffen Rommel, is a German national who was born in 1973 and lives in Grafenhainichen. The German Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Mrs A. Wittling‑Vogel, Ministerialdirigentin, of the Federal Ministry of Justice.
The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant brought proceedings in 1994 against a hospital before the Zwickau Regional Court for alleged medical malpractice which had caused complete and irreversible paraplegia (Querschnittslähmung) at the age of thirteen, claiming damages of around 1.2 million German marks (DEM). On 10 October 1995, the parties entered into a revocable friendly settlement (widerruflicher Vergleich) before the Zwickau Regional Court, according to which the hospital agreed to pay 265.000 euros (EUR) to the applicant. The applicant, who was represented by his lawyer, was not present during the conclusion of the settlement and did not revoke the settlement within the provided period of one month, i.e. until 10 November 1995. Neither did the applicant’s lawyer, although the applicant claimed that he instructed him to revoke the settlement.
In 1998, the applicant brought proceedings against his former lawyer for damages. The major legal issue during the proceedings was whether the applicant had instructed the defendant to revoke the settlement. It was undisputed between the parties that the applicant had handed over a written statement to the defendant on 7 November 1995 in which he asked him to revoke the settlement. The defendant had read the statement and subsequently returned it to the applicant. In the following conversation, the defendant had asked the applicant and his mother to reconsider their decision and inform him by 8 November 1995 whether or not he should revoke the settlement. The applicant’s mother then called on 9 November 1995 the defendant’s legal office and talked to his secretary. The content of the conversation was disputed between the parties.
On 14 May 1999, the Zwickau Regional Court, in a judgment on the basis of the cause of action (Grundurteil), allowed the applicant’s claim. It found that the applicant had instructed the defendant to revoke the settlement on 7 November 1995. Therefore, the time-limit set by the defendant to inform him whether or not to revoke the settlement had no legal basis. In any event, the applicant had called the defendant’s legal office on 9 November 1995 in order to explain that he did not agree with the settlement. This was also supported by a letter which the defendant had sent to the applicant on 13 November 1995.
On 6 April 2000, the Dresden Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the Zwickau Regional Court and dismissed the applicant’s claim. It found that the applicant had failed to prove that he instructed the defendant to revoke the settlement. The Dresden Court of Appeal reasoned that the applicant had given such an instruction on 7 November 1995, but that he had subsequently agreed to reconsider his decision. After having heard the applicant’s mother and the defendant’s secretary as witnesses regarding the telephone conversation on 9 November 1995, the Dresden Court of Appeal found that the applicant’s mother had not given an instruction to revoke the settlement when calling the defendant’s legal office on that day.
On 26 April 2000, the applicant filed his appeal on points of law with the Federal Court of Justice. After the applicant had asked for an extension of the time-limit on two occasions, he submitted his statement of grounds for appeal (Revisionsbegründung) on 14 August 2000. The Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law on 24 June 2003.
On 16 September 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaint.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 and under Article 8 of the Convention about the allegedly erroneous court decisions. Moreover, he complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings.
THE LAW
A. The length of the proceedings
The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government contested that argument. In their submissions, the length of the proceedings, in particular before the Federal Court of Justice, had not been excessive. Placing reliance on statistical evidence, the Government based their principal argument on the heavy workload of the chamber (Senat) to which the applicant’s appeal on points of law had been allocated. That increase stemmed from a reform of the Code of Civil Procedure in 2002 which had introduced a motion against the decision to refuse to grant leave to appeal on points of law (Rechtsbeschwerde). The Federal Court of Justice established an additional chamber in 2003 in order to relieve the chamber to which the applicant’s case had been allocated from an increasing number of cases that had been brought since that reform was implemented. Subsequently, the applicant’s appeal on points of law was decided within six months. Second, the length of the proceedings was due to the particular complexity of the case. That complexity stemmed from the fact that the applicant’s appeal on points of law did not only touch upon the conversations between him and the defendant lawyer after the conclusion of the settlement, but also upon the question of causality between the operation in the hospital and the damage the applicant had suffered. The case also concerned complex legal questions as to the extent to which a lawyer was obliged to give legal advice in civil proceedings regarding medical malpractice. Moreover, the applicant had applied twice for an extension of the time-limit for submitting his statement of grounds for appeal, eventually causing a delay of several months.
The applicant maintained that the overall duration of the proceedings was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In his view, the matter was of considerable importance for him in view of his disability and the material and moral damage he had suffered from the medical malpractice. Moreover, the case was not as complex as described by the Government. The present proceedings merely concerned the question whether the applicant had in principle been obliged to revoke the settlement. The amount of damages did not form part of the appeal proceedings. The increased workload of the Federal Court of Justice could not be used as an argument for the length of the proceedings as Contracting Parties were obliged to organise their judicial systems accordingly to avoid undue delays.
The Court notes that the period taken into consideration commenced on 20 October 1998, when the applicant instituted proceedings against his former lawyer before the Zwickau Regional Court. It ended with the decision by the Federal Constitutional Court of 16 September 2003. Therefore, the period in question lasted approximately four years and ten months, for four levels of jurisdiction. In this respect, the Court notes that the applicant’s appeal on points of law was pending before the Federal Court of Justice from 26 April 2000 to 24 June 2003, i.e. for a period of about three years and two months.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court notes that the present proceedings involved a claim for damages against the applicant’s former lawyer for damages caused by alleged malpractice in civil proceedings against a hospital. Those proceedings had been instituted by the applicant for medical malpractice, which had caused complete and irreversible paraplegia at a very young age. While the claim against his former lawyer was of considerable significance for him, the Court also notes that the applicant contributed to a certain extent to the length of proceedings before the Federal Court of Justice by demanding two additional extensions of the time-limit. It further notes that the Government based their principal argument on the heavy workload which at the relevant time was facing the Federal Court of Justice due to a reform of the Code of Civil Procedure in 2002. The Federal Court of Justice established an additional chamber in 2003 in order to relieve the chamber to which the applicant’s case had been allocated from an increasing number of cases that had been brought since that reform was implemented, and the applicant’s appeal on points of law was subsequently decided within six months.
Having assessed the material before it and taken note of the Federal Court of Justice’s efforts to expedite the conduct of business in 2003, the Court considers that the delay did not exceed a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, in particular when viewed together with the overall length of the proceedings which lasted four years and ten months, involving three levels of jurisdiction as well as a constitutional complaint.
The Court therefore notes that the complaint as regards the length of the proceedings is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
B. The remainder of the complaints
Invoking Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention the applicant complained in substance about the decisions rendered in the aforementioned proceedings. In the light of all the material in its possession, and insofar as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Claudia WesterdiekPeer Lorenzen
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy