FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 55388/00
by Vincenzo RISPOLI
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 14 March 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 17 February 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1940 and living in Salerno. He is represented before the Court by MM. M., D., and C. Mancuso, lawyers practising in Salerno.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Salerno, which he had let to R.C.
In a writ served on the tenant on 3 May 1990, the applicant informed the tenant of his intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 November 1990 and summoned her to appear before the Salerno Magistrate.
By a decision of 15 May 1990, which was made enforceable on 1 June 1990, the Salerno Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1991.
On 28 January 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 6 April 1992, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 21 April 1992.
On 21 April 1992 the bailiff made one attempt to recover possession that proved unsuccessful as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 27 January 1997, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself.
Pursuant to article 6 of Law no. 431/98, the Salerno Magistrate suspended the eviction proceedings until 19 November 1999.
On 20 October 1999, he served a second notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 19 November 1999.
On 19 November 1999, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that his inability to recover possession of his apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings and about the denial of his right of access to a court.
The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies on the grounds that he failed to challenge the refusal of police assistance before the administrative courts.
The Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 40-42, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government submit that the delay in granting police assistance is justified on grounds of the order of priorities established according to public-safety requirements. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy