Communicated on 25 August 2015
FIFTH SECTION
Application no. 17906/15
Krzysztof RUMINSKI
against Sweden
lodged on 10 April 2015
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Mr Krzysztof Ruminski, is a Swedish national, who was born in 1950 and lives in Jordbro. He is represented before the Court by Ms A. Massarsch, a lawyer practising in Stockholm.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant suffered for many years from, inter alia, pain in his back and legs and numbness in his right arm. He was granted a full sickness benefit in 2002, after the diagnosis of lumbago, sciatica and myositis.
In 2004 he applied for life annuity and alleged that his physical problems had been caused by his former employment as a driver (1973 to 1974), as a dairy worker (1974 to 1984) and as a food science technician (1984 to 1991). The Social Insurance Office (Försäkringskassan, hereinafter “the Office”) appointed an in-house specialist in orthopaedic surgery who, in a written statement, concluded that there was not a high degree of probability (hög grad av sannolikhet) that any harmful element in the applicant’s former employment had caused his problems.
On 17 May 2005, after having held an oral hearing, the Office rejected the application. Referring to, inter alia, the specialist statement by the insurance doctor, the Office held that the applicant had not been subject to any harmful influences which, with a high degree of probability, could have caused or worsened his problems.
The applicant appealed to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Stockholm. On 19 April 2007 the court, after having held an oral hearing, upheld the Office’s decision in full.
Upon further appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Stockholm, the applicant submitted, inter alia, a medical statement (epikris) issued in February 2008 by the Centre of Public Health, division of labour and environmental medicine (Centrum for folkhälsa, Arbets- och miljömedicin). According to the medical statement, there were reasons to believe that the applicant’s work had caused his problems. The applicant requested that an oral hearing be held by the Administrative Court of Appeal before it decided whether to grant leave to appeal as well as before it decided on the merits of the case. He also requested expert witnesses to be heard before the court.
In a written statement to the appellate court, the Office questioned the conclusions in the medical statement and, furthermore, referred to medical records from 1997, in which the applicant was held to be fully able-bodied and in which it was noted that no somatic evidence had been found in support of the applicant’s symptoms.
On 17 March 2008, the Administrative Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal. The applicant requested an oral hearing to be held in the case but, on 5 September 2008, the court rejected the request. It referred to the nature of the case and to the fact that an oral hearing had been held before the County Administrative Court. The applicant was given the opportunity to submit further observations. It is unclear whether he took advantage of this opportunity.
In a judgment on 27 October 2008, the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment in full, giving the following reasons:
“The medical and other evidence in the case does not support that the applicant has been exposed to any such harmful influences in his work which could, with a high degree of probability, have caused his problems. His problems can thus – as has been found also by the Office and the County Administrative Court – not be defined as a work-related injury.”
The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen). He complained about the lack of reasoning in the Administrative Court of Appeal’s judgment and argued that that court’s refusal to hold an oral hearing had infringed his right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. If the Supreme Administrative Court were to grant leave to appeal, he requested an oral hearing.
On 4 August 2009, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.
On 3 February 2010 the applicant lodged an application with the Court, complaining that his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention had been infringed because the Administrative Court of Appeal had refused to hold an oral hearing and its judgment had not been sufficiently reasoned.
This application was declared inadmissible by the Court on 21 May 2013 for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court found that the applicant had failed to lodge a claim with the Chancellor of Justice (Justitiekanslern) or the ordinary courts to seek compensation for the alleged breaches of the Convention (Ruminski v.Sweden (dec.), no. 10404/10, on 21 May 2013).
Consequently, on 20 December 2013, the applicant lodged a claim for compensation for the alleged breaches of the Convention with the Chancellor of Justice. He argued that the Administrative Court of Appeal´s lack of reasoning as well as its refusal to hold an oral hearing had infringed his right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. He requested 50,000 Swedish kronor (SEK) for non-pecuniary damage.
The Chancellor of Justice communicated the case to the Administrative Court of Appeal which submitted that its handling of the case had been in accordance with domestic law as well as the Convention. In response, the applicant maintained his claim and developed his grounds therefor.
On 15 January 2015 the Chancellor of Justice rejected the applicant´s claim. As concerns the lack of an oral hearing, the Chancellor of Justice noted that the County Administrative Court had held an oral hearing and consequently, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, a less strict standard applied to the requirement to hold a hearing before the appellate court. Thus, in view of the character of the case and the fact that the applicant had been given the opportunity to finalise his submission in writing and the court had had access to substantial written evidence, the Chancellor of Justice concluded that there had been no breach of the Convention in this respect.
As concerns the Administrative Court of Appeal´s alleged lack of reasoning, the Chancellor of Justice referred extensively to the Court’s case law on this matter and then made the following evaluation. The Administrative Court of Appeal had in its judgment accounted for the applicant´s arguments and the new evidence he had submitted before it. It had further accounted for the considerations and conclusions drawn from the evidence submitted by the parties, namely, that the investigation in the case did not support that the applicant had been exposed to any such harmful influences in his work which could, with a high degree of probability, have caused his problems. Thus, the Chancellor of Justice found that the Administrative Court of Appeal had taken a stance on the central and decisive question in the case, namely, whether the applicant had been exposed to harmful influences in his work. While the Chancellor noted that it could have been preferable, for pedagogical reasons, for the court to have given clearer grounds for why the applicant’s evidence had not been sufficient, she concluded that the reasoning was not so deficient that the applicant´s right to a fair trial under the Convention had been infringed.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that he was denied a fair trial because the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal was not reasoned and thus did not address the new evidence presented by him.
QUESTION TO THE PARTIES
Was the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal dated 27 October 2008 sufficiently reasoned so as to ensure the applicant fair proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention?
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