Rywin v. Poland

Information Note on the Court’s case-law 193

February 2016

Rywin v. Poland - 6091/06, 4047/07 and 4070/07

Judgment 18.2.2016 [Section I]

Article 6

Criminal proceedings

Article 6-1

Impartial tribunal

Independent tribunal

Alleged influence of parliamentary commission of inquiry and media coverage on a criminal trial: no violation

Article 6-2

Presumption of innocence

Alleged influence of parliamentary commission of inquiry and media coverage on a criminal trial: no violation

Facts – In December 2002 a leading national daily newspaper published an article on corruption in connection with the legislative procedure for the amendment of the Broadcasting Act. The article criticised the applicant, a well-known film producer, and a number of high-ranking State officials. Following the revelations in the press, the prosecutor’s office at the Court of Appeal instituted proceedings against the applicant for trading in influence. A few days later the lower house of Parliament adopted a resolution setting up a parliamentary commission of inquiry. The case was the subject of widespread media coverage. Among other actions, the applicant brought an action against a weekly newspaper complaining of a breach of his right to be presumed innocent. His action was dismissed. Most of the sittings of the commission of inquiry were held in public and broadcast live on radio and television. The minutes of the commission’s meetings were systematically posted on the Parliament’s website and were the subject of extensive comment in the media. The commission worked in close cooperation with the public prosecutor’s office in charge of the criminal investigation against the applicant. The chair of the commission requested the prosecutor’s office to carry out certain investigative steps, and several exchanges of information took place. In April 2004, a few days after the commission had adopted its final report, the applicant was found guilty of attempted fraud. In May 2004 the lower house of Parliament approved a shadow report written by one of the members of the commission. In December 2004 the Court of Appeal sentenced the applicant to a prison term for aiding and abetting trading in influence.

In the proceedings before the Court, the applicant alleged a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence and of his right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal, on account of the proceedings of the parliamentary commission of inquiry, which had been conducted in parallel with his trial and had related to the same facts and circumstances and made use of the same evidence as the criminal proceedings. The applicant complained both of the wording of the resolution adopted by the lower house of Parliament setting up the commission of inquiry and of the findings set out in the commission’s final report. He further alleged that the press coverage of both sets of proceedings had aggravated the unfair nature of the criminal proceedings against him.

Law – Article 6 §§ 1 and 2

(a) Observance of the principle of presumption of innocence – The remarks of which the applicant complained were made prior to his final conviction by the Court of Appeal. The authorities concerned had therefore been under a duty to observe the principle of presumption of innocence.

The relevant domestic legislation made clear that the work of a parliamentary commission of inquiry was of a political nature. The purpose of the commission’s report had been to act as a starting point for, or contribute to, a possible parliamentary debate concerning the irregularities identified on the part of the public authorities and institutions subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The conduct of individuals not acting in an official capacity could be examined by the commission only to the extent necessary to uncover shortcomings in the public institutions and authorities. The commission had been bound to refrain from making findings concerning the criminal responsibility of persons not acting in an official capacity. Any such “finding” in a parliamentary resolution or in the report of a parliamentary commission of inquiry would be in breach of the Polish Constitution. Furthermore, the relevant domestic legislation allowed the commission’s inquiries to be carried out at the same time as any criminal proceedings concerning the same facts and circumstances. In such a case, the commission was required to ensure that its findings and conclusions did not infringe the rights of the persons who were the subject of the criminal proceedings being conducted at the same time, with particular regard to their right to be presumed innocent.

The remarks in question had been made against a background of widespread media coverage, which was precisely what had led to the setting-up of the commission, tasked with investigating allegations of corruption and unlawful interference by high-ranking State figures in the legislative process. There had therefore been compelling reasons in the public interest for the proceedings before the commission to be conducted publicly and transparently and for public opinion to be informed about the findings of its report.

According to the applicant, the wording of the parliamentary resolution, and in particular the reference to his supposed “attempt to extort financial and political advantages”, made clear that the members of Parliament had preconceived ideas as to his guilt. The Court took the view, on the contrary, that the remarks in question, seen in the light of the resolution as a whole, were to be viewed as a means of indicating to the commission the factual circumstances it should be investigating. Accordingly, in so far as it referred to the applicant’s conduct as reported in certain press publications at the time, the resolution in question did not contain any remarks that could be deemed to constitute a finding of guilt.

As to the report of the parliamentary commission of inquiry, its findings, read in the light of the report as a whole and the context in which they had been made, were to be understood as a means for the commission to inform Parliament that, on the basis of the evidence gathered, the high‑ranking public officials identified therein were strongly suspected of committing the offence of corruption. Even though the report had described the applicant as the “agent” of the individuals in question, it had not accused him directly or passed any judgement on his conduct. The report’s conclusions had not included any findings as to whether criminal proceedings should have been brought against the applicant, or any comment on his possible criminal liability for aiding and abetting corruption. The commission’s report had not contained any reference to the criminal proceedings against the applicant or to the offences for which he had been prosecuted. Consequently, taking into account their real meaning and their context, neither the impugned wording of the parliamentary resolution setting up the parliamentary commission of inquiry nor the findings of the commission’s report had concerned the issue of the applicant’s guilt – an issue which clearly fell outside the remit of such a commission.

(b) Observance of the applicant’s right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal – In accordance with the principle of separation of powers, the commission was debarred from interfering in the exercise of judicial power. Therefore, where judicial proceedings were instituted in relation to the same facts as those being examined by the commission, the latter had to maintain the requisite distance between its own inquiries and those proceedings. In particular, it had to refrain from any comment on the merits of the decisions taken by the courts or the way in which they were conducting the investigation. In such cases, the commission was not legally bound to suspend its activities pending the outcome of the judicial proceedings, but nevertheless had the option of so doing. Furthermore, the underlying aims of the two sets of proceedings had been different. The commission had been set up to investigate alleged shortcomings on the part of the public authorities or persons acting in an official capacity in connection with the procedure to amend the Broadcasting Act. It had not addressed the issue of the applicant’s criminal liability and had made no finding that breached his right to be presumed innocent.

Under Polish law, a parliamentary commission had no powers to influence possible criminal proceedings being conducted in parallel with its own proceedings concerning the same facts and circumstances. Firstly, the statements made by the members of such a commission and the findings of its report did not entail any legal consequences for the courts examining the criminal aspects of the case. Secondly, a commission of inquiry could not intervene as a third party in the criminal proceedings, nor could it influence the outcome of those proceedings, the implementation of the rules of procedure or the composition of the bench trying the case. Cooperation between the commission and the judicial authorities was permitted, and even in certain circumstances required, by domestic law; however, it had to comply with the domestic legal framework, which was aimed precisely at ensuring independence and impartiality. The exchanges that had taken place between the parliamentary commission and the criminal justice authorities had led the commission to bring the information it had gathered to the attention of the public prosecutor’s office and the courts. Moreover, the defence itself had requested that the minutes of the commission proceedings be added to the criminal file. There was nothing to suggest that the use of the information in question as evidence in the criminal proceedings had taken place in breach of the relevant legal rules.

The present case undoubtedly concerned an important question of general interest in connection with which the press had been entitled, and even obliged, to report the information in its possession. The importance of the case in the eyes of public opinion was explained by its unprecedented nature and by the serious nature of the facts in which the applicant, himself a very well-known figure, was suspected of being involved. It had therefore been inevitable that the press would voice sharp criticism concerning such a sensitive case, which cast doubt on the morals of senior public figures and the relationship between politics and business. The opinions expressed in the publications in question had not emanated from the State authorities and had in no sense been inspired or led by the representatives of the domestic authorities, but had simply been the journalists’ own opinions. Moreover, the action brought by the applicant against a weekly newspaper had been dismissed by a judgment against which he had not appealed. Although it had been open to him to do so, the applicant had not complained to the domestic authorities either about the article appearing in another publication or about the remarks made by the members of the commission.

The courts hearing the case had been made up entirely of professional judges, whose experience and training usually enabled them to disregard any suggestions from external sources. Moreover, the applicant had not adduced any evidence showing that the press statements could have influenced the formation of the judges’ opinion or the outcome of the deliberations in the criminal proceedings against him.

The applicant had been convicted following adversarial proceedings in which it had been open to him to submit any arguments he deemed useful for his defence. The reasoning of the judgments did not reveal anything to suggest that, in their interpretation of domestic law or their assessment of the parties’ arguments and the evidence for the prosecution, the judges had been influenced by the statements of the members of the commission or the findings contained in its report.

In sum, the fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant had not been impaired, with particular reference to his right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal.

Conclusion: no violation (four votes to three).

The Court also held that there had been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention regarding the compatibility of the applicant’s state of health with detention.

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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