AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 23377/94
by X. and Y.
against Finland
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 12 April 1996, the following members being present:
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 10 November 1993
by X. and Y. against Finland and registered on 2 February 1994 under
file No. 23377/94;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are Finnish citizens residing in Helsinki and born
in 1943 and 1947 respectively. Before the Commission they are
represented by Mr. Martin Scheinin, Doctor of Laws, Helsinki.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be
summarised as follows.
In 1979 the applicants financed the purchase of a share in a
housing association with a publically-funded loan granted under the
1975 Act on Improving the Housing Conditions of the Gypsies (mustalais-
väestön asunto-olojen parantamisesta annettu laki). Under the terms the
loan, the share was subject to a restriction on resale according to
which the applicants were obliged to offer the share to the local
authority first. The restriction was to apply for 30 years.
By October 1988 the applicants had paid off the loan and
requested advance notice as to whether the local authority intended to
use its right of pre-emption in case they sold the share.
On 22 November 1988 the Housing Board (asuntolautakunta) of
Helsinki informed the applicants in the affirmative.
On 28 March 1990 the applicants reiterated their request. They
maintained that, because of threats resulting from a vendetta between
certain families, they had to move from Helsinki.
On 31 July 1990 the Housing Board informed the applicants of the
Board's intention to exercise its right of pre-emption in case they
sold the share.
The applicants then brought the matter before the City Council
(kaupunginhallitus) of Helsinki. On 28 January 1991, however, the City
Council dismissed the case on the grounds that the Housing Board had
not yet decided whether it was going to exercise its right of pre-
emption; its response to the applicants merely contained a preliminary
opinion which was not a final and appealable decision.
The applicants, represented by Mr. Scheinin, appealed against the
decision dismissing the case to the County Administrative Court
(lääninoikeus) of Uusimaa. On 9 June 1992 the County Administrative
Court of Uusimaa upheld the City Council's decision. It appears from
the County Administrative Court's decision that the relevant law had
been amended as from 1 April 1991 to the effect that the applicants'
share was no longer subject to a right of pre-emption due to the fact
that they had paid off their loan.
On 6 May 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-
oikeus) upheld the County Administrative Court's decision.
It appears that in the meantime, in 1990, certain other Acts
concerning state loans for financing the purchase of apartments were
also amended to the effect that the restriction on resale was lifted
if the loan was paid off.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain that the Housing Board's opinion of
31 July 1990 resulted in a violation of their property rights since
they were not able to sell their share freely. They further submit that
since the Housing Board's refusal of their request prevented them from
moving, their family had to live in fear, resulting in a violation of
the right to personal safety and the right to respect for their private
and family life. Finally, they maintain that they were not able to
choose their residence freely. They invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the Convention, Article 5 para. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention
and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.
2. The applicants complain, under Article 14 of the Convention, that
the gypsies were discriminated against in comparison with other groups
that also benefit from social housing loans since the Act concerning
loans for gypsies was amended later than certain other Acts.
3. Finally, as regards the court proceedings, the applicants
complain, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the length of the
proceedings was not reasonable. The applicants also invoke Article 13
of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain, firstly, about the alleged effects which
the Housing Board's opinion of 31 July 1990 concerning the right of
pre-emption had on the applicants' property rights, private and family
life, personal safety and ability to choose their residence. They
invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, Article
5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) and Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention and
Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2) to the Convention.
However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not
the facts alleged by the applicants disclose any appearance of a
violation of these provisions, as Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter
... within a period of six months from the date on which the final
decision was taken".
In the present case, the Commission recalls that the relevant Act
on Improving the Housing Conditions of the Gypsies was amended as from
1 April 1991. The applicant's advocate learned about the amendment at
the latest in June 1992 from the County Administrative Court's
decision. After 1 April 1991 the applicants, who had already paid off
their loan in October 1988, were free to sell their share without any
interference from the authorities. The application was submitted to the
Commission on 10 November 1993, that is, more than six months after the
date of the amendment of the relevant Act. Furthermore, an examination
of the case does not disclose the existence of any special
circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of
that period.
It follows that this part of the application has been introduced
out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3
(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
2. The applicants further complain, under Article 14 (Art. 14) of
the Convention, of discriminatory legislation in respect of, on the one
hand, the gypsies and, on the other hand, other groups that benefit
from social housing loans.
On this point the Commission refers to its finding above and
recalls that the relevant Act was amended as from 1 April 1991. The
application was submitted to the Commission on 10 November 1993, that
is, more than six months after the date of the amendment of the
relevant Act. Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose
the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted
or suspended the running of the period.
It follows that this part of the application has also been
introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3
(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
3. Finally, the applicants complain, under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention, about the length of the proceedings concerning the Housing
Board's opinion of 31 July 1990 on the right of pre-emption in respect
of the applicants' share. They also invoke Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, in so far
as relevant, as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... , everyone is entitled to a ... hearing
within a reasonable time ... "
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention reads as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
For Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) under its "civil" head to be
applicable, there must be a "dispute" over a "right" which can be said,
at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The
"dispute" must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the
actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its
exercise. The outcome of the proceedings must be directly decisive for
the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences
not being sufficient to bring Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) into play
(see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., Masson and Van Zon judgment of
28 September 1995, Series A no. 327, para. 44).
The Commission finds that the Housing Board's preliminary notice
of 31 July 1990 about its intentions as regards the right of pre-
emption was not decisive as this question would be decided only when
a sale was actually effected. Furthermore, the Commission recalls that
after 1 April 1991, in the light the amendment of the relevant law and
the fact that the applicants had paid off their loan, their share was
no longer subject to a right of pre-emption. Therefore, the Commission
finds that, at least after 1 April 1991, there was no genuine and
serious "dispute" over a right.
In view of the above, the Commission finds that, whether or not
the proceedings concerned a "right", the outcome of the proceedings was
not directly decisive for the right in question and, furthermore, after
1 April 1991 they did not involve a "dispute" for the purposes of
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). In these circumstances the Commission
finds that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is not applicable to
the proceedings.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be
rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
As regards the alleged violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention the Commission finds, in the circumstances of the case, that
the applicants cannot be said to have an arguable claim for the
purposes of Article 13 (Art. 13). Therefore the Commission finds that
there is no appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy