FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 1298/16
SIA RT PIEDZIŅAS GRUPA
against Latvia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 23 October 2025 as a Committee composed of:
Davor Derenčinović, President,
Artūrs Kučs,
Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 1298/16) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 24 December 2015 by a company incorporated in 2009 under Latvian law, SIA RT Piedziņas grupa (“the applicant company”) which was represented by Mr A. Rasa, a lawyer practising in Riga;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Latvian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms K. Līce;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the alleged non-enforcement of a decision ordering a bailiff to transfer funds to the applicant company.
2. In 2009 the applicant company brought a debt recovery claim against J.K. and two others. While the claim was pending, bailiff J.I. auctioned two properties owned by J.K. to cover her debts. As the properties had been mortgaged in favour of the applicant company, bailiff B.B., who had in the meantime taken over the enforcement proceedings, informed the applicant company that the auction proceeds had been reserved for it in a deposit account maintained by the bailiffs as a custodial account for third-party funds pending receipt of a writ of execution.
3. After bailiff A.K. took over responsibility for the enforcement cases and the deposit account from bailiff B.B., on 14 July 2011 she informed the Council of Sworn Bailiffs of Latvia that she had identified a significant deficit in the deposit account. The Council subsequently lodged a complaint with the prosecutor, resulting in the institution of criminal proceedings on 6 July 2012 in relation to the deficit.
4. On 21 May 2012 the Riga Regional Court granted the applicant company’s claim against J.K. and others in part. The judgment entered into force on 16 December 2014, with a writ of execution being issued on 14 January 2015. The applicant company submitted the writ to bailiff A.K., who initiated enforcement proceedings.
5. On 20 February 2015 bailiff A.K. informed the applicant company that, owing to a deficit in the deposit account, she could only pay a portion of the funds initially reserved. Following later inventories, the applicant company received further payments on 16 November 2017 and 14 March 2018; however, a substantial amount has remained unpaid.
6. On 2 March 2015 the applicant company lodged a complaint against bailiff A.K. under Section 632 of the Civil Procedure Law (“the CPL”) which provides for judicial supervision of bailiffs’ actions in enforcement proceedings. By decision of 24 March 2015, as upheld on appeal on 26 June 2015, the Vidzeme District Court found the complaint justified and ordered A.K. to pay to the applicant company the remaining amount of the funds initially reserved for it in the deposit account. When the applicant company applied for enforcement of the decision, it was informed that execution was not possible due to a lack of funds. The writ of execution had been recalled on the grounds that decisions issued under Section 632 of the CPL cannot be enforced through standard civil proceedings, as bailiffs cannot be treated as debtors in such cases.
7. The applicant company also sought to make use of the following remedies in an effort to recover the amounts awarded:
(a) On 9 March 2015 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Council of Sworn Bailiffs regarding the actions of bailiffs A.K. and B.B. The complaint was forwarded to the Ministry of Justice, which initiated disciplinary proceedings against A.K., resulting in a reprimand on 9 October 2015. No proceedings could be initiated against B.B. due to a two-year limitation period.
(b) On 29 March 2016 the applicant company filed a civil claim for damages against bailiff A.K. and two insurance companies. By judgment of 7 June 2019, as upheld on appeal on 6 April 2020, the Vidzeme District Court rejected the claim on the grounds that bailiff A.K. could not be held liable for damage caused by her predecessors.
(c) On 5 July 2018 a prosecutor asked whether the applicant company wanted to be recognised as a victim in the criminal proceedings against bailiff J.I. On 30 July 2018 the applicant company declined, stating there was no legal relationship between itself and J.I. On 19 September 2018 the prosecutor brought charges against J.I. for misappropriation and abuse of office.
(d) On 14 October 2020 the applicant company requested compensation from the Ministry of Justice which responded that it could not decide on this while the criminal proceedings were ongoing.
(e) On 10 May 2021 the applicant company lodged a civil claim against the Latvian State in the person of the Ministry of Justice. This claim was left without consideration on 20 May 2021 because the applicant company failed to pay the required fee and costs. After the applicant failed to remedy these deficiencies, the claim was considered as not having been lodged and was returned to it on 28 June 2021.
8. Invoking Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant company complained that bailiff A.K. had failed to execute the decision of 24 March 2015 requiring full payment of the amounts outstanding, that the State authorities had failed to ensure effective enforcement of court decisions against bailiffs, and that inadequate oversight of bailiffs’ deposit accounts and insufficient professional liability insurance had led to a shortfall in the deposit account.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
9. The Government submitted that the Article 6 complaint was inadmissible ratione materiae, as the final decision of 26 June 2015 was issued in a supervisory procedure that did not involve a “dispute” over civil rights and obligations but merely allowed judicial review of a bailiff’s conduct. It further submitted that the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. In relation to Article 6, the Government noted that criminal proceedings against bailiff J.I. were still pending and their outcome was crucial for addressing the alleged violation. As for Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant company failed to exhaust remedies in three ways: by refusing victim status in the criminal proceedings, thereby forfeiting the right to claim compensation; by not bringing a civil claim against J.I. under Section 39 § 2 of the Law on Bailiffs and Section 1779 of the Civil Law; and by failing to pursue civil proceedings against the State after its initial application was returned for non-payment of court fees.
10. The applicant company submitted that, insofar as the outcome of the proceedings leading to the final decision of 26 June 2015 affected its right to receive funds from the deposit account, it was decisive for the determination of its civil right and thus fell within the scope of Article 6. It further argued that the criminal proceedings, which had been ongoing for over ten years, did not constitute an effective remedy on account of an excessive length and that it had no legal claims against bailiff J.I. Moreover, the applicant company maintained that, having pursued at least one apparently effective domestic remedy, namely a claim under Section 632 of the CPL, it was not required to exhaust others pursuing essentially the same objective. Finally, the applicant company noted that the domestic judgments relied upon by the Government to support the claim that civil proceedings against the State offered prospects of success all dated from 2017 to 2019 and therefore postdated the relevant facts of the case.
11. The Court notes at the outset that the applicant company’s complaints, as stated in the application form, concerned solely the non-enforcement of the decision of 24 March 2015, as upheld on appeal on 26 June 2015, rather than the non-enforcement of the original judgment against J.K. It reiterates that the scope of a case “referred to” the Court under the right of individual application is defined by the applicant’s complaint, comprising the factual allegations and legal arguments submitted, and that the Court cannot base its decision on facts falling outside the scope of that complaint (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018). It follows that the scope of the present case is confined to the decision of 24 March 2015, as upheld on appeal on 26 June 2015.
12. On the question of whether Article 6 § 1 applies to the proceedings leading to the decision of 26 June 2015, the Court reiterates that, for the “civil” limb of Article 6 § 1 to be applicable, there must be a dispute over a “civil right” which is recognised, at least on arguable grounds, under domestic law, and the outcome of the proceedings must be directly decisive for that right (see Benthem v. the Netherlands, 23 October 1985, § 32, Series A no. 97).
13. The Court observes that the proceedings in question were conducted under Section 632 of the CPL, which provides a supervisory mechanism for reviewing bailiffs’ conduct rather than a process for resolving disputes between opposing parties. The procedure was not adversarial but served only to verify the lawfulness of the bailiff’s actions. There was thus no dispute between the applicant company and bailiff A.K. over competing claims or conflicting interests, but merely a request for judicial confirmation that the bailiff should comply with a pre-existing obligation.
14. The Court notes that the decision of 26 June 2015 did not determine or create any new civil right for the applicant company whose entitlement to the funds had already been established by the judgment of 21 May 2012. The supervisory proceedings merely confirmed that these funds had been reserved in the deposit account and that the bailiff was obliged to transfer them. The decision was therefore purely declaratory, reiterating an existing legal position rather than constituting it. As the Court has previously found, where an applicant could obtain a decision confirming that non-execution had been unlawful, “the outcome of such an action would only have produced repetitive results, namely a warrant enabling the bailiffs to proceed with the execution of the judgment” (see Jasiūnienė v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 41510/98, 24 October 2000, and also Plotnikovy v. Russia, no. 43883/02, § 17, 24 February 2005). In the present case, the supervisory decision likewise produced only repetitive results, confirming what was already legally established without creating new rights or obligations.
15. Accordingly, the proceedings leading to the decision of 26 June 2015 did not involve the determination of the applicant company’s civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
16. As regards the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court reiterates that this provision extends to “legitimate expectations” of enjoying a pecuniary asset, including “claims” that are sufficiently established to be enforceable.
17. The applicant company’s enforceable claim against the private debtor’s funds originated from the judgment of 21 May 2012 and not from the supervisory decision of 26 June 2015. The latter decision was declaratory in nature and did not establish or confer upon the applicant company any pecuniary entitlement beyond that which had already been recognised. Decisions issued under Section 632 of the CPL are not subject to standard enforcement proceedings, and the writ of execution was therefore recalled. The supervisory decision did not, consequently, create any “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and that provision is not applicable in the present case.
18. Lastly, the Court reiterates that in a legal system where the issuing of a declaratory ruling acknowledging the unlawfulness of a bailiff’s conduct constitutes a necessary precondition for seeking monetary compensation, an applicant’s failure to pursue a compensation claim in accordance with the domestic procedural rules amounts to a failure to exhaust domestic remedies (see Smagilov v. Russia (dec.), no. 24324/05, §§ 50-52, 13 November 2014). In the present case, by failing to pursue its civil claim against the State to conclusion after the initial application was returned for non-payment of fees, the applicant company failed to exhaust a remedy that was both available and prima facie effective under national law. The applicant company’s initial pursuit of this remedy before abandoning it for non-payment of fees demonstrates that it considered the claim to have reasonable prospects of success, thereby undermining any assertion that the remedy was ineffective in principle. Moreover, it was open to the applicant company to bring a civil claim against bailiff J.I. in the same manner as it had done against bailiff A.K., particularly since domestic authorities had established J.I.’s responsibility for the deficit, yet the applicant company failed to pursue this available remedy or to accept victim status in the criminal proceedings to seek compensation.
19. It follows that the application must be rejected both as incompatible ratione materiae and on the ground of non-exhaustion, in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 20 November 2025.
Liv Tigerstedt Davor Derenčinović
Deputy Registrar President