Communicated on 30 August 2017
THIRD SECTION
Application no. 38427/11
Artem Anatolyevich SAMSONOV
against Russia
lodged on 30 March 2011
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns a fine of thirty euros imposed on the applicant for the offence under Article 20.2 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences on account of the violation of the regulations for organising a public event because he had been spotted by an officer of the anti-extremist unit of the local department of the Interior as posting on 10 November 2010 on the Internet messages calling other people to gather in front of the Consulate of South Korea to point out violations of human rights in this country. The courts noted that the above amounted to “pre-event campaigning”, which could only be lawfully carried after lodging an event notification (sections 4 and 10 of the Public Events Act). Such notification about a static demonstration had been lodged with the Vladivostok Town Office on 12 November 2010; its authors had then been told that the notification had had to be submitted to the regional administration instead, given the location of the planned venue and that it was next to a public building, that of the Regional Office of the Property Agency. The courts dismissed the applicant’s argument that his Internet messages were mere discussions of political views and did not amount to “campaigning” for any specific event with any specific agenda.
The demonstration was held as planned.
QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES
1. Was there a violation of Article 10 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s prosecution for an administrative offence? In particular:
- Was the interference in the present case “prescribed by law”? Did the domestic law and judicial practice at the material time provide for clear criteria for distinguishing between “pre-event campaigning” and other legitimate expression (compare Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia, no. 42911/08, §§ 117-35, 21 February 2017; Ruling no. 4-P of 14 February 2013 by the Russian Constitutional Court (paragraph 2 of the operative part) about the distinction between campaigning, providing information (оповещение) about a planned event and, a fortiori, merely expressing an opinion on a matter of public interest)?
- What legitimate aim was sought to be pursued by the applicable regulation prohibiting “campaigning” prior to lodging an event notification and by the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression, in particular his freedoms to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas?
- Was the interference “necessary in a democratic society” and proportionate to the aim pursued? Did the domestic authorities adduce relevant and sufficient reasons and properly apply the standards under Article 10 of the Convention (see Terentyev v. Russia, no. 25147/09, §§ 22‑25, 26 January 2017)?
2. Was there an “interference” under Article 11 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s prosecution? If yes, was this Article violated in the present case?
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