FIRST SECTION
FINAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 36760/97
by Hasan ŞANLI and Fatma EROL
against Turkey
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 17 October 2000 as a Chamber composed of
MrsE. Palm, President,
MrL. Ferrari Bravo,
MrGaukur Jörundsson,
MrB. Zupančič,
MrT. Panţîru,
MrR. Maruste, judges,
MrF. Gölcüklü, ad hoc judge,
andMrM. O'Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 26 May 1997 and registered on 1 July 1997,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the Commission's partial decision of 1 July 1998,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are Turkish nationals, born in 1971 and 1972 respectively and living in Istanbul, Turkey. They are represented before the Court by Mr Özcan Kılıç, a lawyer practising in Istanbul.
A.The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 14 November 1996 police officers from the anti-terrorist branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate arrested the applicants and 8 other suspects in possession of firearms (Kalashnikov rifles, revolvers, bullets and cartridge clips). The police officers accused the applicants of membership of an illegal organisation, the Komünist Parti/İnşa Örgütü (the Communist Party/Establishment organisation).
On the same day, the head of the anti-terrorist branch of the Istanbul police wrote a letter to the Chief Public Prosecutor's office at the Istanbul State Security Court requesting permission to keep the applicants in police custody for 10 days. The Chief Public Prosecutor granted the permission requested.
On 27 November 1996 the applicants were brought before the Istanbul State Security Court which ordered their detention on remand.
On 12 December 1996 the Chief Public Prosecutor issued a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the applicants on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to commit them for trial.
B.Relevant domestic law and practice
Article 19 of the Constitution provides:
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with the formalities and conditions prescribed by law:
...
The arrested or detained person must be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours at the latest or, in the case of offences committed by more than one person, within fifteen days... These time-limits may be extended during a state of emergency...
...
A person deprived of his liberty, for whatever reason, shall have the right to take proceedings before a judicial authority which shall give a speedy ruling on his case and order his immediate release if it finds that the deprivation of liberty was unlawful.
Compensation must be paid by the State, as the law shall provide, for damage sustained by persons who have been victims of treatment contrary to the above provisions.”
Section 1 of Law no. 466 on the payment of compensation to persons arrested or detained provides:
“Compensation shall be paid by the State in respect of all damage sustained by persons
(1) who have been arrested, or detained under conditions or in circumstances incompatible with the Constitution or statute law;
(2) who have not been immediately informed of the reasons for their arrest or detention;
(3) who have not been brought before a judicial officer after being arrested or detained within the time‑limit laid down by statute for that purpose;
(4) who have been deprived of their liberty without a court order after the statutory time-limit for being brought before a judicial officer has expired;
(5) whose close family have not been immediately informed of their arrest or detention;
(6) who, after being arrested or detained in accordance with the law, are not subsequently committed for trial ..., or are acquitted or discharged after standing trial; or
(7) who have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment shorter than the period spent in detention or ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty only...”
At the material time, section 30 of Law no. 3842 of 18 November 1992 provided that, with regard to offences within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts any arrested person had to be brought before a judge within 48 hours at the latest, or, in the case of offences committed by more than one person, within 15 days.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that they were held in police custody for 13 days without being brought before a judge.
They submit further that, under the provisions of the Turkish Code on Criminal Procedure, persons taken into police custody must be brought before a judge within a maximum period of 4 days. This period can be extended up to 15 days in relation to offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. The applicants allege therefore that two types of custody periods between different types of offences constitute a discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 14 of the Convention.
THE LAW
A.Government's preliminary objection
The Government submit that the applicants failed to exhaust domestic remedies. They argue that it would have been possible for the applicants to seek a remedy using the procedure laid down in Law no. 466, which guarantees the possibility of an award of damages to any person who has been unlawfully deprived of his liberty, or who, after being lawfully detained, is not subsequently committed for trial or is acquitted after standing trial. However, since the applicants failed to invoke Law no. 466, the application is manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
The applicants contest the Government's arguments. They allege that they were unable to invoke Law no. 466 since it is applicable only to damage suffered as a result of unlawful detention. They submit that a long period of custody by order of the public prosecutor is authorised under domestic law and accordingly they could not claim compensation.
The Court notes that at the material time in proceedings before the State Security Courts the length of detention in police custody could be extended to 15 days by order of the prosecution. The length of pre-trial detention being challenged by the applicants did not therefore exceed the maximum time-limit provided for in domestic law. According to Law no. 466, cited by the Government, an action against the authorities can only be brought for compensation for damage suffered as a result of unlawful deprivation of liberty.
The Court reiterates that, in earlier cases based on similar facts, the Convention organs had already found that this remedy was ineffective on the grounds, inter alia, that the Turkish judicial authorities to which applicants complained had already concluded that the detention in question was lawful (see, for example, the Sakık and Others v. Turkey judgment of 26 November 1997, Reports 1997-VII, p. 2626, § 60).
In any event, the Court notes that the applicants complained of the excessive length of their pre-trial detention, not that they had no legal remedies whereby they could obtain damages for detention. The applicants' complaint therefore goes to Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, whereas the remedy mentioned by the Government concerns only Article 5 § 5 (see, the Demir and Others v. Turkey judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI, pp. 2652 and 2653, § 37).
The Court considers, therefore, that the Government's submission that the applicants failed to exhaust domestic remedies cannot be upheld.
B.Merits
1.Complaints under Article 5 § 3
The applicants complain of the excessive length of their pre-trial detention. They invoke Article 5 § 3 of the Convention which provides, in so far as relevant:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
The Government highlight the nature and scale of the terrorist threat which aimed at destabilising the Turkish State and particular difficulties to ward off that threat. In this regard, they submit that the exceptional complexity of judicial investigations concerning terrorist networks required longer periods of police custody to allow the Turkish authorities to complete the investigation of the offences concerned and to bring those responsible for terrorist acts before the courts. On that account, the Government point out that in the present case the applicants were apprehended along with 8 other suspects in the course of an operation carried out by the anti-terrorist branch of the police.
The Government also argue that the applicants were held in detention in police custody with the authorisation of the public prosecutor and that on the last day of their detention they were brought before the judge. The Government thus consider that the custodial measure was ordered by a competent authority and was enforced by that authority in accordance with the requirements laid down by law. They conclude that, under domestic law, the national authorities did not in any way exceed the margin of appreciation accorded to governments under the Convention and that the measures in question were not in any way disproportionate.
The Government finally point out that the custody periods were shortened by Law no. 4229 of 12 March 1997, which amended Law no. 3842. In this respect, they state that persons arrested for collective offences must be brought before a judge within 48 hours. This period can be prolonged up to four days by a written order of the public prosecutor owing to the difficulties in collecting evidence or to the number of perpetrators, or for similar causes. If the investigation is not concluded within this period, it can be prolonged for up to seven days upon the request of the public prosecutor and the decision of the judge.
The applicants contest the Government's submissions and maintain that the length of their pre-trial detention was unreasonably long and in breach of their rights under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. They contend that despite the amendments made to Law no. 3842 they can still claim to be victim of a violation of Article 5 § 3.
The Court considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that this part of the case raises complex issues of law and of fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits of the application. The Court concludes, therefore, that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.
2.Complaints under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 5 § 3
The applicants complain of a breach of Article 14 of the Convention, which provides:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The applicants submit that according to the Turkish Code on Criminal Procedure persons taken into police custody must be brought before a judge within a maximum period of four days, whereas in relation to offences which fall within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts this period may be extended up to 15 days in accordance with Law no. 3842. In this respect, the applicants allege that that difference constitutes unlawful discrimination, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention.
The Government argue that under Turkish law any type of discrimination is prohibited. They submit however that States are entitled to make distinctions in their laws between different types of offences according to their gravity. They submit therefore that Turkish legislature made a distinction between common law offences and terrorist offences since it considered the latter a threat to humanity and democracy.
The Court considers that this question relates to “a detainee's right to be promptly brought before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power” and should therefore be examined under Article 14 taken together with Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
The Court reiterates that Article 14 is not concerned with all differences of treatment but only with differences having as their basis or reason a personal characteristic (“status”) by which persons or group of persons are distinguishable from each other (see the Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 23, p. 29, § 56).
The Court notes that in principle the aim of Law no. 3842 is to penalise people who commit terrorist offences and that anyone arrested and charged with an offence falling within the scope of that law will be treated less favourably with regard to the length of pre-trial detention than persons arrested and charged with an offence under the ordinary law. In this regard, the Court considers that the distinction is made not between different groups of people, but between different types of offences, according to the legislature's view of their gravity (see, mutatis mutandis, the Gerger v. Turkey judgment of 8 July 1999, to be published in Reports 1999, § 69). It therefore concludes that that practice does not amount to a form of “discrimination” that is contrary to the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Articles 35 § 3 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the applicants' complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that they were not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power;
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Michael O'BoyleElisabeth Palm
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy