Communicated on 20 January 2018
FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 77684/16
Alexandru Dragoș SAVU
against Romania
lodged on 6 December 2016
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
On 19 November 2013 the applicant received by post an administrative fine, in view of his having joined an unauthorised public demonstration on the pavement next to the Romanian Parliament’s court yard in Bucharest, on 7 November 2013.
On 22 June 2015 the Bucharest County Court upheld the sanction imposed on the applicant, considering that the demonstration should have been authorised beforehand in view of the fact that the gathering took place in public areas, and not simply “outside ... of the premises of public ... legal entities”, circumstances in which prior authorisation would have not been necessary, according to Article 3 of the Law no. 60/1991 regulating public demonstrations. The impugned judgment was communicated to the applicant on 8 July 2016. The applicant complains under Article 10 of the Convention that the authorities’ overly restrictive interpretation of the notion of “outside ... of the premises of public ... legal entities” resulted in a disproportionate interference with his right to freedom of expression.
QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES
1. Has the judgment of 22 June 2015, upholding the sanction applied to the applicant as a consequence of his participation in an unauthorised public demonstration on 7 November 2013, constituted an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression, in particular his right to impart ideas, within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention?
2. If so, was that interference justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention (see Tatár and Fáber v. Hungary, nos. 26005/08 and 26160/08, § 39, 12 June 2012; Karademirci and Others v. Turkey, nos. 37096/97 and 37101/97, § 26, ECHR 2005‑I)?
In particular:
(a) Was the interference “prescribed by law”, and in the affirmative, was the law formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicant to foresee to a reasonable degree the consequences which his actions may entail, in terms of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention (see Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, § 34, ECHR 1999‑III and, mutatis mutandis, Galstyan v. Armenia, no. 26986/03, § 106-7, 15 November 2007)?
(b) If so, did it pursue one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention?
(c) If so, was it necessary in a democratic society? In particular, was the sanction imposed on the applicant proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued?
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