FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 66297/13
Concetta SCHEMBRI
against Malta
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 19 September 2017 as a Chamber composed of:
Ganna Yudkivska, President,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Iulia Motoc,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Georges Ravarani,
Péter Paczolay, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 17 October 2013,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms Concetta Schembri, is a Maltese national who was born in 1944 and lives in Rabat. She was represented before the Court by Dr M. Camilleri, a lawyer practising in Valletta. The Maltese Government were represented by their Agent, Dr Peter Grech, Attorney General.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:
1. Background to the case
3. In 2004 S., a Pakistani citizen of Afghan origin, arrived irregularly in Malta by boat and was detained under the applicable immigration laws. While in detention, S. met C., the applicant’s brother, who worked with the detention services.
4. Following his release from detention in 2005, S. maintained contact with C. and started carrying out some maintenance work in the latter’s house. S. eventually started living in that house in October 2005 and met the applicant, with whom he started a relationship. It appears that for some time the applicant also lived there while renovation work was being carried out in her own place. Three months later S. wanted to marry the applicant, but she did not agree. According to the Government, the applicant and S. had only gone out together once and S. spoke little English; however, during the domestic proceedings (see paragraphs 5, 12 and 15 below), the applicant stated that she had originally got to know S. online and that after they had met they had sometimes gone out together – when asked whether their outings had been romantic she replied that they had been normal outings.
5. After some time, in 2006, once his asylum application (at first instance) had been rejected, S. entered Italy unlawfully and went to Naples. According to the applicant’s testimony S. contacted the applicant around a month later by phone and the two remained in contact via telephone calls around twice a week. An appeal against the asylum decision was never examined since S. could not be traced.
6. In November 2007 the applicant went to Milan on holiday and met S. again; she then prolonged her stay. In December 2007 her brother and the latter’s daughter joined them and on that occasion the applicant and S. decided to get married. According to the applicant she lived with S. for some time and then returned to Malta for a few months before returning to Italy in March 2008. The Government submitted that there was no evidence of their cohabitation.
7. On 19 March 2008 the applicant married S., who was thirty years her junior, under the regime of separation of estates. The rest of the applicant’s family (save for C.) was not informed. They married in Milan, Italy and their marriage was registered in the Public Registry of Malta in the same year, given that one of the spouses was a Maltese national.
8. According to a declaration by two Italian lawyers (who had assisted the applicant) dated 2011, to their knowledge the applicant and S. lived together before and after their marriage until they went abroad.
9. In April 2008 the applicant and S. went to the Maltese embassy in Rome in order to apply for a visa for S. He was interviewed in that connection. According to the applicant, following the interview S. was informed verbally that he would not be granted a visa to enter Malta. No written decision was issued nor was he informed about any possibility of appeal. The applicant alleged that it had been suggested to S. that he go back to Pakistan wherefrom he could apply for an entry visa. The embassy denied this (during the domestic proceedings), their position being that his visa had been refused because during the interview it transpired that S. had been lying, in particular concerning the status of his stay in Italy and the means by which he had entered Italy, and his means of subsistence. In her testimony the Consul stated that she had consulted the Central Visa Unit in Malta (“the Visa Unit”) and submitted a report to this effect, and subsequently, on an unspecified date, a letter had been sent to S. rejecting his application.
10. In May 2008 the applicant went back to Malta to ask for a review of the decision taken by the embassy and to try to obtain a visa for her husband through the Visa Unit in Malta. She was informed that she had to write a letter to the Visa Unit outlining her request. She followed this instruction on 5 August 2008 and then returned to Italy on 8 August 2008. She continued communicating with the Visa Unit, but no decision was communicated to her.
11. In October 2008 S. returned to Pakistan to try and obtain an entry visa from there. However, the Italian embassy in Islamabad could not provide assistance.
12. In the meantime the applicant had returned to Malta and continued pursuing the application for an entry visa from there. She was sent from one office to another to no avail. On an unspecified date, at a meeting with M.C. and J.M. (two employees of the Visa Unit), the applicant, who referred to having met S. online, was told that if the visa were to be issued she would have to give personal guarantees with regard to the financial support of her husband. She accepted that responsibility. No attempts were made to contact S. and no decision ensued.
13. It appeared that an internal board had started to investigate the applicant’s complaint. It also transpired that the authorities suspected that the applicant’s marriage to S. had been one of convenience, which was why a visa would not be issued. Moreover, it appeared that S.’s intention was to stay in Rome. The Visa Unit submitted their conclusions to the department of Citizenship but no decision had been formally issued by the time the proceedings hereinafter mentioned were instituted. In any event, according to the applicant, the law did not appear to provide for a possibility to appeal against any such decision (unless it had been taken by the Principal Immigration Officer, which did not appear to be so in the present case).
2. Constitutional redress proceedings
14. On 23 July 2009 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining that the refusal to issue her husband a visa had been unlawful and had constituted a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
15. The court heard evidence from a number of witnesses including the applicant (who reiterated the facts as mentioned above), but not S., who did not testify.
16. J.M., the director of the Department of Citizenship, stated that S. was an exempt person but that his status had not yet been confirmed. He explained that exempt status was an inherent right of a spouse of a Maltese citizen, unless the spouses did not live together or if there had been an order by the Minister responsible. He explained that he had been in contact with the Visa Unit and the embassy in Italy and that his role was to ensure that the legislation was not abused, particularly in the light of marriages of convenience, which were not rare and which could be detected through an EU Council Resolution which gave pointers on identifying such situations. He further testified that even with exempt-person status an individual could not automatically enter the country and a visa was still required. J.M. noted that the exempt-person status of S. had never been confirmed. At the same time he also stated that there was no application to be lodged, since an individual should not have to apply for something which belonged to him or her by right. He explained that there was an enquiry form requiring details of the exempt person and when this was filled in, a letter confirming the status would be sent out. However, J.M. stated that this was simply a formality because the exempt-person status was acquired as soon as the marriage was contracted. S. had never filled in this form, as he had never entered Malta following his marriage. Nevertheless, J.M. testified that an informal request had been made by the applicant, who had been accompanied by a lawyer.
17. M.S., another employee of the Visa Unit, stated that S.’s visa application had been refused but that there was a right of appeal – he later stated that it was not an appeal but a review or reconsideration. He declared that the Visa Unit had reviewed the case and decided that the application should be refused because there had been a suspicion that it had been a marriage of convenience. M.S. explained that the file had been sent to the Department of Citizenship and that the case had not yet been concluded, and no decision letter had been sent out.
18. By a judgment of 29 November 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction dismissed the applicant’s claim.
19. The court rejected the Government’s objection as to non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. It considered that the reconsideration procedure as undertaken by the Visa Unit in the present case could not be considered an effective remedy – it had taken too long, despite the Visa Unit having had all the relevant information from the Maltese embassy in Rome. Indeed the Visa Unit had had no reason to prolong issuing a decision, to the extent that it was never rendered. Furthermore, the procedure eventually came to a halt with the institution of the constitutional redress proceedings. Moreover, such a remedy was not independent of the Visa Unit since it was decided upon by the same unit. It followed that, having regard to the totality of the procedure and its ineffectiveness, the court had to exercise its constitutional competence to assess the merits of the complaint.
20. It also held that the applicant had had a juridical interest in lodging the complaint in her name, since her complaint was that as a result of the impugned actions or omissions, her own family life was being violated.
21. In connection with the merits, the court referred to the testimonies of the applicant, M.C. and J.M. and that the latter officials considered that S. needed a visa in order to enter Malta. This would have enabled him to apply for a residence permit and to travel in the Schengen area.
22. The court noted that the couple had never cohabited in Malta, and that the applicant had never had the intention to marry S. when he had been in Malta. Referring to general principles of the Court’s case-law, it considered that the couple had never envisaged having a family life together, and why the applicant had changed her mind and decided to marry S. in Italy was a mystery. The court was not convinced that the applicant’s decision to marry had been genuine – not once in her testimony had she declared her love for her husband, nor had she in the slightest touched on the level of intimacy she had with her husband, who was thirty years her junior; neither had she given an explanation about her change of mind, nor why she had not wanted to follow her husband to Pakistan. She had also admitted that she had not been living with her husband as he had been in Pakistan, thus implicitly admitting that she had been de facto separated. Thus, S. could not have expected to obtain exempt status, nor could it be said that there had been family life in the present case, and the authorities had simply applied the law. Furthermore, S. had shown a total disregard for the proceedings, having chosen not to submit any written testimony corroborating the applicant’s statements or challenging those of the authorities. The court considered that it was not for it to decide whether there had been a marriage of convenience; it sufficed to find that the authorities refusal to issue S. with a visa had not breached Article 8 of the Convention.
23. The applicant appealed. By a judgment of 26 April 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal.
24. It considered that when they had been in Malta the applicant and S. had not formed a family, and their encounters had been rather ambiguous, tenuous and lacking any commitment towards each other. The same appeared to be the case of their life in Italy. While it was true that they had married there, the only commitment undertaken appeared to have been for S. to acquire a visa. The Constitutional Court pointed out that according to the Court’s case-law it was only genuine marriages undertaken according to law which were protected by Article 8 of the Convention. While the Constitutional Court was ready to accept that the marriage had been contracted according to law, it had to address the State’s argument as to whether the marriage had been a genuine one.
25. The Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had been aware of the precarious situation S. had been in (since he had been a third country national, thus requiring a visa to enter Malta) despite her claim that he had not required a visa. Nevertheless, S. had never instituted an ordinary remedy to challenge the refusal. It could not be ignored that the applicant had refused to marry S. when they had been in Malta, and had only changed her mind in Italy after a few months and despite the age difference between them. Their cohabitation in Italy had been temporary and they could not have aspired to making it permanent owing to a variety of reasons, specifically S.’s irregular status in Italy, the applicant’s refusal to follow him to Pakistan (which she had not proved would have been problematic), and the visa refusals by the Maltese authorities. Furthermore, the court was struck by the lack of commitment towards, and interest in the proceedings by S., who had not even bothered to submit written testimony, or at least to attempt to send a letter or make use of letters of request or other means which were available to persons not on the territory of the State.
26. All the above led the Constitutional Court to conclude that there had been no family life, within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, in the present case and that therefore there had been no breach of the applicant’s rights.
B. Relevant domestic and European Union law
1. The Immigration Act
27. Part IV of the Immigration Act deals with “Prohibited Immigrants” and requires all, except those with a right of entry and residence according to the provisions of the Act, to obtain permission to enter Malta from the Principal Immigration Officer.
28. Part II of the Act concerning “Exempt Persons” provides that Part IV of the Act does not apply to exempt persons. The relevant provision, namely Article 4 (1) reads as follows:
“The provisions of Part IV of this Act shall not apply to any person -
(a) who is a citizen of Malta; or
...
(g) who is the spouse of any person referred to in any of the foregoing paragraphs and is still married to and living with that person; ...”
29. The Act as applicable at the time of the present case provided, in its Article 25 A (5), for a review of a decision only in limited circumstances. It read as follows:
“Any person aggrieved by any decision of the competent authority under any regulations made under Part III, or in virtue of article 7, article 14 or article 15 may enter an appeal against such decision and the Board shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such appeals.”
30. For the purposes of comprehending the above, Part III of the Act concerns special provisions connected to the European Union, Article 7 concerns residence permits, Article 14 concerns removal orders and Article 15 concerns carriers. It follows that visas, which are dealt with in Article 8 (Part IV) of the Act are in theory excluded from any available review according to this provision.
31. Nevertheless, Regulation 19 of Subsidiary Legislation 271.04 provided, amongst its miscellaneous provisions, that “Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Principal Immigration Officer may appeal to the [Immigration Appeals] Board as provided for in article 25A(5) of the Act.”
32. In 2012, the situation regarding visa appeals was clarified by means of Regulation 2 of Legal Notice 2 of 2012 which reads as follows:
“The Immigration Appeals Board has the competence to hear appeals related to the refusal, annulment or revocation of the visa with reference to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 32 and paragraph 7 of Article 34 of the Regulation (EC) No. 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the [EU] Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code).”
33. The time limit of such an appeal was three days, eventually extended to fifteen days by Legal Notice 20 of 2013.
2. The Marriage Act
34. Article 38 of the Marriage Act reads as follows:
“(1) Any person who contracts a marriage with the sole purpose of obtaining -
(a) Maltese citizenship; or
(b) freedom of movement in Malta; or
(c) a work or residence permit in Malta; or
(d) the right to enter Malta; or
(e) the right to obtain medical care in Malta, shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
(2) Any right or benefit obtained by a person convicted of an offence under subarticle (1) on the basis of the marriage referred to in that subarticle (1) may be rescinded or annulled by the public authority from which it was obtained.
(3) Any person who contracts a marriage with another person knowing that the sole purpose of such other person in contacting the marriage is one or more of the purposes referred to in subarticle (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable for the same punishment laid down in subarticle (1).”
3. EU Council Resolution of 4 December 1997 on measures to be adopted on the combating of marriages of convenience
35. Articles 1 to 5 of the (EU) Council Resolution of 4 December 1997 read as follows:
“1. For the purposes of this resolution, a ‘marriage of convenience` means a marriage concluded between a national of a Member State or a third-country national legally resident in a Member State and a third-country national, with the sole aim of circumventing the rules on entry and residence of third-country nationals and obtaining for the third-country national a residence permit or authority to reside in a Member State.
2. Factors which may provide grounds for believing that a marriage is one of convenience are in particular:
- the fact that matrimonial cohabitation is not maintained,
- the lack of an appropriate contribution to the responsibilities arising from the marriage,
- the spouses have never met before their marriage,
- the spouses are inconsistent about their respective personal details (name, address, nationality and job), about the circumstances of their first meeting, or about other important personal information concerning them,
- the spouses do not speak a language understood by both,
- a sum of money has been handed over in order for the marriage to be contracted (with the exception of money given in the form of a dowry in the case of nationals of countries where the provision of a dowry is common practice),
- the past history of one or both of the spouses contains evidence of previous marriages of convenience or residence anomalies.
In this context, such information may result from:
- statements by those concerned or by third parties,
- information from written documentation, or
- information obtained from inquiries carried out.
3. Where there are factors which support suspicions for believing that a marriage is one of convenience, Member States shall issue a residence permit or an authority to reside to the third-country national on the basis of the marriage only after the authorities competent under national law have checked that the marriage is not one of convenience, and that the other conditions relating to entry and residence have been fulfilled. Such checking may involve a separate interview with each of the two spouses.
4. Should the authorities competent under national law find the marriage to be one of convenience, the residence permit or authority to reside granted on the basis of the third-country national’s marriage shall as a general rule be withdrawn, revoked or not renewed.
5. The third-country national shall have an opportunity to contest or to have reviewed, as provided for by national law, either before a court or before a competent administrative authority, a decision to refuse, withdraw, revoke or not renew a residence permit or authority to reside.”
COMPLAINT
36. The applicant complained that the refusal of the authorities to issue her husband with a visa had breached her right to family life under Article 8 of the Convention. She further considered that the total lack of procedure had meant that any “continued” decision by the authorities had not been taken in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, and had therefore been arbitrary.
THE LAW
37. The applicant claimed that the authorities’ actions had not been in accordance with the law and had thus been in breach of her right to family life under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The applicant
38. The applicant argued that there had been a “family life” between her and S. According to her, their relationship had started in 2005, they had got married in 2008, and there had been only a period of time when the couple had not lived together, specifically the period in which S. had left Malta to go to Italy.
39. As to the substantiation of her claims, she submitted that there were no indications as to which evidence the Government was referring to in order to substantiate the events at issue. The internal investigation board had not published any documents or evidence and had not carried out any enquiries, apart from having one meeting with the applicant. According to the applicant, the Government could not even rely on the assessment of the embassy in Italy since it had been based on one interview and a decision had not been given in writing. No information had been given to the applicant about the possibility to appeal against that decision. Only after her return to Malta had someone at the Visa Unit told her to send a letter to the head of that unit to explain what she needed.
40. The applicant criticised the decisions of the Civil Court (First Hall) and of the Constitutional Court that had not recognised the existence of a family life on the grounds that the couple had not been living together and had therefore been de facto separated. According to the applicant she had started the case because the State had precluded her husband from entering Malta and this fact had been used against her to demonstrate the absence of a family life. In any case the applicant pointed out that the authorities had decided that the marriage in question had been a marriage of convenience even before the couple had had to live apart. Moreover, they had lived separately because S. had not been able to join the applicant without a visa and she could not have moved to Pakistan because it had not been safe for her – a Christian – to move there.
2. The Government
41. The Government submitted that the applicant and S. had met only on one occasion before they had reunited in Italy after he had left without informing her. The Government added that S. had never tendered evidence before the domestic courts concerning his return to Pakistan in order to obtain an entry visa from there or the fact that the Italian embassy in Islamabad had not been able to provide assistance – indeed it did not appear that he had ever applied for a visa from there. In the Government’s view, the statements of the two Italian lawyers had been based on the information submitted by the applicant and S. with no objective verification. Thus her version of events had lacked substantiation.
42. The Government submitted that the representative of the Maltese embassy in Rome had declared that they had refused to issue S. with a visa owing to the fact that he had been residing illegally in Italy and owing to inconsistencies that had become apparent from his interview. Thus, the application for a visa had been rejected on the basis that there had been a well-founded suspicion that the marriage between S. and the applicant had been a marriage of convenience. Following that rejection the applicant had requested a reconsideration of the refusal, which was investigated by an internal board.
43. At the outset, the marriage between the applicant and S. was considered by the Maltese authorities to be a marriage of convenience which had been contracted purely for immigration purposes “with the sole aim of circumventing the rules on entry and residence” (reference was made to the relevant EU Council resolution, see paragraph 35 above) and without any intention to cohabit or share the other social characteristics of marriage. In this respect, the Government alleged that the applicant’s brother had declared that he had been willing to adopt S. as his child and that when this had not been possible the marriage between the applicant and S. had taken place. The Government stressed that the situation of the couple indicated a marriage of convenience, in view of the way in which they had met – when S. had been an illegal immigrant –, the little contact and the language barrier between them, as well as the inconsistent submissions made by S. at the embassy while he had had an irregular status, as well as the fact that they had only cohabited for a brief period and had ultimately lived separately after S.’s return to Pakistan. Furthermore, there was no proof that they had maintained a relationship to this date and S. had not even given a statement to this Court. Thus, it could not be said that between the applicant and S. there existed a “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention and this provision was not applicable in the present case.
44. The Government also submitted that the jurisdiction of the Maltese authorities was limited to marriages contracted in Malta, therefore they could not take any action to challenge the marriage in question, which had been contracted in Italy.
B. The Court’s assessment
45. The Court should first examine whether Article 8 of the Convention applies in the present case, and notably determine whether the ties between the applicant and S. gave rise to a family life protected by that Article. In connection with this, it reiterates that the existence or non-existence of “family life” is essentially a question of fact depending upon the existence of close personal ties (see Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, § 31, Series A no. 31). The notion of “family” in Article 8 concerns marriage‑based relationships, and also other de facto “family ties” where the parties are living together outside marriage or where other factors demonstrated that the relationship had sufficient constancy (see Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], no. 25358/12, § 140, ECHR 2017).
46. The right to respect for “family life” does not safeguard the mere desire to found a family; it presupposes the existence of a family (see Marckx, cited above, § 31), or at the very least the potential relationship between, for example, a child born out of wedlock and his or her natural father (see Nylund v. Finland (dec.), no. 27110/95, ECHR 1999-VI), or the relationship that arises from a genuine marriage, even if family life has not yet been fully established (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 62, Series A no. 94, and Paradiso and Campanelli, cited above, § 141).
47. The Court has accepted that the existence of a stable union might be independent of cohabitation (see Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, §§ 49 and 73, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). Indeed, in the globalised world of today various couples, married or in a registered partnership, experience periods during which they conduct their relationship at long distance, needing to maintain residence in different countries, for professional or other reasons, and that in itself has no bearing on the existence of a stable committed relationship (see Oliari and Others v. Italy, nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, § 169, 21 July 2015).
48. In the present case, the Court must assess whether the applicant’s marriage to S. can be considered as a genuine marriage for the purposes of the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court notes that the Maltese embassy in Rome, which interviewed both S. and the applicant, and the Visa Unit, which later examined the situation and heard the applicant, as well as the first-instance constitutional jurisdiction, which also heard evidence from the applicant and other witnesses, all suspected that the marriage was one of convenience and thus not genuine (see paragraphs 13, 17 and 22 above). The Constitutional Court, which again had the benefit of the applicant’s written and oral submissions (see paragraph 15 above), came to the definite conclusion that the marriage was not genuine and thus that Article 8 did not apply (see paragraphs 23-26 above).
49. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its sole duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court or to substitute its own assessment for that of the national courts or other national authorities unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I in connection with Article 6, and Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654/00, § 89, ECHR 2007-I in connection with Article 8).
50. Turning to the present case, the Court cannot ingore the fact that the decision-making process, and particularly the proceedings before the constitutional jurisdictions, were fair and allowed those concerned to present their case fully.
51. Further, the Court notes the following elements in the material before it: the applicant has not been able to give a coherent and detailed account of her relationship, nor has S. attempted to support her application. Indeed, it is unknown how many times the applicant and S. actually met and whether the applicant and S. actually had gone on romantic dates together at any time (see paragraph 4 above), or at least before they met again in Italy sometime after S. had left Malta without giving news of himself to the applicant until at least one month later (see paragraph 5 above). From the applicant’s submissions, devoid of any specific details or supportive elements, it is also unclear how long they lived simultaneously in C.’s household in Malta, and it appears that their cohabitation in Italy did not exceed a few weeks before the marriage and slightly more than a month right after the marriage before returning to Malta (see paragraphs 6 and 10 respectively) – indeed the applicant failed to submit various relevant dates. Further, while she returned to Italy again in August (see paragraph 10 above) it is unclear whether they cohabited thereafter until she returned to Malta on an unspecified date (see paragraph 12 above), or until S. left for Pakistan in October of the same year.
52. The Court considers that while nowadays cohabitation might not be a defining criterion to establish the stability of a long-lasting relationship (see the case-law quoted in paragraph 47 above), in the present case it certainly is a factor which could help rebut other indications which raise doubts about the sincerity of the applicant’s marriage with S. (see paragraph 7 above). While the Court can accept that his illegal status is what caused S. to move back to Pakistan, substantiation concerning a consistent cohabitation of the applicant and S. at least in connection with the period antecedent to the return to Pakistan, would have been welcomed in a case such as the present one. The Court also notes that at no stage have the applicant’s submissions referred to her future plans with S. or to any special bond or similar which she shared with S.
53. In light of the above, the Court considers that it does not appear from the material produced before it that the applicant and S. genuinely wished to cohabit and to lead a normal family life (see, conversely, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, cited above, § 63 in fine). It follows that it cannot be said that the domestic courts’ conclusions are unreasonable, much less arbitrary. In the circumstances, the Court must thus confirm the decision of the domestic courts that the applicant and S.’s marriage was not genuine and that there was not a committed relationship which was sufficient to attract the application of Article 8.
54. It follows that the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 12 October 2017.
Marialena TsirliGanna Yudkivska
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy