SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 44047/19
Grigory SCHERBAKOV
against Estonia
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 28 April 2020 as a Committee composed of:
Valeriu Griţco, President,
Arnfinn Bårdsen,
Peeter Roosma, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 14 August 2019,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Grigory Scherbakov, is a Russian national who was born in 1973. He was represented before the Court by Ms J. Karzetskaja, a lawyer practising in Tallinn.The circumstances of the case
1. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
2. The applicant was born in Estonia where he has spent his entire life. In 2000 he was issued with the permanent residence permit which – following an amendment to the Aliens Act (Välismaalaste seadus) – was replaced by the long-term resident’s residence permit (pikaajalise elaniku elamisluba – hereinafter “the long-term residence permit”).
3. His mother, brother and sister, his cohabiting partner and his two adult children also lived in Estonia at the time of application.
4. The applicant has been convicted for crimes on two occasions. He was convicted of driving in the state of intoxication in 2007 and received a suspended sentence of five months’ imprisonment with a three-year probation period. In 2012 the applicant was convicted of unlawful handling of large quantities of narcotic drugs in a group and was sentenced to ten years four months and twenty-seven days’ imprisonment. According to the conviction, the applicant repeatedly transported narcotic drugs between Estonia and Russia in 2009. In addition, he has been punished for misdemeanours on eleven occasions.
5. The applicant has been serving his prison sentence since 17 May 2010. His sentence ends on 14 October 2020.
6. On 21 March 2017 the Ministry of Justice forwarded a proposal to the Police and Border Guard Board (Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet – hereinafter “the PBGB”) to have the applicant’s residence permit revoked and for an order to leave (lahkumisettekirjutus) in respect of him to be issued.
7. The PBGB initiated the proceedings and invited the applicant to submit his comments.
8. The applicant submitted a certificate from a company called M. which proved that he had been working for that company as a logistics and transport consultant since 5 September 2016 and would continue to work there after his release. He provided his services over the phone or by post. The applicant referred that he was born and raised in Estonia. His two daughters were also born in Estonia and relatives had been buried there. His mother, who needed his support, was living in Estonia. He expressed hope to be able to be reunited with his family after his release from prison. He had obtained Russian citizenship in order to be able to go on business trips abroad. He submitted that he intended to learn the Estonian language and obtain Estonian citizenship.
9. On 25 April 2017 the PBGB decided to revoke the applicant’s long-term residence permit, issue an order to leave and impose a prohibition on entry to Estonia for five years (hereinafter the three decisions, contained in the same administrative act, are referred to collectively as “the expulsion decision”). The PBGB referred to section 241(1)(2) of the Aliens Act, sections 7-2(2)(7) and 7-4(2) of the Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry Act (Väljasõidukohustuse ja sissesõidukeelu seadus – hereinafter “the Leave and Entry Act”) and referred also to the Council Directive no. 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003.
10. The PBGB noted the nature and seriousness of the offences the applicant had committed as well as the danger they had posed to society (ühiskonnaohtlikkus). The applicant’s handling of drugs had been a criminal offence of the first degree which, by its nature, had been damaging to the wider population’s life and health. He had also been convicted for drunk driving and had been punished eleven times for misdemeanours. The PBGB further noted that despite the applicant having been born in Estonia, he had not made any significant efforts to integrate into Estonian society. He had obtained an A1 level knowledge of the Estonian language only while in prison and had not finished an A2 level course in 2013. The applicant had Russian citizenship and his mother tongue was Russian. After graduating from high school he had founded a metalworks company in Russia. Later he had founded real-estate, construction and transport companies in Estonia. The PBGB attached weight to the fact that, based on the information given by the prison, the applicant had maintained contact with people known to be involved in organised crime and such persons had visited him while he was serving his sentence. Based on the risk assessment of the Viru Prison, the applicant was considered to be “highly dangerous to the public” (avalikkusele kõrgohtlik).
11. The PBGB also gave weight to the fact that the applicant had a mother, a brother, a sister, a cohabiting partner and two adult children in Estonia. As for the applicant’s mother, the PBGB considered it unlikely that she would not be able to manage without his assistance, as the applicant had in any event been imprisoned and there were other relatives, including grandchildren, who could help her. The applicant had good relationship with his adult daughters, who had visited him in prison. The applicant was also in contact with his cohabiting partner and the latter had visited him in prison. However, since January 2016 there had only been telephone contact, as the partner had not come to the planned visits. The applicant was able to continue communicating with his partner and daughters over the phone and via email. The PBGB acknowledged that the applicant’s expulsion from Estonia would complicate his seeing his family members, but considered that the public interest outweighed the applicant’s personal interest.
12. Based on the reasoning above, the PBGB concluded that the applicant would pose “an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public order and security (tegelik ja piisavalt tõsine oht avalikule korrale ja julgeolekule) even after his future release from prison and considered his expulsion necessary.
13. The applicant challenged the decision of the PBGB. He referred to his limited capacity to work due to health reasons and his lack of contacts in Russia, which would make finding a job there more complicated. In addition, he noted that under the Estonian law he had a right to receive maintenance (ülalpidamist saama) from his children. He also had “the right to hope” to receive maintenance from his cohabiting partner whom he had supported. If deported to Russia, he could not receive such maintenance. He also pointed out that the PBGB had considered the possibility of revoking his residence permit already in 2014, but had then decided that that measure would have been disproportionate. Since then no factual circumstances, other than his health, had changed.
14. On 15 May 2018 the Tartu Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s appeal and annulled the PDGB’s decision of 25 April 2017. The court noted that the PBGB had considered – in response to a proposal by the prison – the possibility of initiating proceedings for revocation of the applicant’s residence permit in 2014, but had found that such an action would not be proportionate. The court considered that when doing so the PGBG had assessed the matter on the merits and that its response to the prison had constituted an administrative decision. It followed that when taking a decision in the instant case, the PBGB should have considered the applicant’s legitimate expectation that the residence permit would not be revoked. The PBGB had not presented any new circumstances which could have justified reaching a different outcome than in 2014.
15. The PBGB appealed against the decision of the Tartu Administrative Court. The PBGB noted, inter alia, that the decision to deport the applicant did not constitute a restriction to his family life, as his daughters were adults and he had not had any meetings with his cohabiting partner since 2016.
16. On 22 November 2018 the Tartu Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the judgment of the Tartu Administrative Court. The court held that the PBGB’s response to the prison in 2014 had not constituted an administrative decision. It had not had any “regulatory impact” (regulatiivne toime) on the applicant (that is to say it had not created, altered or ended any rights or obligations with respect to the applicant) and could therefore not have formed basis of the applicant’s trust that his residence permit would not be revoked. The court then considered that the PBGB had correctly assessed that the applicant posed a threat to public order and security and that it had properly analysed all the relevant circumstances related to the applicant. In response to the applicant’s argument concerning his reduced capacity to work, the court adjudged that the applicant’s possibilities of finding work in the field of transport and logistics had not been impaired. The applicant had founded and had been a member of the board of a number of companies. The court also pointed to the applicant’s work for the company M. and the fact that the latter had agreed to continue their cooperation after the applicant’s release from prison. The court further referred to the applicant having in the past founded a company in Russia and concluded that either the applicant must have some contacts there or that at least the lack of contacts had not hindered him in the past. As for the right to receive maintenance from his children, the court noted that there was no evidence in the case that the applicant had a right to demand maintenance from them. In any event, if such a situation arose, the matters could be settled in accordance with the relevant bilateral treaty between Estonia and Russia. In that respect, the court clarified that one of the applicant’s daughters was a Russian citizen and the other an Estonian citizen.
17. The Tartu Court of Appeal noted that the PBGB had made a mistake by relying on Section 7-2(2)(7) of the Leave and Entry Act when it had not set a term for voluntary compliance with the obligation to leave. The court indicated that the correct legal grounds had been section 7-2(2)(4) of the same Act. However, as the conditions for the application of the latter provision (an alien constituting a threat to public order or national security) had in any event been met, this error did not lead to the annulment of the impugned decision.
18. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. He relied on his right to receive maintenance from his children and argued that the PBGB’s response to the prison in 2014 had constituted an administrative decision. By its decision of 26 February 2019 the Supreme Court, relying on Article 219 § 6 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 25 below), refused to examine the appeal.
19. On 12 March 2019 the applicant requested that the Ministry of the Interior revoke the prohibition on entry. It appears from a response of the Ministry of the Interior, which was submitted to the Court in part, that the Ministry analysed the applicant’s request under section 32(1) of the Leave and Entry Act, but decided not to revoke the entry ban.Relevant domestic law and practiceAliens Act
20. Section 241(1)(2) provides that a long-term residence permit may be revoked if the holder poses a threat to public order and national security. Section 241(3) provides that when revoking the residence permit of a long-term resident on the grounds that he or she poses a threat to public order and national security account must be taken of the seriousness and nature of the offence committed by the alien or the threat posed by him or her, as well as the length of his or her residence in Estonia, his or her age, the consequences of the revocation of the residence permit for the alien and his or her family members, and his or her ties with Estonia and his or her country of origin.Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry Act
21. Section 7(1) provides that an order to leave shall be issued to an alien who has no legal basis to remain in Estonia.
22. Under section 7-2(1) an order to leave sets a term for voluntary compliance with the obligation to leave. However, such a term does not have to be set and the enforcement of the order to leave can be carried out immediately if an alien constitutes a threat to public order or national security (section 7-2(2)(4)) or if an alien has an obligation to leave Estonia after his or her release from prison (7-2(2)(7)).
23. Section 7-4(2) provides that in the event that an alien is not granted a term for voluntary compliance with the obligation to leave, the prohibition on entry is to be applied for the period of five years by the order to leave, except in cases where the alien has a valid prohibition on entry for a period longer than five years as of the date of the issue of the order to leave. Section 7-4(3) adds that if the period of the prohibition on entry is disproportionate taking into account of all the relevant circumstances, it may be applied for a shorter term.
24. Section 32(1) states that the Ministry of the Interior or an authorised governmental authority under the aegis of the Ministry of the Interior may revoke the prohibition on entry or shorten its period of validity following a justified request on the part of the alien or a justified proposal from a governmental authority or a State agency administered by the governmental authority or following a request by the competent authority of a member state of the Schengen Convention, except Estonia, if the circumstances forming the basis for the application of the prohibition on entry have changed or ceased to pertain, as well as for humanitarian reasons if this does not pose a threat to national security or public order.Code of Administrative Procedure
25. Article 219 § 6 in conjunction with Article 219 § 3 provides that the Supreme Court can refuse to examine an appeal on points of law if the arguments presented in the appeal do not warrant the conclusion that the appellate court has incorrectly applied a rule of substantive law, or has significantly infringed the rules of court procedure, which has resulted or could have resulted in the rendering an incorrect judgment. The Supreme Court can decide to examine an appeal on points of law if its examination would be significant in order to ensure legal certainty or consistency of case-law.Judgment of the Supreme Court in case no. 3-17-1545
26. The case concerned a revocation of a long-term residence permit of a Russian citizen who had been born in 1977 in Russia, but who had lived in Estonia since 1983. In addition, he had been issued with an order to leave and a five-year entry ban had been imposed on him. He had been convicted on ten occasions for drug-related crimes and thefts and had been punished for misdemeanours on twenty-nine occasions.
27. The Supreme Court explained in its decision, rendered on 19 February 2019, that section 241(1)(2) of the Aliens Act and section 7(1) of the Leave and Entry Act must be interpreted in the light of Article 9 § 3 and Article 12 § 1 of Council Directive 2003/109/EC (see paragraphs 31-32 below). The court stressed the importance of differentiating “threat to public order and national security” from “an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public order and national security”. It followed that the long-term residence permit could be revoked under section 241(1)(2) of the Aliens Act without necessarily having to issue an order to leave. However, in the event that the PBGB intended to issue an order of leave and impose an entry ban right upon revocation of the residence permit, it had to first establish that the person in question posed an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public order and national security.
28. The Supreme Court stated that the PBGB’s assessment of whether or not a threat within the meaning of section 241(1)(2) of the Aliens Act existed was fully open to judicial review. It followed that the courts could consider that under the circumstances an actual and sufficiently serious threat existed even if the PBGB had not expressly used these terms.
29. Assessing the concerned person’s criminal past, the Supreme Court concluded that the person could be considered to pose a sufficiently serious threat to public order. However, taking into account the person’s good behaviour in prison, the fact that he now spoke Estonian at B2 level, and that he had participated in several rehabilitation programmes, had been working while on an open prison regime and had acted as a counsellor (kogemusnõustaja), the Court concluded that the threat posed by the person was not actual. The Supreme Court decided that it had been lawful to revoke the long-term residence permit, but annulled the PBGB’s decision regarding the order to leave and the prohibition on entry.Relevant European Union law
30. Council Directive no. 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerns the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents.
31. Article 9 of the Directive regulates the withdrawal or loss of long-term resident status. Article 9 § 1(b) provides that long-term residents are no longer entitled to maintain long-term resident status in the event that an expulsion measure under the conditions provided for in Article 12 is adopted. Article 9 § 3 of the Directive states that member States may provide that the long-term resident is no longer entitled to maintain his or her long-term resident status in cases where he or she constitutes a threat to public policy, in consideration of the seriousness of the offences he or she committed, but such a threat is not a reason for expulsion within the meaning of Article 12.
32. Article 12 of the Directive concerns expulsion of long-term residents. Article 12 § 1 provides that member States may take a decision to expel a long-term resident solely where he or she constitutes an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or public security. (In the Estonian version “actual and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or public security” has been translated as tegelik ja piisavalt tõsine oht avalikule korrale ja julgeolekule).
COMPLAINTs
33. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the revocation of his residence permit and the obligation to leave Estonia upon his release from prison had violated his private and family life and his right to respect for his home. He emphasised that the domestic authorities had not established that he had posed an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public order and national security, as they should have done in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 February 2019 in case no. 3-17-1545.
34. The applicant also complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, about the Supreme Court’s refusal to examine his appeal on points of law and apply in his case the approach it had set out in its judgment in case no. 3-17-1545. According to the applicant, the inconsistent application of the Aliens Act had undermined legal certainty.
THE LAW
35. The applicant complained of the violation of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”Complaint under Article 8 of the ConventionWhether there has been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention
36. The Court has previously held that there is no family life between parents and adult children or between adult siblings unless they can demonstrate additional elements of dependence (see Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 97, ECHR 2003-X, and, as a more recent authority, Levakovic v. Denmark (no. 7841/14, § 35, 23 October 2018). However, the Court reiterates that as Article 8 protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s social identity, it must be accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living constitutes part of the concept of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 (see Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, § 63, ECHR 2008, and Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, § 59, ECHR 2006‑XII). Regardless of the existence or otherwise of a “family life”, the Court considers that the expulsion of a settled migrant constitutes interference with his or her right to respect for private life. It will depend on the circumstances of the particular case whether it is appropriate for the Court to focus on the “family life” rather than the “private life” aspect (see Üner, cited above, § 59).
37. Turning to the facts of the case at hand, the Court observes that the applicant is an adult. He has adult children, siblings and a mother who all live in Estonia. As to whether there are additional elements of dependence between himself and his adult family members, the Court notes that the applicant referred in the domestic proceedings to his elderly mother whom he needed to support as well as to his own right to receive maintenance from his children. However, the Court considers that the PBGB and the Tallinn Court of Appeal have already addressed these claims convincingly and comprehensively (see paragraphs 11 and 16 above) and that the applicant has not put forward any new arguments that would call these findings into question. In his application to the Court the applicant also referred to having a partner who lives in Estonia. In this regard the Court notes that the applicant has not raised this aspect, which would fall under “family life”, at all in his appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. Moreover, during the domestic proceedings in lower-instance courts, the applicant appears to have referred to his partner mainly in relation to “having a right to hope” to receive maintenance from her in the future. Against this background, the Court finds that that the applicant’s expulsion decision must the analysed from the viewpoint of his private life. The applicant has not advanced any arguments that would allow the Court to establish that peaceful enjoyment of his home as such would be in question.
38. An interference with the right to respect for private life will be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention unless it can be justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 as being “in accordance with the law”, as pursuing one or more of the legitimate aims listed therein and as being “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve the aim or aims concerned.“In accordance with the law”
39. The PBGB’s expulsion decision was based on section 241(1)(2) of the Aliens Act and sections 7-2(2)(7) and 7-4(2) of the Leave and Entry Act. The decision also referred to Council Directive no. 2003/109/EC and stated that the applicant posed “an actual and sufficiently serious threat” to public order and national security.
40. Although the Tallinn Court of Appeal adjudged that instead of section 7-2(2)(7), section 7-2(2)(4) of the Leave and Entry Act should in fact have been referred to as the correct legal basis for the decision not to set a term for voluntary compliance with the obligation to leave, that fact did not render the decision unlawful as the conditions of the latter provision were in any event met.
41. The applicant complained that the PBGB had not established whether he had posed “an actual and sufficiently serious threat” to public order and national security and about the Supreme Court’s not examining his appeal on points of law, despite having just clarified in another court case the need to verify the existence of such a level of threat.
42. The Court observes that it is apparent from the domestic law, as interpreted in accordance with Council Directive no. 2003/109/EC, that a long-term resident can be expelled only if he or she poses an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public order and national security. Such an approach was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 19 February 2019 in its judgment no. 3-17-1545 (see paragraph 27 above). In the same judgment the Supreme Court also stated that as the assessment of whether or not such a threat existed was open to judicial review, courts could consider a person to pose an actual and sufficiently serious threat even if the PBGB had not expressly used such terminology in their assessment (see paragraph 28 above). In any event, in the case at hand, the PBGB analysed the nature and seriousness of the offences the applicant had committed as well as his behaviour in prison and found him to pose an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public order and security. In a situation where the Tartu Court of Appeal had considered the PBGB’s expulsion decision to be lawful and the Supreme Court agreed with the finding and the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court did not have an obligation to render a judgment in response to the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The fact that approximately a week earlier the Supreme Court had delivered a judgment in a different case where it had annulled an order to leave and the prohibition on entry because the requirement of “an actual threat” had not been met, cannot be interpreted to mean that it was bound to examine the appeal and deliver a judgment in the instant case.
43. In the light of the abovementioned reasons, the Court concludes that
the expulsion decision was in accordance with law.Legitimate aim
44. The Court notes that in the context of domestic law and applicable European Union law, the expulsion decision referred to the interests of public order and national security, which can be seen as legitimate aims under Article 8 of the Convention. Given that the decision relied on the applicant’s criminal record, which included unlawful handling of large quantities of narcotic drugs, the Court considers that it can also be seen to have served the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others. “Necessary in a democratic society”
45. The main principles of the Court’s case-law in respect of whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” have been summarised in the case of Üner (cited above, §§ 57-58) and have been recently reiterated in the case of Levakovic v. Denmark (cited above, §§ 36-37).
46. Turning to the facts of the present case the Court notes that the applicant mainly complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the PBGB and the domestic courts had not properly established that he posed an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public order and national security. He supported his argument by the fact that the Supreme Court refused to examine his appeal on points of law, despite having explained in a recent judgment the need to identify such a threat when expelling a long-term resident from a country. At the same time the applicant did not put forward any substantive arguments in his application to the Court as to why the threat assessment had been erroneous or why he should not be considered to pose an actual and sufficiently serious threat.
47. The Court considers that the offence which the domestic authorities mainly relied on when deciding to expel the applicant – unlawful handling of large quantities of narcotic drugs – was undoubtedly very serious, as evidenced by the fact that it gave rise to a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. The severity of this offence must therefore weigh heavily in the balance. It moreover appears that the applicant committed the drug offence in 2009, during the probation period linked to his earlier criminal offence of driving in the state of intoxication. The Court reiterates that the member States are entitled to view offences involving drugs as serious, particularly given the destructive effects of such offences on society as a whole (see Assem Hassan Ali v. Denmark, no. 25593/14, § 47, 23 October 2018, and the cases cited therein, and Balogun v. the United Kingdom, no. 60286/09, § 49, 10 April 2012). In addition to the nature and seriousness of the offences committed by the applicant, the domestic authorities also relied on the risk assessment of the applicant (in which he was considered to be highly dangerous to the public) as well as on the information provided by Viru Prison that the applicant maintained contact with people known to be involved in organised crime. Against that background, the Court does not see a reason to question the PBGB’s finding that the applicant posed an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public order and national security.
48. The Court has also taken note of the applicant’s reference to the Supreme Court’s judgment in case no. 3-17-1545, where the court found that the person who was about to be expelled from Estonia did not pose an actual threat. In that case the Supreme Court attached weight to a number of positive developments that had taken place while the person in question had been imprisoned. The Court observes that the case before the Supreme Court is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand, where the applicant himself has not put forward any arguments, and none appear from the material available to the Court, that would allow the Court to consider that the threat emanating from the applicant is no longer “actual”.
49. The Court turns next to assessing the applicant’s ties with the host country and with the country of destination. As already established above, the applicant cannot rely on the right to respect for his family life (see paragraph 37 above; see also Levakovic, cited above, § 44, where the Court
attached particular weight to the fact that the expulsion of the applicant did not interfere with his family rights, and was limited to his right to private life). However, the Court has no doubt that the applicant has strong personal ties to Estonia owing to the fact that he was born there and has lived in that country his entire life. The applicant is currently forty-six years old. Moreover, his mother, brother, sister, cohabiting partner and two adult children live there.
50. At the same time, it is true that the applicant has not obtained Estonian citizenship and that his knowledge of Estonian is limited, considering that he passed the A1 level course of the Estonian language in prison only in 2013 and, as far as is known, has not been successful in pursuing his language studies (see paragraph 10 above).
51. The Court reiterates, that in pursuance of their task of maintaining public order, Contracting States have the power to expel an alien convicted of criminal offences, even in circumstances where an alien entered the host country as an adult or at a very young age, or was perhaps even born there (see Üner, cited above, § 55).
52. The Court notes that although the applicant’s current ties to Russia are undoubtedly weaker than his ties to Estonia, it cannot be disregarded that he speaks Russian as a mother tongue and has taken Russian citizenship. Moreover it was established in the domestic proceedings that the applicant had in the past founded a company in Russia. Given the applicant’s age and his field of employment (see paragraphs 10 and 16), the Court does not consider that he would face insurmountable difficulties in strengthening his ties with Russia and settling there.
53. Lastly, the Court notes that the expulsion decision was accompanied by a prohibition to enter Estonia for five years. However, the applicant did not raise a complaint about the entry ban as such or its duration before the Court (compare Samsonnikov v. Estonia, no. 52178/10, § 73, 3 July 2012). Although the applicant did not expressly challenge the entry ban before the domestic courts either, the Tartu Court of Appeal, referring to section 7-4(2) of the Leave and Entry Act nonetheless found that it was lawful. The applicant did not challenge this finding in his appeal of points of law. Although after the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s appeal on points of law, he requested the Minister of the Interior to revoke the entry ban, he did not challenge the minister’s refusal to do so. Hence, even assuming that the applicant’s complaint before the Court concerned all aspects of the expulsion decision – that is to say also the entry ban – the Court is prevented from addressing this complaint owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Accordingly, the Court will not analyse whether the duration of the entry ban constituted a proportionate interference with the applicant’s rights guaranteed under the Convention.
54. In the light of the reasons given above and taking into account the careful and appropriate consideration that was given to the applicant’s case by the domestic authorities, the Court finds that the interference with the applicant’s private life caused by his expulsion from Estonia being ordered was not disproportionate in the circumstances of the case.
55. Accordingly, it is appropriate to reject the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.Other alleged violations of the Convention
56. As for the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that the decisions regarding the entry, stay and deportation of aliens do not concern the determination of an applicant’s civil rights or obligations or of a criminal charge against him, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Maaouia v. France [GC], no. 39652/98, §§ 38-40, ECHR 2000‑X). Consequently, Article 6 § 1 is not applicable in the instant case. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
57. The Court reiterates that, regardless of the finding above, the applicant’s complaint raised under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the application of the notion of threat to public order and security as laid down in the Aliens Act and interpreted by the Supreme Court has in any event already been addressed in the context of the applicant’s complaint lodged under Article 8 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 19 May 2020.
Hasan BakırcıValeriu Griţco
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy