AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 11831/85
by Manfred SCHMID
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 9 December 1987, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
S. TRECHSEL
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 28 August 1985
by Manfred Schmid against Austria and registered on 14 October 1985
under file N° 11831/85;
Having regard to the Commission's decision of 2 March 1987 to
give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to
invite them, in accordance with Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of
Procedure, to submit observations in writing on the admissibliity and
merits;
Having regard to the Government's observations of 19 May 1987,
and the applicant's observations in reply of 15 June 1987;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, an Austrian citizen born in 1938 who resides at
Mils, Tyrol, was formerly a practising lawyer and has been debarred
since 1981. He complains of criminal proceedings in which he has been
convicted of an offence under the Foreign Exchange Act (Devisengesetz).
An earlier application lodged with the Commission (No. 10670/83)
related to the detention and bail conditions imposed on him in
connection with the same proceedings. It was declared inadmissible on
9 July 1985.
The facts agreed between the parties may be summarised as
follows:
The criminal proceedings in question originated in two
different sets of investigation proceedings.
In one case, which involved charges of criminal bankruptcy
(Sections 12, 156 (1) and (2) of the Penal Code) against the applicant
and another person, the public prosecutor's office in Innsbruck
submitted an indictment on 27 November 1980. In this case the
applicant filed an objection (Einspruch) against the indictment which
was rejected by the Innsbruck Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) on
22 January 1981.
In the other case, which involved inter alia a charge
based on Section 24 (1) of the Foreign Exchange Act, the indictment
was submitted on 30 June 1981. It was deposited for the applicant at
the post office on 19 August 1981 and he raised no objections in this
case.
In the first case, the charges against the applicant were
severed from those against his co-accused by a decision of the
Innsbruck Regional Court (Landesgericht) of 26 March 1981. By a
subsequent decision of the same court, of 2 May 1983, these charges
were joined to those in the second case.
On 10 October 1984, the Regional Court found the applicant
guilty of the criminal offence stipulated by Section 24 (1) of the
Foreign Exchange Act, committed by the purchase of 4 kg of gold ingots
in Liechtenstein without the required permission from the National
Bank. The Court sentenced him to a conditional fine of AS 4,800.-
subject to a probation period of three years. At the same time the
applicant was acquitted of all other charges which had been preferred
against him.
The applicant filed a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde)
against his conviction, and the public prosecutor appealed against the
sentence (Berufung).
In the plea of nullity, the applicant complained that at the
(first) trial on 11 July 1983 the Court had violated Section 250 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) in that it had
failed to inform him of the statement of a co-defendant who had been
examined in his absence. He further complained that his requests for
the hearing of certain witnesses had been rejected, and that the
judgment lacked a detailed assessment of the evidence.
The Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) rejected the plea of
nullity by a decision of 21 March 1985. It held that any possible
ground of nullity regarding the trial of 11 July 1983 had become
without object as the trial had been repeated on 10 October 1984.
The applicant had not made similar allegations concerning the latter
trial. As regards the applicant's requests for evidence, it was true
that he had asked in writing for the hearing of certain witnesses, but
he had failed to repeat these requests at the trial on 10 October
1984, and therefore he was barred from claiming an irregularity of the
proceedings in this respect. Finally as regards the reasoning of the
Regional Court's judgment, the Supreme Court considered that it showed
in a logical and conclusive manner why certain of the co-defendant's
statements had been regarded as true.
The prosecution's appeal against the sentence was not examined
by the Supreme Court itself, but was referred to the Innsbruck Court
of Appeal. In this appeal, the prosecution applied to increase the
conditional fine and to impose, in addition, a substitute fine in lieu
of forfeiture (Verfallsersatzstrafe) amounting to the value of the
traded gold. Section 29 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Act provides for
the imposition of such a penalty if objects liable to forfeiture
cannot be seized. The prosecution submitted that the aim of this
provision was to prevent that the proceeds of the criminal transaction
remain in the hands of the offender. Accordingly the gold ingots
concerned in the present case should have been declared forfeited, and
as they were no longer available, a substitute penalty should have
been imposed.
On 12 June 1985, the Court of Appeal partly allowed the
prosecution's remedy. It declared the traded gold forfeited and
imposed a substitute fine of AS 900,000.- to be replaced, in case of
default, by ten months' imprisonment (Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe). The
conditional fine of AS 4,800.-, however, was not increased. In the
reasons for this decision it was stated that, in view of the scope of
the applicant's illegal transactions, it was appropriate to make a
declaration of forfeiture in accordance with Section 29 of the Foreign
Exchange Act. As it was certain that the gold could not be seized, a
substitute fine had to be imposed in lieu of the unenforceable
forfeiture. Regarding the applicant's doubts as to the prosecution's
right to claim forfeiture in the appeal proceedings after it had
announced an appeal against the sentence, the Court observed that also
ancillary penalties (Nebenstrafen) such as forfeiture are part of the
sentence and can be requested in appeal proceedings.
&_COMPLAINTS&S
1. The applicant now complains, under Article 6 para. 3 (d) of
the Convention, that at his trial several witnesses proposed by him
were not heard, and that he was thereby treated differently from the
prosecution. He further submits that his conviction was essentially
based on the statements of a co-defendant which had been considered as
true although it was simultaneously established that allegations by
the same person as to the involvement of the applicant's brother were
incorrect. In this context the applicant criticises the joinder of
the cases against himself and the co-defendant, because this measure
deprived him of an effective defence. As an accused the co-defendant
allegedly was not obliged to tell the truth nor to reply to any
questions. Had he instead been summoned as a witness, he could have
been questioned and would have been obliged to tell the truth, and the
applicant would further have had the possibility to throw doubt on his
credibility by requesting his psychiatric examination. All these
possibilities allegedly did not exist against a co-defendant.
2. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention that on appeal his case was not heard by an impartial
tribunal. The Court of Appeal, when deciding on the imposition of the
substitute penalty, comprised two judges who had earlier taken part in
the decision of the same Court of 22 January 1981 concerning objections
of the applicant against the bill of indictment. Furthermore, the
applicant claims that the proceedings were unfair because he was
deprived of a remedy against the substitute penalty by virtue of the
fact that this penalty was imposed on him only in the appeal
proceedings.
3. The applicant finally claims that the alternative prison
sentence pronounced in default of payment of the forfeiture
substitution fine lacked a sufficient base in law. It is true that
Section 32 of the Foreign Exchange Act mentions a prison sentence as a
substitute penalty of forfeiture, but it does not lay down any precise
criteria as to the conditions on which it applies. In the present
case the substitute penalty was moreover pronounced despite the
prosecution's failure to apply for it in the trial proceedings, and
without the Court having verified whether or not the ingots struck by
the primary sanction of forfeiture were still available. The
applicant states that he risks the actual enforcement of the
substitute prison sentence as the substitute fine is uncollectable and
he considers that his imprisonment on this basis would violate
Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention.
&SPROCEEDINGS&-
The application was introduced on 28 August 1985 and
registered on 14 October 1985.
On 2 March 1987 the Commission decided to give notice of the
application to the respondent Government and to invite them, in
accordance with Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure, to
submit observations in writing on the admissibility and merits.
It was specified that the observations should be limited to
the complaints concerning the appeal proceedings before the Innsbruck
Court of Appeal and in particular the complaint that this court was
not impartial. The Government were invited to comment on this
complaint in the light of the Commission's Report of 7 May 1985 on
Application No. 9976/82, Ben Yaacoub v. Belgium.
The time limit for the submission of the Government's
observations was fixed at 15 May 1987. At the Government's request it
was subsequently extended until 31 May 1987.
The Government submitted their observations on 19 May 1987.
The applicant replied on 15 June 1987.
&SSUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES&-
A. The Government
Insofar as the applicant alleges the lack of impartiality of
the Court of Appeal, the Government refer to Section 68 para. 2 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which provides for the exclusion from the
trial, that is the direct oral hearing in a court of first instance,
of any judge who has previously acted as an investigating judge in the
same case or who has participated in the decision on objections
against the indictment. Section 69 defines special reasons for the
exclusion of members of higher courts. However, there exists case-law
according to which the grounds of exclusion stipulated in Section 68
for the trial before a court of first instance are also applicable to
a renewed trial before an appellate court, if a new decision is to be
taken on the merits after the previous decision has been quashed by
the Supreme Court. This does not apply, however, if the appellate
proceedings do not deal with questions of fact or guilt but merely
with the penalty.
In the present case, the Regional Court of Innsbruck found the
applicant guilty only of the offence stipulated by Section 24 para. 1
(a) of the Foreign Exchange Act. It acquitted him of all other
charges, including those contained in the indictment of 27 November
1980 which originally belonged to separate proceedings and were joined
to the present case on 2 May 1983. The Court of Appeal had to deal
exclusively with the public prosecutor's appeal concerning the
sentence imposed according to the Foreign Exchange Act. The charges
of the Bill of Indictment to which the applicant had raised objections
had long been legally settled by the applicant's above acquittal.
The Government consider that partiality within the meaning of
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention cannot be inferred from the fact
that members of the Court of Appeal had participated in a decision
rejecting objections against the indictment in another, already
legally terminated case against the applicant.
The two judges of the Court of Appeal did not decide twice on
one and the same matter when they dealt with the objection against the
bill of indictment and when they decided the appeal in the present
case. However, it follows from the Piersack and De Cubber judgments
of the Court (Eur. Court H.R., Piersack judgment of 1 October 1982,
Series A no. 53; De Cubber judgment of 26 October 1986, Series A
no. 86) as well as from the Commission's Report in the Ben Yaacoub
case (Application No. 9976/82, Ben Yaacoub v. Belgium, Comm. Report
7.5.85), that the decisive point was the fact that the judge had
far-reaching powers in the preliminary proceedings, from which it
could be gathered that he had acquired profound knowledge of the case,
which enabled him to play a leading part in the taking of the decision
at the trial. In the present case, the two judges had not acquired a
profound knowledge of the case simply because the earlier decision
concerned a different matter.
If the applicant had nevertheless feared that these two judges
might not be impartial he could have voiced his reasons in the
appellate proceedings, either personally or through his counsel as
soon as he learned that the two judges would participate. It would
have been incumbent upon the Court of Appeal to take a decision based
on the analogous application of the provisions governing the trial of
first instance. Motions to disqualify individual members of the
tribunal that are not filed in the appellate proceedings are decided
upon by the President of the Court of Appeal. In the present case it
must, however, be assumed that the applicant's motion would not have
been allowed.
As regards, finally, the lawfulness of the Court of Appeal's
decision to impose a forfeiture substitution fine and a substitute
prison sentence, the Government refer to Section 283 para. 2 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which stipulates that an appeal to the
detriment of the defendant may be filed if the Court has not
pronounced the harshest legally admissible penalty or has not imposed
a legally admissible ancillary penalty or if the fine or prison
sentence imposed did not reach the maximum level provided for by the
law. The forfeiture substitution fine as provided for in Section 29
para. 2 of the Foreign Exchange Act is an ancillary penalty which,
according to Section 283 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, may be
imposed to the detriment of the defendant in appeal proceedings. There
is no necessity for the Bill of Indictment to include a special motion
in order to apply Section 29 of the Foreign Exchange Act. Furthermore,
the Court can immediately impose a forfeiture substitution fine
instead of the non-enforceable forfeiture. The Court of Appeal did
not transgress its punitive power when it imposed a substitute prison
sentence of 10 months since Section 32 para. 1 of the Foreign Exchange
Act specifically provides for a substitute prison sentence for fines
in lieu of forfeiture and since the scope of this provision was not
exceeded in the concrete case. Accordingly, the substitute prison
penalty is provided for by law and admissible under Article 5 para. 1
(a) of the Convention.
The Government therefore request the Commission to reject the
application as being manifestly ill-founded or, alternatively, to find
no violation of the Convention.
B. The applicant
The applicant observes that the two proceedings concerning
offences under the Foreign Exchange Act and fraudulent bankruptcy were
joined and tried together. Therefore it is correct to say that there
were judges of the Court of Appeal who had earlier participated in a
decision on objections against the indictment concerning a part of the
proceedings.
The Government admit that Austrian law would not allow the
challenge of the two judges. Furthermore it is impossible to separate
conviction and sentence. The Foreign Exchange Act gives the court
discretion to impose a fine in lieu of a forfeiture. An unbiased
court would not have used this discretion. Therefore the public
prosecutor did not request such a penalty in the first instance
proceedings because the impartial chamber of that court would not have
granted the request. Instead the prosecutor pressed the matter before
the biased Court of Appeal. This inserts itself in a campaign by the
public prosecutor's office in Innsbruck against the applicant.
The applicant could not challenge the judges under Sections 68
or 69 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If they were biased, the
judges should have stood down on their own initiative (cf. Section 73
of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
As regards the lawfulness of the additional penalty, the
applicant maintains that its imposition in the appeal proceedings was
inadmissible because he was thereby deprived of a remedy. He further
observes that Section 32 para. 1 of the Foreign Exchange Act does not
provide a sufficiently precise legal basis for the substitute prison
sentence.
THE LAW
1. With regard to the judicial decisions of which the applicant
complains, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19
(Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the
obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In
particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging
that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,
except where it considers that such errors might have involved a
possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention. The Commission refers, on this point, to its constant
case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp. 222, 236;
No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77,
Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).
2. The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 3 (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of
the Convention of the trial proceedings which led to his conviction.
Article 6 para. 3 (d) provides (Art. 6-3-d):
"3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has
the following minimum rights:
...
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses
against him."
The applicant claims that the Court unjustifiedly refused to hear
certain witnesses proposed by him and that he could not put questions
to the co-accused on whose evidence his conviction was primarily
based.
The Commission notes that the applicant has in substance
raised these complaints in the domestic proceedings by including them
in his plea of nullity to the Supreme Court. However, as regards the
refusal to hear certain witnesses the plea of nullity was rejected on
the ground that the applicant had not repeated his requests for
evidence at the trial itself as required under Section 246 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. The Commission recalls its case-law according
to which "an applicant is normally required to comply with the formal
conditions of the domestic law as regards his requests for witnesses'
evidence, otherwise he will be considered as having failed to exhaust
the domestic remedies in good order" (Application No. 10498/83,
Prasser v. Austria, dec. 7.12.1984, to be published). In the present
case the applicant did not comply with the conditions of Austrian
law as regards his requests for the hearing of the witnesses in
question. He therefore has not exhausted the domestic remedies in conformity
with the requirements of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. This part of
the application must accordingly be rejected under Article 27 para. 3
(Art. 27-3).
Insofar as the applicant had complained of the impossibility
to put questions to the co-accused, his plea of nullity was rejected
on the ground that it related only to a trial which was subsequently
repeated, and that he had not raised similar complaints regarding the
ultimate and decisive trial of his case. In these circumstances it
appears that the applicant again has not exhausted the domestic
remedies in good order. Moreover, even assuming that the applicant may
nevertheless be regarded as having exhausted the domestic remedies
insofar as he complains of the applicable legislation which allegedly
did not allow him to question a co-accused, as distinguished from a
witness in the formal sense, his submissions are contradicted by the
Code of Criminal Procedure itself. Section 248 (4) provides that the
accused shall be asked immediately after the examination of any
witness, expert or co-accused whether or not he wishes to reply to the
latter's testimony. Section 249 further provides that inter alia the
accused and his defence counsel have the right to put questions to any
person heard by the Court, subject to control by the President of the
Court as to whether any questions so put are inappropriate. Section
250 finally provides that, in the exceptional cases where a witness or
co-accused is heard in the absence of the accused, the latter must
after his readmission to the courtroom be informed, under sanction of
nullity, of any development of the proceedings which has taken place
in his absence, and in particular of the depositions which have been
made. In these circumstances there is no appearance of an
infringement of the rights of the defence as laid down in Article 6 para. 3 (d)
(Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention. This part of the application must accordingly
be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of
the Convention of the proceedings before the Innsbruck Court of Appeal.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), first sentence, provides:
"In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law."
The applicant alleges on the one hand that two of the judges lacked
impartiality because of their involvement in a previous decision
concerning objections against the indictment, and on the other hand
that it was unfair to impose additional sanctions on him in the appeal
proceedings.
As regards the first complaint, the Commission notes that the
applicant did not challenge the judges under Sections 72 and 73 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
However, according to the Government the remedy in question
did not have any prospects of success; it must therefore be regarded
as ineffective. In these circumstances the applicant was not, under
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, required to exhaust this remedy.
The applicant submits that the Court of Appeal which imposed
an additional sanction on him was not impartial because two judges had
in an earlier decision of the same court rejected an objection raised
by the applicant against the indictment. However, that decision, which
was given on 22 January 1981, concerned a different case. The relevant
proceedings, which involved charges of criminal bankruptcy, were at
that time conducted separately from those which involved the charge
under the Foreign Exchange Act.
It is true that the two sets of proceedings were subsequently
joined by a decision of 2 May 1983 and that in first instance all
charges were the subject of the same trial before the Regional Court
of Innsbruck. However, the applicant was eventually convicted only
under the Foreign Exchange Act and acquitted of all other charges.
The appeal proceedings of which he now complains concerned exclusively
the offence under the Foreign Exchange Act. The proceedings
concerning the charges of criminal bankruptcy against whose admission
the applicant had filed an objection, and of which he had been
acquitted, were then no longer pending.
According to the principles developed by the Court (Eur. Court
H.R., Piersack judgment of 1 October 1982, Series A no. 53; De Cubber
judgment of 26 October 1986, Series A no. 86) and the Commission
(Application No. 9976/82, Ben Yaacoub v. Belgium, Comm. Report 7.5.85), the
judicial "impartiality" required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention may be jeopardised if a judge takes part in several consecutive
stages of the proceedings. In particular in the Ben Yaacoub case the
Commission found that a judge who had taken part in a decision concerning the
admission of the indictment should not participate in the subsequent trial
proceedings (Comm. Report, loc. cit. paras. 108-109). In the Commission's
view he should also be excluded from the appeal proceedings.
However, as the Government rightly observe, these principles
only apply where participation in different stages of the same
proceedings is concerned. A judge is not necessarily biased merely
because he has been involved in other proceedings concerning the same
person. In the present case other proceedings were temporarily
combined with the present case and two Court of Appeal judges had
earlier participated in a decision concerning those proceedings.
This, however, does not in the Commission's view justify the finding
that the judges concerned were not impartial, as required by Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1). Their involvement in the criminal bankruptcy case, although
concerning the same person, is not sufficient a reason to assume that they were
prejudiced in the foreign exchange case.
It follows that the applicant's first complaint concerning the
Court of Appeal's proceedings is manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
As regards the second complaint, the Commission notes that
the imposition of an additional sanction in the appeal proceedings
deprived the applicant of the possibility of filing an appeal which he
would have had if the sanction had been pronounced by the trial Court
itself. However, this circumstance cannot in itself be considered as
unfair as no right to criminal appeal proceedings can be derived from
the Convention and in particular from Article 6 (Art. 6) (cf. the constant
case-law, e.g. Eur. Court H.R. Sutter judgment of 22 January 1984,
Series A no. 74, p. 13 para. 28). The Commission further notes that
in the present case the prosecution had requested the additional
sanction in its grounds of appeal and that the applicant was able to
make submissions in reply. Furthermore an oral hearing took place
before the Court of Appeal in which the applicant was represented by
counsel and therefore was able to defend himself. It has not been
substantiated that the principles of a fair hearing, including the specific
principles enshrined in Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3) of the Convention, have
been disregarded at this hearing. It follows that the applicant's above
complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
4. The applicant finally complains that the alternative sanction
imposed on him in the appeal proceedings, i.e. a term of imprisonment
to be served in default of the payment of the fine replacing the
forfeiture (Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe für die Verfallsersatzstrafe),
lacked a sufficient legal basis. In this respect, the applicant
invokes Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention, claiming that the
imminent deprivation of his liberty on this basis would be unlawful.
The Commission considers that the substance of the applicant's
above complaint, namely his allegation that a penal sanction was
imposed on him without a sufficient legal basis, comes within the
scope of Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the Convention.
This provision reads as follows:
"No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which
did not constitute a criminal offence under
national or international law at the time when
it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be
imposed than the one that was applicable at the
time the criminal offence was committed."
The second sentence of this provision clarifies that not only
the definition of any criminal offence, but also the penalties which
may be imposed for it, must in principle be determined by the law
prior to the commission of the offence in question. A sufficient
legal basis of the "applicable penalty" is in fact presupposed when it
is stated that no heavier penalty than the one "applicable" at the
time of the commission of the offence may be imposed.
However, with regard to the particular facts of the present
case the Commission notes that the penalty complained of, i.e.
imprisonment as an alternative sanction for a fine replacing
forfeiture, is indeed mentioned in Section 32 of the Foreign Exchange
Act. It provides that imprisonment as an alternative to a fine
replacing forfeiture, and imprisonment as an alternative to another
fine, taken together, shall not exceed the total length of eighteen
months. This shows that the sanction complained of was provided for
by law and limited as to its scope. The Commission considers this to
be a sufficient legal basis for the purposes of Article 7 (Art. 7).
As to the imposition of the challenged penalty in this
particular case the Commission notes that under Austrian law an
ancillary sanction such as this could lawfully be imposed in appeal
proceedings, and that the conditions for replacing forfeiture by a
fine or imprisonment were also met because the Courts had actually
established that the ingots were irretrievable. The applicant has not
substantiated in any way that this latter finding was based on wrong
factual assumptions, in particular he has not made any submissions
that the ingots were still in his possession.
The applicant's above complaint that this penal sanction
lacked a sufficient legal basis is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must
also be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)