AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 25461/94
by Anna SEIDLOVÁ
against the Slovak Republic
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 6 September 1995, the following members being present:
Mr. H. DANELIUS, President
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
MM. G. JÖRUNDSSON
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
F. MARTINEZ
L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
Ms. M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 23 March 1994 by
Mrs. Anna SEIDLOVÁ against the Slovak Republic and registered on
21 October 1994 under file No. 25461/94;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Slovak citizen born in 1914. She is retired
and resides in Roznava.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
In 1961 the applicant's husband and several other persons were
found guilty of larceny in that they had illegally dealt in meat which
belonged to a State-owned company. The courts found the husband
responsible for damage amounting to 152,962 crowns and considered him
as one of the principal organisers of the larceny. He was sentenced
to twelve years' imprisonment and subsidiarily to confiscation of his
property. In addition, he and his co-defendants had to compensate the
damage. In 1963 the applicant's husband died in prison.
Pursuant to the Judicial Rehabilitation Act 1991 the Prosecutor
General lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court (Najvyssí súd) in
which he alleged that the 1961 decision to confiscate the property of
the applicant's husband's three co-defendants was unlawful. On
25 March 1992 the Supreme Court quashed the decision challenged by the
Prosecutor General. The co-defendants, one of whom had also been
regarded as a principal organiser of the larceny, had been held
responsible for damage amounting to 83,200, 43,711 and 39,470 crowns,
respectively. In 1961 they had been sentenced respectively to ten and
six and a half years' imprisonment.
In the Supreme Court's view, the decision to confiscate the
property of the three co-defendants was disproportionate to the gravity
of the crime of which they had been found guilty and contradictory to
the aim of the punishment, namely the individual and general
deterrence.
The Supreme Court found that the confiscation bore no relation
to the offence committed, and that in any event the courts had also
ordered them to pay damages. The decision to confiscate the property
was not appropriate as the prison sentences imposed on the three
offenders were sufficiently severe as such. Finally, the Supreme Court
considered that in 1961 the courts had overestimated the aggravating
circumstances of the case without taking into due consideration the
fact that the accused had voluntarily admitted their criminal activity
and thereby facilitated the investigation.
On 8 December 1992 the Prosecutor General lodged a similar
complaint against the 1961 sentence by which the property of the
applicant's husband had been confiscated. He considered that the
penalty imposed on the husband was disproportionate and that it had
been motivated by political reasons. The Prosecutor General maintained
that neither the character and gravity of the offence committed by the
offender nor his personal situation had required the confiscation of
his property.
The Prosecutor General considered that the justification, in
1961, of the confiscation of the husband's property by the necessity
to deprive him of the material basis for committing further offences
had been unlawful as he had been a State employee and his
material situation had been in no relation to the offence of which he
had been found guilty. In addition to the confiscation of his
property, the husband had also been sentenced to pay damages to his
employer.
On 10 March 1993 the Supreme Court dismissed the Prosecutor
General's complaint. It noted that although the 1961 judgment
concerning the applicant's husband had been politically motivated, the
sentence was neither disproportionate nor contrary to the aim pursued.
The husband had been regarded as one of the principal organisers of the
larceny, and the damage for which he had been held responsible far
exceeded that caused by the three other co-defendants.
The Supreme Court found that in 1961 the courts had taken into
due account all particular circumstances of the case as regards the
applicant's husband, namely that the criminal activity served as a
source of income, that the damage caused by him exceeded eight years'
income in a public company, and that it was therefore not probable that
he would be able to pay the damages as ordered by the courts. For
these reasons, the Supreme Court had concluded that the decision to
confiscate his property was not unlawful.
The applicant considered that the Supreme Court had treated her
husband's case differently from those of his three co-defendants. She
introduced a petition before the Constitutional Court (Ústavny súd)
alleging a violation of the constitutional right to equality in dignity
and rights. On 22 September 1993 the Constitutional Court rejected the
petition as it found that the particular circumstances of the
applicant's husband's case were not identical with those of his co-
defendants.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that the Supreme Court evaluated the
facts on which the decision to confiscate her husband's property had
been founded differently from those of the other co-defendants' cases.
She alleges that she was thereby deprived of a fair hearing by an
impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention.
She further alleges a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
in that the Supreme Court did not order the restitution of her
husband's property, notwithstanding that it had been confiscated in
violation of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and the generally
recognised principles of international law.
Finally, the applicant complains that her husband's case was
treated differently from those of the other co-defendants despite the
identity of their particular circumstances. She alleges a violation
of the principle of equality of all persons before the tribunals
guaranteed by Article 14 para. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
THE LAW
1. The applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention which provides, so far as relevant, as
follows:
"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an ...
impartial tribunal established by law."
The Commission does not consider it necessary to examine whether
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention applies to the proceedings at
issue since this part of the application is in any event inadmissible
for the following reasons.
To the extent that the applicant complains of the Supreme Court's
decision in her husband's case, the Commission recalls that it is not
called upon to decide whether or not the domestic courts have correctly
assessed the evidence before them (cf. No. 6172/73, Dec. 7.7.75, D.R.
3 p. 77, with further references) or to deal with an application
alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic
courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved
a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention (cf. No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 p. 31, with further
references).
In the present case the Supreme Court examined the particular
circumstances of the case, evaluated the evidence which it had before
it and for reasons expressly stated in its decision of 10 March 1993
found no violation of the law as regards the confiscation of the
applicant's husband's property. The Commission considers that this
decision is neither grossly unfair nor arbitrary.
To the extent that the applicant alleges lack of impartiality of
the Supreme Court, the Commission notes that the impartiality of a
court cannot be put in doubt by the fact alone that it decided
differently in similar cases, and the applicant does not invoke any
other arguments in this respect.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant further alleges a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in that the Supreme Court did not quash the
decision by virtue of which her husband's property had been
confiscated.
In the present case the property was confiscated in 1961, and
according to the Commission's case-law deprivation of ownership or
another right in rem is in principle an instantaneous act which does
not produce a continuing situation of "deprivation of right" (cf. No.
7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14 p. 146).
On 10 March 1993 the Supreme Court decided that the 1961 decision
to confiscate her husband's property was not unlawful and thereby
deprived the applicant of the possibility to acquire this property
anew. However, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) "applies only to
existing possessions" and it does not guarantee, as such, any right to
acquire property (cf. No. 11628/85, Dec. 9.5.86, D.R. 47 p. 271, with
further references).
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. Finally, the applicant complains, with reference to Article 14
para. 1 (Art. 14-1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, that the Supreme Court took a different decision in
her husband's case although its particular circumstances were identical
with those of his co-defendants' cases.
The Commission recalls that pursuant to Article 25 (Art. 25) of
the Convention it may only receive complaints of a violation of the
rights set forth in the Convention. However, the Commission considers
that in substance the applicant complains of discrimination and
considers it appropriate to examine this complaint under Article 14 of
the Convention in connection with Article 6 (Art. 14+6) of the
Convention.
In its decision of 10 March 1993 the Supreme Court noted, inter
alia, that the damage for which the applicant's husband had been held
responsible far exceeded that which the three other co-defendants had
caused. The Constitutional Court found that the particular
circumstances of the husband's case had not been identical with those
of his co-defendants, and the Commission does not find this decision
arbitrary.
In these circumstances the Commission considers that the
distinction objected to by the applicant is founded, inter alia, on
dissimilar factual circumstances and is consistent with the
requirements of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber
(M.-T. SCHOEPFER) (H. DANELIUS)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy