FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 27767/13
Mirko ŠKUBONJA
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 19 May 2015 as a Committee composed of:
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, President,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
Ksenija Turković, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 19 March 2013,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Mirko Škubonja, is a Croatian national, who was born in 1950 and lives in Šibenik. He was represented before the Court by Mr M. Barbir, a lawyer practising in Ploče.
2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Civil proceedings
4. On 7 January 2003 the applicant brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu) against the State seeking payment of salary arrears.
5. On 21 March 2003 the first-instance court suspended the proceedings (mirovanje postupka).
6. On 26 June 2003 the applicant asked the first-instance court to resume the proceedings.
7. On 20 January 2004 the first-instance stayed the proceedings (prekid postupka) pending the outcome of the parallel civil proceedings between the State and another plaintiff concerning the same legal issue.
8. On 8 February 2007 the applicant withdrew his action.
9. On 10 May 2007 the State as the defendant asked the first-instance court to resume the proceedings since the conditions for doing so had been met.
10. On 25 May 2007 the first-instance court decided to resume the proceedings.
11. By a decision of 1 June 2007 the first-instance court declared that the applicant’s action had been withdrawn (see paragraph 8 above) and ordered him to pay the State as the defendant 1,890 Croatian kunas (HRK) in costs of proceedings.
12. On 21 June 2007 the applicant appealed against the part of that decision concerning the award of costs.
13. On 17 July 2007 the State as the defendant asked the first-instance court to rectify its decision of 1 June 2007 (see paragraph 11 above) as regards the applicant’s surname.
14. On 6 February 2008, 9 June 2010 and 19 November 2010 the State as the defendant urged the first-instance court to expedite the proceedings.
15. By a decision of 12 January 2011 the first-instance court rectified its decision of 1 June 2011 (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above).
16. On 3 February 2011 the applicant pointed out to the first-instance court that his appeal had never been forwarded to the second-instance court.
17. On 14 February 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision of 12 January 2011 (see paragraph 15 above).
18. On 3 July 2012 the case-file was forwarded to the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu).
19. On 24 July 2012 the applicant informed the Split Municipal Court that he had paid the State the costs of proceedings he had been ordered to pay in the decision of 1 June 2007 (see paragraph 11 above) and enclosed a payment slip indicating that on the same day he had paid HRK 1,890 in the State budget.
20. By a decision of 12 December 2012 the Split County Court reduced the amount of costs of proceedings the applicant had been ordered to pay the State in the first-instance decision of 1 June 2011 (see paragraph 11 above) to HRK 1,150.
21. On the same day the Split County Court upheld the first-instance decision on rectification of 12 January 2011 (see paragraph 15 above).
2. Proceedings following the applicant’s request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time.
22. Meanwhile, the applicant lodged a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time (zahtjev za zaštitu prava na suđenje u razumnom roku) with the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu), complaining about the length of the above civil proceedings.
23. On 17 May 2011 the Split County Court declared the applicant’s request inadmissible.
24. Following the applicant’s appeal, on 20 September 2012 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) reversed the first-instance decision by finding a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. It awarded him HRK 300 in compensation and ordered the Split County Court to decide upon his appeals within three months from service of its decision.
COMPLAINT
25. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the above civil proceedings.
THE LAW
26. The applicant complained that the length of the above civil proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
27. The Government disputed the admissibility of the application on four grounds. In particular, they argued that the application was incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention, that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the violation complained of, that he had not suffered a significant disadvantage and that the application was, in any event, manifestly ill-founded.
1. The parties’ submissions
28. The Government argued, inter alia, that the amount at stake in the civil proceedings complained of was only HRK 1,890 (see paragraphs 14 and 22 above), that is, some 260 euros (EUR). That sum had been further reduced by the Split County Court’s decision of 12 December 2012 whereby the applicant had been ordered to pay the State HRK 1,150 only (see paragraph 20 above), that is, some EUR 153. In this connection the Government referred to cases where the amounts at stake had been similar or substantially higher than the one in the present case and which the Court had declared inadmissible for lack of significant disadvantage. In particular, they cited the cases of Burov v. Moldova ((dec.), no. 38875/03, 14 June 2011) and Kiousi v. Greece ((dec.), no. 52036/09, 20 September 2011) where the amounts at stake had been EUR 228 and EUR 504, respectively. The Government thus invited the Court to declare the applicant’s case inadmissible on the same ground. In response to the applicant’s arguments to the contrary (see the following paragraph), the Government averred in particular that he had not submitted any evidence for his claim that the amount he had been ordered to pay constituted half of his monthly pension.
29. The applicant replied that it could not be argued that he had not suffered significant disadvantage because the amount of HRK 1,890 represented half of his monthly pension. Furthermore, he had to pay statutory default interest accrued on that amount from 1 June 2007 until 12 December 2012, that is, in the period of more than six and a half years, which had increased the sum in question by 84%.
2. The Court’s assessment
30. The Court first notes that by a decision of 1 June 2007 the applicant was ordered to pay the State HRK 1,890 in costs of proceedings (see paragraph 11 above), that is, some EUR 260. It also notes that the applicant paid those costs on 24 July 2012 (see paragraph 19 above) and that the amount it had to pay was eventually reduced to HRK 1,150, that is, some EUR 153 by the Split County Court’s decision of 12 December 2012 (see paragraph 20 above).
31. As regards the applicant’s argument that he also had to pay the statutory default interest accrued on those costs from the delivery of the first-instance decision of 1 June 2007 (see paragraph 29 above), the Court notes that the decision in question did not stipulate payment of statutory default interest on the costs of proceedings, and that on 24 July 2012 he had paid only the principal amount without any accrued interest (see paragraph 19 above). While it is true that under the relevant domestic legislation payment of statutory default interest on costs of proceedings could have been requested in the enforcement of a judgment or decision ordering payment of costs, the applicant could have prevented that interest from accruing had he paid the costs immediately, after the delivery of the first-instance decision.
32. The Court therefore finds that the amount at stake in the present case was indeed HRK 1,890 (EUR 260). That is so regardless of the fact that the applicant eventually had to pay HRK 1,150 (EUR 153). That being so, the Court further refers to its findings in the cases of Kiousi v. Greece (cited above) and Šumbera v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 48228/08, 21 February 2012) where it held that, having regard primarily to the low amounts at stake corresponding to EUR 504 and EUR 227 respectively, the applicants had not suffered a significant disadvantage. It sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.
33. In particular, the Court notes that in the instant case, just like in the Šumbera case (cited above), the proceedings complained of were incidental proceedings for determination of litigation costs following the applicant’s withdrawal of his civil action. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the applicant’s financial situation was such that payment of sum in question had a significant impact on his personal life (see Kiousi, cited above). In this respect the Court notes that the applicant did not substantiate his allegations that this amount represented a half of his monthly pension (see paragraph 29 above) by any evidence.
34. As to whether respect for the human rights safeguarded by the Convention and its Protocols requires the examination of the merits of the application, the Court has established in a number of cases (see, for example, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII; Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 69-98, ECHR 2006‑V; Majewski v. Poland, no. 52690/99, 11 October 2005; and Wende and Kukówka v. Poland, no. 56026/00, 10 May 2007), including those brought against Croatia (see, for example, Horvat v. Croatia, no. 51585/99, ECHR 2001‑VIII; Kozlica v. Croatia, no. 29182/03, 2 November 2006; and Pavić v. Croatia, no. 21846/08, 28 January 2010), its practice concerning complaints about the violation of one’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. Thus, given the clear and extensive case-law on the topic, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require an examination of the application on the merits.
35. Lastly, as to whether the case was “duly considered by a domestic tribunal”, the Court notes that the issue whether the applicant had to pay the costs of proceedings to the State following the withdrawal of his civil action on 8 February 2007 (see paragraph 8 above), and if so, in what amount, was examined on the merits by the first- and the second-instance courts (see paragraphs 11 and 20 above). Furthermore, his complaint about the length of those proceedings was also examined on the merits by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 24 above). The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant’s case was “duly considered by a domestic tribunal”.
36. It follows that the present application is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention because the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, and thus must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
37. In view of this conclusion it is not necessary to examine the remaining inadmissibility objections (see paragraph 27 above) raised by the Government.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 11 June 2015.
André WampachMirjana Lazarova Trajkovska
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy