S.N. AND T.D. v. LATVIA

FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 5794/13
S.N. and T.D.
against Latvia

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 6 December 2016 as a Chamber composed of:

Angelika Nußberger, President,
Erik Møse,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
André Potocki,
Faris Vehabović,
Yonko Grozev,
Síofra O’Leary, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 January 2013,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having regard to the decision taken by the President to appoint Judge Yonko Grozev, the judge elected in respect of Bulgaria, to sit in the place of Judge Mārtiņš Mits, the judge elected in respect of Latvia, who withdrew from sitting in the case (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rules 28 and 29 § 2(b) of the Rules of Court),

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicants, Mr S.N. (“the first applicant”) and Mr T.D. (“the second applicant”), are two Russian nationals, who were born in 1977 and 1972 respectively and live in Moscow. The President of the Section decided that their names should not be disclosed (Rule 47 § 4 of the Rules of the Court). The Chamber also decided not to notify the Government of the Russian Federation of the present application on the grounds that Article 36 § 1 of the Convention did not apply in the circumstances of the present case (see I v. Sweden, no. 61204/09, §§ 40-46, 5 September 2013).

2. The applicants were represented before the Court by Ms C. Kruger and Mr O. Rode, lawyers practising in Strasbourg and Riga respectively. The Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs K. Līce.

3. The applicants complained, in particular, that their expulsion to the Russian Federation had put them at risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, and that they did not have effective remedies in that regard. They also complained under Article 8 of the Convention about interference with their family life and absence of procedural safeguards in that regard.

4. On 6 February 2014 the above-mentioned complaints were communicated to the Government.

A. The circumstances of the case

5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

6. The applicants were born in what is now the Chechen Republic in the Russian Federation. The first applicant moved to Latvia in 1997 and has lived there ever since, on the basis of regularly renewed residence permits. In 2002 he was granted a permanent residence permit, which was renewed in 2007 and 2012. The second applicant moved to Latvia in 2002 and has lived there subsequently, on the basis of regularly renewed residence permits.

1. Inclusion in the list of aliens prohibited from entering in Latvia

7. On 26 July 2012 the Latvian Minister of Interior adopted decisions to include the applicants in the list of aliens prohibited from entering and remaining in Latvia and the Schengen Area (hereinafter “the blacklist”) for an indeterminate period of time. These decisions were taken on the basis of a report by the Constitution Protection Bureau, one of the Latvian intelligence services (Satversmes aizsardzības birojs – hereinafter “the SAB”), submitted on 9 July and amended on 20 July 2012. The SAB had informed the Minister of Interior that both applicants had been engaging in criminal activity and planning to commit a serious crime, and hence posed a threat to national security and public order and safety. The part relating to national security grounds was identical in both decisions and stated:

“The SAB indicated that the information obtained attests to [the applicant’s] criminal activity in a leading role within an organised criminal group. Similarly, it is apparent from the information provided by the SAB that [the applicant] is planning to commit a serious or especially serious crime which may have irreversible consequences on national security. As a consequence [the applicant] in his activity [is] a threat to public order and national security.”

8. The applicants were not made aware of the SAB’s report.

9. The decision concerning the first applicant pointed to the fact that he was married to a Russian national. It was therefore concluded that he would not encounter any obstacles in meeting his spouse outside Latvia.

10. In the decision concerning the second applicant it was noted that he was married to a Latvian national. His former wife (a Russian national) and their minor child were also residing in Latvia. The decision went on to state that an interference with the second applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life was justified, taking into account, among other things, that during the nine years he had resided in Latvia “he had not learned the [State language], which [had] clearly obstructed his integration into society”. It was also pointed out that he had moved to Latvia when he was over eighteen, which meant that his ties to his native country had not disappeared. With regard to him having an opportunity to meet his young son, the decision stated that he had already agreed in 2002, while still residing in Russia, that the child would reside with his mother in Latvia. It was therefore concluded that he “would not be entirely deprived of opportunities to meet [his] son” in Russia. The interference with his family life with his spouse, a Latvian national, was held to be “commensurate with the interests of the society”.

11. Both decisions mentioned that under section 61(8) of the Immigration Law, an appeal could be lodged with the Prosecutor General’s Office. The decisions became effective on the day they were signed, 26 July 2012, and were sent to the applicants’ declared addresses in Riga. On 3 August 2012 they were expelled from Latvia (see paragraph 23 below).

12. On 3 August 2012 the applicants, through their legal representative, applied to the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court to challenge the Minister of Interior’s decision to put their names on the blacklist. On 7 and 9 August 2012 the Senate refused to accept the applicants’ complaints for lack of jurisdiction, indicating that such reviews fell within the competence of the Prosecutor General if the decision had been adopted “on the basis of information obtained as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence”. The decisions also referred to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 6 December 2004 (see paragraph 53 below) which said that the prosecutor’s review as such did not infringe the right of access to court. The Senate’s decision was final.

13. On 20 August 2012 the applicants’ legal representative appealed to the Prosecutor General asking, inter alia, that the decision to put them on the blacklist be revoked and that he be given access to the SAB’s report of 9 and 20 July 2012, which had formed the basis of the Minister of Interior’s decision. On five occasions the appeals were amended to include, inter alia, the allegations that in 1998 the applicants had collaborated with the Latvian State security services in a hostage liberation operation in the Chechen Republic. Later the appeal was amended to include the second applicant’s allegation that subsequently he had refused to cooperate with a SAB officer in relation to certain activities of the leaders of the Chechen community in Latvia, and therefore the expulsion had been instigated in revenge for that.

14. In a reply of 24 September 2012 the Prosecutor General dismissed the request for access to the requested documents. He noted that the possibility to familiarise oneself with information containing State secrets, if necessary with the assistance of specially authorised representatives, as provided in section 65³ of the Immigration Law (see paragraph 51 below), applied only to administrative court proceedings. The Prosecutor General in his reply also stated:

“... By envisaging in section 61(8) of the Immigration Law that an appeal against a decision the Minister of Interior adopted on the basis of information obtained in the course of intelligence or counterintelligence activities carried out by a State security institution could be lodged with the Prosecutor General [but] not a court, the legislator wished especially to protect information obtained in the course of intelligence or counterintelligence activities; [granting] access to such information to persons not possessing special permission ... could seriously infringe the work of the State security institutions ... thus seriously impairing national security.”

15. In a final decision of 23 November 2012 the Prosecutor General reformulated the Minister of Interior’s decision of 26 July 2012 (see paragraph 7 above). The part relating to national security grounds was identical in his decisions relating to both applicants and stated:

“Having familiarised myself with the results of the review carried out by the Prosecutor [General’s Office] and the information provided in the conclusions and supporting documents, [I] find that the SAB, as a competent State institution, had grounds to consider that [the applicant] had a role in an organised criminal group and [was] one of its leaders, [had] committed or [was] planning to commit a serious or especially serious crime, and [that his] presence in Latvia was a threat to public order and national security as confirmed by the information [obtained by the SAB in the course of counterintelligence activities], which I have verified and examined.

Nevertheless, when adopting a decision to include [someone] in the list of aliens prohibited from entering the Republic of Latvia, the Minister must assess whether the behaviour of the foreigner and the nature and scope of information held by the competent institution is sufficient to establish any of the ... conditions set out in section 61(1) of the Immigration law.

Having examined the information held by the SAB, [I] consider that [the information] is not sufficient to establish the conditions set out in section 61(1)(1) and (3), [namely] that [the applicant is] acting in an anti-governmental or criminal organisation or [has] a role in such an organisation, and has carried out or is planning to commit a serious or particularly serious crime.

At the same time, the nature and scope of the SAB information obtained in the course of counterintelligence activities clearly attest to [the fact] that [the applicant’s] activity is a threat to Latvian national security and public order and safety, as well as a threat to the national security of the States in the Schengen [Area]. The condition set out in section 61(1)(2) has therefore been established, which serves as a basis for the adopted decision to include [the applicant] in the list of aliens prohibited from entering the Republic of Latvia.”

16. The Prosecutor General also dismissed the applicants’ fear that they could be exposed to ill-treatment in Russia due to their alleged involvement in the hostage liberation in 1998, as that involvement remained unconfirmed. In particular, the witnesses questioned had provided controversial submissions, which did not correspond to the testimony of other witnesses, including the statements obtained from the hostages liberated during the operation. In examining the allegations about the risk of ill-treatment after expulsion, the information the Prosecutor General’s Office had obtained from the Border Guard Service and the applicants’ relatives confirmed that on numerous occasions between January 2010 and July 2012 the applicants had entered the Russian Federation, including the Chechen Republic.

17. In relation to the complaint of unlawful activity by a SAB officer, the Prosecutor General noted that the meeting between the SAB officer and the second applicant had been recorded in accordance with the law, and that the second applicant’s allegations were ill-founded.

2. Proceedings for review of the decision of the Minister of Interior

18. Subsequently, in the light of the Prosecutor General’s decision to reformulate the basis on which the applicants’ names had been put on the blacklist, on 22 August 2013 their legal representative wrote to the Minister of Interior and director of the SAB asking for a review of the decisions to include them in the list.

19. On 25 September 2013 the applicants’ representative received a response from the director of the SAB, stating that his request of 22 August 2013 did not refer to any new circumstances which could serve as a basis for amending or revoking their report to the Minister of Interior in July 2012 (see paragraph 7 above). On 10 October 2013 the Minister of Interior gave a similar reply to the applicants’ representative.

20. In a letter sent to the Court on 21 October 2013 the applicants’ representative brought to the Court’s attention the following:

“... [I]n April 2013 the applicants were informed that in an unofficial conversation with a certain high-ranking police officer, [a staff member of the SAB] had stipulated that he would “take care” of any potential complaints the applicants might submit to the Court, and certain politicians would make sure the complaints were not successful. ... The applicants considered this information irrelevant before the above‑ mentioned official information [the Government’s letter] was received.”

They further drew the Court’s attention to two questions, the first being how the SAB became aware of their application to the Court, and the second how the application influenced the decisions of the SAB and Minister of Interior.

3. Other proceedings following the decision of the Minister of Interior of 26 July 2012 to include the applicants in the blacklist

(a) Detention and expulsion

21. The authorities apprehended the first and second applicants on 31 July and 2 August 2012 respectively. They were both placed in a State Police temporary detention facility. The first applicant met one of his lawyers on the day of his detention, and the other one the following day. The second applicant met his lawyer on the day of his detention.

22. On 2 August 2012 the acting chief of the Riga branch of the State Border Guard Service adopted decisions to expel the applicants from Latvia and to deport them to the Russian Federation. The reason was that the applicants constituted a threat to national security, public order or safety under section 51 paragraph 2 part 4 of the Immigration Law (see paragraph 47 below). The decisions indicated that it was possible to lodge an appeal without suspensive effect to the chief of the Border Guard Service. On the same day both applicants were made aware of the respective decisions. They both appealed (see paragraph 26 below).

23. On the morning of 3 August 2012 the applicants were taken to the Russian border and expelled from Latvia.

24. That afternoon one of the legal representatives sent a fax to, inter alia, the Border Guard Service, asking the applicants not to be expelled to the Russian Federation “because they are possibly agents of the Security Police and their expulsion to the receiving State puts them under threat and they could be subjected to torture”.

25. According to the applicants’ initial submissions to the Court, “five days after their expulsion to the Russian Federation” they were summoned by Chechen police and were questioned about their role in the hostage liberation operation in 1998 before being beaten up. The case file contains an identical certificate for each applicant issued by a Chechen hospital, confirming that on 10 August 2012 both applicants had been found to have concussion, a brain injury and multiple bruises and scratches. The applicants alleged that as a result of what had happened they had had to flee the Chechen Republic and were now hiding in the Russian Federation.

26. The applicants’ representative submitted appeals against the expulsion orders of 2 August 2012 (see paragraph 22 above), complaining, inter alia, of the authorities’ failure to strike a fair balance between the right to respect for their family life and the alleged threat to national security, as required under Article 8 of the Convention. The chief of the Border Guard Service dismissed the first and second applicant’s complaints on 23 and 27 August 2012 respectively.

27. In their appeal to the Administrative District Court of 7 September 2012 the applicants also said that before adopting the impugned decision the Border Guard Service had not heard them, meaning they had not been able to provide information on the possible threat they would face at the hands of the security services after their expulsion to the Russian Federation.

28. On 7 May 2014 the Administrative District Court, in two judgments, upheld the impugned decisions in relation to both applicants. The Administrative District Court established that prior to expulsion the applicants had not approached the Latvian authorities with allegations concerning the risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if expelled to the Russian Federation. It also noted that on 2 August 2012 both applicants were informed that the expulsion would be carried out the following day, on 3 August 2012. On the same day one of the applicants submitted a request to the chief of the Border Guard Service asking to be given several impounded goods in custody, but no other requests were made. Both applicants met their lawyers after being detained.

29. The court referred to its well-established case-law and noted that the decisions to put the applicants’ names on the blacklist on national security grounds had been reviewed and upheld by the Prosecutor General, so neither the Border Guard Service nor the administrative court were competent to review the Minister of Interior’s decision.

30. By addressing the complaint that in adopting the impugned expulsion decision of 2 August 2012 the applicants were not heard, the court noted that even if it constituted a minor procedural shortcoming, the lack of hearing of the applicants and witnesses could not have an effect on the outcome of the case. In particular, the court noted that the review of the Minister of Interior’s decision fell outside the scope of the present administrative proceedings. Any information the applicants might have submitted in relation to the adoption of the above decision could not have any effect on the content of the contested decision of 2 August 2012 to expel the applicants. Moreover, the applicants were not prevented, with the assistance of their legal representatives, from communicating to the Border Guard Service any information regarding the alleged interference the impugned decision would have on their family life.

31. The judgments also stated that there were no obstacles for the applicants to enjoy their family life in the Russian Federation. Nor were there any special circumstances to the effect that the family members could not join them outside Latvia. The wife of the first applicant was a Russian national and she would not have any restrictions to travel to the Russian Federation, whereas the second applicant would not encounter any obstacles in meeting outside Latvia his child whose mother was a Russian national.

32. On 3 September 2015 (in relation to the first applicant) and on 5 February 2015 (in relation to the second applicant) the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court refused to initiate cassation proceedings. The Senate stated, in particular, that the contested expulsion orders were a final stage in the proceedings initiated by the decisions of the Minister of Interior. The Senate further noted that it had been made aware of the decisions of the Minister of Interior and the letters of SAB on which the decision was based, and of the decisions of the Prosecutor General. Review of the above decisions fell outside the scope of the present proceedings, but these decisions attested to the lawful basis and legitimate aim of the applicants’ expulsion.

33. On the question of the proportionality of the interference with the applicants’ family lives, the Senate upheld the lower court’s findings and noted that the applicants had not advanced any arguments indicating any restrictions to enjoy their family life outside Latvia. In relation to the second applicant, the Senate noted that in 2002, while still residing in Russia, he had agreed that the child would reside with the applicant’s former wife, a Russian national, in Latvia. The Senate also stated that both applicants had entered the Republic of Latvia as adults and throughout their stay in Latvia they had not learned Latvian, which showed that their ties with the expelling State were not strong.

(b) Withdrawal of the residence permit

34. On 1 August 2012 the acting director of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs decided to withdraw the first applicant’s residence permit and refused to grant the second applicant a temporary residence permit because of their inclusion in the blacklist.

35. The applicants’ legal representative lodged appeals against the above-mentioned decisions on 22 and 28 August 2012 respectively. Two levels of administrative courts dismissed the complaints.

36. On 14 August 2015, the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court refused to initiate cassation proceedings in relation to the second applicant. The Senate noted, in particular, that the authorities had concluded that the applicant posed a threat to national security, and that depriving him of residence permit served a legitimate aim. The Senate also did not see any reasons why the applicant could not meet his minor child outside the territory of Latvia, especially in the circumstances where already in 2002, while still residing in Russia, the applicant had agreed that the child would reside with his mother in Latvia.

37. The cassation complaint submitted by the first applicant is pending examination before the Senate.

38. On 15 September 2014 the Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia issued an opinion following the applicants’ complaint concerning their expulsion proceedings. The Ombudsman did not find any violation of Articles 3 or 8 of the Convention. In relation to the review procedure, the opinion stated:

“A decision to include someone in the list of foreigners prohibited from entering the Republic of Latvia is adopted by the Senate of the Supreme Court in the form of oral proceedings by a special panel of judges to whom special access to [State] secrets is granted, as well as interpreters, recordkeepers and other court officials to whom such access is also granted. No prima facie legitimate purpose can currently be established for dividing the appellate procedure into the competence of two other institutions, the Supreme Court and Prosecutor General; no further analysis shall follow, however, as the assessment of this issue is not the subject of this case.”

39. The final conclusions, as far as relevant, stated:

“Firstly, a breach of Article 13 of the [Convention] and [Article 1 § 1 (a)] of Protocol No. 7 to the [Convention] has been committed in respect of the expelled S.N. and T.D. Once a State holds that not only the Supreme Court but also the Prosecutor General has the right to review a decision to include someone in the list of foreigners prohibited from entering the State, observation of the adversarial principle has to be ensured in the latter process, similar to the process guaranteed in Supreme Court [review cases]. If an alien seeks to contest the decision, defence counsel must be provided who has access to classified information, [State] secrets, and the right to familiarise [himself] with the evidence on which the expulsion of foreigners is based, so that a complaint may be filed for the protection of the interests of the expelled foreigner.”

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. Constitution

40. The relevant Articles of the Latvian Constitution (Satversme) provide:

Article 92

“Everyone has the right to defend his or her rights and lawful interests in a fair court. Everyone shall be presumed innocent until his or her guilt has been established in accordance with the law. Everyone whose rights are violated without justification has the right to commensurate compensation. Everyone has the right to the assistance of counsel.”

Article 96

“Everyone has the right to inviolability of his or her private life, home and correspondence.”

Article 116

“The rights of persons set out [in Article 96] ... of the Constitution may be subject to restrictions in the circumstances provided for by law in order to protect the rights of other people, the democratic structure of the State and public safety, welfare and morals. On the basis of the conditions set forth in this Article, restrictions may also be imposed on the expression of religious beliefs.”

2. The Constitutional Court Law, as in force at the material time

(a) Relevant provisions

41. Section 18 paragraph 1 part 4 of the Constitutional Court Law provides that an application to the Constitutional Court regarding the initiation of constitutional proceedings must, among other criteria, contain legal reasoning (juridiskais pamatojums). Pursuant to section 19², in addition to the above-mentioned requirements, an individual constitutional complaint must include justification as to how the applicant’s fundamental rights as defined in the Constitution have been infringed upon, and show that all available remedies have been used.

42. Section 20 sets out the grounds on which the panel examining the constitutional complaint may refuse to initiate a case. When examining a constitutional complaint (application) the panel may also refuse to initiate a case where the legal reasoning included in the complaint is evidently insufficient to satisfy the claim (section 20(6)).

(b) Interpretation of the “legal reasoning” requirement

43. In a decision of 14 March 2014 (application no. 29/2014) on the question of institution of constitutional proceedings, the panel of the Constitutional Court stated that the legal reasoning of a complaint is an analysis of the content of a legal provision, an explanation as to how the impugned provision interferes with the applicant’s fundamental rights, an assessment of the lawfulness of the procedure according to which the impugned provision has been adopted, and an assessment of the legal aim and proportionality of the interference.

44. On 7 May 2014 (application no. 61/2014) on the question of institution of constitutional proceedings, the panel of the Constitutional Court stated that in support of an allegation that the impugned provision does not comply with the provisions of the Constitution, the applicant must indicate in the legal reasoning (1) whether the contested provision contains any restriction of rights, (2) whether this restriction is prescribed by law and has a legitimate aim and (3) whether the restriction is proportionate to the aim pursued.

3. Immigration law (wording in force at the material time)

45. Under section 46(5) of the Immigration Law, once a decision to include an alien in a blacklist has been adopted by the Minister of Interior and if the person is on Latvian territory, the chief of the Border Guard Service or someone authorised by him must adopt a decision to expel (lēmums par piespiedu izraidīšanu) the person concerned within eight days, to be counted from the date it was established that he or she was on Latvian territory.

46. Section 50(1) provides that an alien has the right to appeal against an expulsion decision within seven days. Under section 50(3), an appeal against a decision taken pursuant to section 46 does not have suspensive effect.

47. Section 51 of the Immigration Law lists the circumstances in which the State Border Guard Service may detain an alien. Paragraph 2 part 4 at the material time, provided that an alien could be detained on grounds of information that a person poses threats to national security, public order or safety.

48. Under section 61(1)(1) the Minister of Interior may decide to include someone who is not a Latvian citizen or a “non-citizen” in a blacklist if, among other things, “competent State institutions have reason to believe” (“kompetentām valsts iestādēm ir pamats uzskatīt”) that he or she (i) is a member of an anti-governmental or criminal organisation or has a role in such an organisation, (ii) is a threat to national security or public order and safety, or (iii) may hinder the pre-trial investigation or work of the law enforcement authorities in investigating the crimes upon arriving in Latvia (section 61(1)(2)), or (iv) has carried out or is planning to carry out a serious or particularly serious crime (section 61(1)(3)).

49. In relation to the review, section 61 at the material time provided as follows:

(6) A alien in respect of whom a decision has been taken in accordance with [61(1)] has the right, within one month of becoming acquainted with the decision, to appeal to the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia. Submission of an application to the court may not suspend implementation of the decision referred to [in section 61(1)]. The applicant does not have the right to request the court to suspend the operation of such a decision.

...

(8) If the decision referred to in section 61(1) has been taken on the basis of information acquired by State security institutions as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence operations, it may be appealed to the Prosecutor General’s Office, whose decision shall be final.”

50. Section 61(6) came into effect on 1 July 2005 and it was introduced after the Constitutional Court had declared unconstitutional a provision providing that decisions adopted by the Minister of Interior were not amenable to review (see paragraph 53 below). Section 61(8) about the Prosecutor General’s Office review came into effect on 10 February 2006.

51. In May 2006 section 653(3) came into force, which provides that if the applicant’s representative does not have a special permit for access to State secrets, the court must appoint as the applicant’s representative for that part of the proceedings an advocate practising in Latvia who has been issued such a permit. If the applicant does not consent to such representation, the court must examine the information associated with official secrets without involving the applicant or his or her representative.

52. Section 63(7) provides that in cases where the period of an entry ban exceeds three years, the institution which has adopted the decision to include an alien in the blacklist shall review it every three years from the date it was taken.

4. Relevant Constitutional Court case-law

53. The relevant parts of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 6 December 2004 (case no. 2004-14-01) on the compliance of section 61(6) of the Immigration Law with Article 92 of the Constitution read:

“10. In conformity with section 61 of the Immigration Law, the opinion of the competent State authorities (in this particular case, the opinion of the State security institution) lies at the basis of the Minister’s [of the Interior] decision. Someone who challenges his or her inclusion in the [blacklist] does not agree, as a matter of course, with the facts expressed in the decision, which are often connected with issues of State security. When reviewing such claims, the use of confidential material may be unavoidable. Even though in cases connected with national security the possibility of legal examination is limited, this does not mean that the national authorities can be free from effective judicial control in all cases, whenever they choose to assert that national security and terrorism are involved (see ECHR Judgment in case “Chahal v. the United Kingdom” § 131).

...

If the violation of a person’s rights is the result of the decision of a competent institution (State security institution), on the basis of which the Minister of Interior has adopted the decision, one can agree with the opinion voiced in the letter by the Ministry of the Interior that the person has the possibility of protecting his rights by lodging a complaint to the prosecutor under the procedure set out in Article 6 of the State Security Institutions Law. As regards an assessment of the activity of the State security institution in this case, the State has secured a protection remedy for the individual, which is as effective as possible in circumstances where the issue is connected with State security and, possibly, the use of confidential information. The Constitutional Court in its judgments has already pointed out that “in Latvia the Prosecutor [General’s Office] may be regarded as an effective and available means of protection, because the status and role of the prosecutor in supervising the law secures an independent and impartial review of cases in compliance with Article 13 of the Convention” (see the Constitutional Court October 11, 2004 Judgment in case no. 2004-06-01; April 23, 2003 Judgment in case no.2002-20-0103)

Thus, as regards the assessment of the competent (State security) institution, the State has secured effective protection under Article 13 of the Convention.

...

15. ... The fact that the Minister of Interior’s decision might be connected with interests of State security does not prevent the State from establishing a procedure under which the judicial institutions in certain cases, and under a definite procedure, may acquaint themselves with the material connected with State security. The institution concerned may even decide to present the required amount of documents separately if [they] do not include State secrets. Article 6 of the Convention, if read together with Article 5, also provides such a solution by, among other things, a special positive duty upon States, in accordance with which they have to create institutional infrastructures necessary for the implementation of a fair court, and enact legal norms which guarantee that the procedure is fair and impartial.

...

The impugned provision thus does not ensure realisation of a person’s right to a fair court as guaranteed by Article 92 of the Satversme”.

54. On 7 October 2010 the Constitutional Court (case no. 2010-01-01) noted that international human rights norms and the practice of their application serve as a means of interpretation at constitutional law level to determine the contents and scope of fundamental rights and the principle of the law-governed State, as far as it does not lead to a decrease or limitation of the fundamental rights included in the Constitution.

55. On 6 November 2014 the Constitutional Court (case no. 2013-20-03) held that the contested provision of the domestic law did not comply with the Constitution and was repealed with effect from 1 May 2015. As regards the individual applicant, in order for him to have the possibility to require repeated assessment of the proportionality of the measure adopted against him, the contested legal provision was repealed with effect as of the date of its adoption.

COMPLAINTS

56. The applicants complained, in particular, that their expulsion from Latvia to the Russian Federation had put them at risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, and that they did not have an effective remedy in this respect as required by Article 13 of the Convention. Furthermore, they complained that their expulsion had violated their right to respect for their private and family life, guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. They also raised other complaints under Article 2, Article 5, Article 6 together with Article 13, and Article 10.

THE LAW

A. Alleged violation of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention

57. The applicants complained that their expulsion from Latvia to the Russian Federation had put them at risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, and that they did not have an effective remedy in this respect as required by Article 13 of the Convention. The relevant Convention provisions read as follows:

Article 3

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Article 13

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

1. Arguments of the parties

58. The Government emphasised that prior to their expulsion to the Russian Federation the applicants had not brought to the knowledge of Latvian authorities any grounds for their fear of a risk of ill-treatment in the receiving State. The Government further argued that neither the general situation in the Russian Federation nor the applicants’ individual situation exposed them to any real risk. In particular, the domestic authorities had examined in detail the applicants’ possible involvement in the release of hostages in the Chechen Republic in 1998. Relying on publicly available information, the Government stated that another member of the Chechen community in Latvia, whose role in the above hostage release negotiation was confirmed, had been travelling freely to the Russian Federation. The same was true for both applicants – between 2010 and 2012 they had visited Russia twelve and five times respectively, therefore showing that they did not feel threatened when travelling there, or to the Chechen Republic.

59. In relation to the Article 13 complaint, the Government considered that the applicants did not have an arguable claim under the Convention. They invited the Court to follow the approach adopted in the cases of Keipenvardecas v. Latvia ((dec.), no. 38979/03) and Rūža v. Latvia ((dec.), no. 33798/05), in which it had found the Article 3 complaint manifestly ill-founded and had therefore not examined the Article 13 complaint. Alternatively, the Government contended that the applicants had not applied under the Asylum Law for any measure with suspensive effect which, according to the Government, attested to the fact that the allegations in relation to the risk of ill-treatment in the Russian Federation were unfounded.

60. The applicants did not deny that prior to their expulsion they had not brought the risk of ill-treatment to the attention of the authorities or claimed asylum. They contended that this had been because of the hasty conditions in which their expulsion had been carried out. On the day of expulsion one of their lawyers had sent a fax informing the authorities about the risk of ill‑treatment after expulsion, but they had ignored this information. The applicants invoked that in 1998 they had collaborated with the Latvian State security services in the hostage liberation operation in the Chechen Republic, but their names had not been associated with the operation publicly. Contrary to what had been alleged by the Government, the only person known publicly to have taken part in the hostage operation had since 2000 avoided travelling to Russia for fear of persecutions.

61. The applicants did not deny that they had been able to travel to Russia several times of their own volition. They blamed the Latvian authorities, not only for expelling them from Latvia without any means of subsistence or documents, but also for informing the Russian security forces about their expulsion to Russia. According to the applicants, “this certainly drew the attention of Russian authorities to the personalities of the applicants, and also was the reason for them to return to Chechnya, to meet the relatives [who had] helped them to settle financial and documentary issues”.

62. The Government contested the above allegations and explained that the applicants had never been handed over to officials of the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation. Instead, since they had not shown their passports, the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation were contacted so that the applicants could enter on the basis of copies. The Government also added evidence attesting to the allegation that even though the applicants had not shown their passports to the Border Guard Service, a week after their expulsion they had nevertheless presented them to a public notary in Chechnya.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) The relevant principles

63. The Court reiterates that according to its well-established case-law, Contracting States have the right, as a matter of international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3 and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, §§ 124-125, ECHR 2008). In these circumstances, Article 3 implies an obligation not to expel the individual in question to that country (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, § 111, ECHR 2016 and J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166/12, § 79, ECHR 2016, with the case-law cited therein).

64. In order to determine whether there is a risk of ill-treatment, the Court must examine the foreseeable consequences of sending the applicants to the receiving country, bearing in mind the general situation there and their personal circumstances (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 67, ECHR 2005‑I). Exceptionally, in cases where an applicant alleges that he or she is the member of a group systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the Court has considered that the protection of Article 3 of the Convention comes into play when the applicant establishes that there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her membership of the group concerned (see J.K. and Others v. Sweden, cited above, §§ 103-105; see also NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904/07, § 116, 17 July 2008). In any event, an applicant’s specific allegations in a particular case require corroboration by other evidence (see Mamatkulov, cited above, § 73).

65. The existence of the risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of expulsion, but the Court is not precluded from having regard to information which comes to light subsequent to the expulsion (see J.K. and Others v. Sweden, cited above, §§ 83 and 87). Furthermore, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3, and the assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration and its physical or mental effects (see Mamatkulov, cited above, § 70).

(b) Application of the principles to the particular case

66. At the outset the Court notes that it is not disputed, and the applicants have confirmed both before the Court and the domestic authorities, that prior to their expulsion they had not brought to the Latvian authorities’ attention any grounds for their fear of a risk of ill-treatment. Furthermore, the Court observes that the Minister of Interior’s decision was sent to both of them (see paragraph 11 above), and they did not contest that the content or consequences of the decision were known to them. Following the adoption of the blacklisting measure, the applicants’ representatives had submitted several complaints to various domestic authorities, though none of them raised a complaint of ill-treatment. In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced by the applicants’ allegations that they had no time to lodge an appeal or apply for asylum. Even assuming that the fax to the Border Guard Service (see paragraph 24 above) was submitted before the applicants actually crossed the border, its brief and vague wording at such a late stage (see paragraph 60 above) would not fulfil the obligation to properly substantiate their fear of ill-treatment. The Court therefore concludes that no substantial grounds were shown to the Latvian authorities to suggest that, if expelled to Russia, the applicants would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3.

67. In addition, the Court notes that in the subsequent domestic proceedings leading to an examination of the information received from the applicants after they were expelled, three weeks after their expulsion an extensive complaint alleging their collaboration in 1998 with the Latvian State security services in the release of hostages in the Chechen Republic was brought to the attention of the authorities for the first time (see paragraph 13 above), but it did not refer to the episode of alleged ill‑treatment five days after their expulsion, as described by the applicants in their initial application to the Court (see paragraph 25 above). In the course of the investigation carried out following the above-mentioned complaint, the Prosecutor General did not find it established that the applicants had collaborated with the Latvian security services (see paragraph 16 above). In any event the purported collaboration, which had taken place a long time ago, although a factor to be taken into account in the decision-making process, could not alone serve a substantial ground in the assessment of potential exposure to ill-treatment (see, mutatis mutandis, Tatar v. Switzerland, no. 65692/12, § 52, 14 April 2015). The Court observes that the applicants have not denied that since 1998 they have been travelling extensively to the Russian Federation, including Chechnya, a fact supported by the testimony of the applicants’ relatives (see paragraph 16 above). In the light of the above, the Court observes that the personal circumstances of the applicants lead to the conclusion that they have themselves demonstrated a lack of fear or any personal threat related to any possible past collaboration with the security services.

68. Furthermore, despite the fact that the applicants in their observations relied extensively on their own account of the hostage release events of 1998, no detailed or coherent submissions were provided of the alleged beating by the Chechen police before 10 August 2012 (see paragraph 25 above): they merely referred to this in their initial application form to the Court (contrast Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386/10, § 131, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). In this connection, the Court observes that the certificate referred to by the applicants in their initial application form had no letter head but simply an illegible stamp. Moreover, it was not corroborated by any other material (e.g. a copy of entries in the patients’ registration journal of the hospital) or explanation attesting to the fact that they had been summoned to the police station, or that they had asked for the alleged ill-treatment thereafter to be investigated. The applicants, who were not in detention or otherwise considered to be in a vulnerable situation at the material time, could not be absolved from their obligation to substantiate the above allegation. In conclusion, the Court reiterates that a mere possibility of ill-treatment in circumstances similar to the present applicants is not in itself sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3 (see also Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378/02, § 352, ECHR 2005‑III, with further references).

69. In the light of the above, there are no substantial grounds for believing that the applicants’ expulsion to the Russian Federation exposed them to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, the complaint under that provision is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

70. Having regard to the aforementioned conclusion that the applicants do not have an arguable claim that there has been a breach of Article 3, their complaint under Article 13 is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must likewise be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

B. Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention

71. The applicants complained that their expulsion from Latvia was in breach of their right to respect for their private and family life. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

1. The Government

72. The Government argued that the Prosecutor General was an independent and impartial body, which had full access to secret intelligence material in relation to the applicants’ case and which provided an effective review of the impugned decisions. In case the applicants did not consider that this procedure met “the quality of law” standards established by the Court’s case-law, they had to challenge the compatibility of section 61(1) of the Immigration Law with the Constitutional Court. The Court has recognised the individual constitutional complaint mechanism as an effective remedy, and the Constitutional Court had already found the previous wording of section 61(1) of the Immigration Law incompatible with the Constitution (see paragraph 53 above).

2. The applicants

73. The applicants considered that the interference with their private and family life was not in accordance with the law. They maintained, in particular, that under the pretext of the status of State secrecy they had never been able to familiarise themselves with the reports according to which they had allegedly posed a threat to national security, nor to defend themselves against these allegations. In their opinion, the Prosecutor General’s Office had carried out a purely formalistic examination of their complaints, including the allegations of their collaboration with the Latvian State security services in the hostage liberation operation in 1998. The applicants argued that, in any event, the Prosecutor General’s Office was not an independent body carrying out such review as the Prosecutor General, before taking up the post, has to obtain security clearance from the SAB.

74. The applicants also dismissed the Government’s argument that the Constitutional Court could provide an effective remedy in their case. They submitted that it was apparent from the Constitutional Court’s case-law, in particular case no. 2004-14-01 (see paragraph 53 above) and case no. 2010‑55-0106 (see Meimanis v. Latvia, no. 70597/11, 21 July 2015, § 24), that the Prosecutor General’s Office was to be considered an independent institution in the light of Article 13 of the Convention. According to the applicants, they therefore had no grounds to consider that in their case the Constitutional Court would come to a different conclusion.

3. The Court’s assessment

75. The Court observes at the outset that the applicants’ complaint concerned two separate and consecutive, albeit linked, proceedings under the Immigration Law. Firstly, they complained that an appeal to the Prosecutor General regarding the applicants’ inclusion in a blacklist on national security grounds had not provided them with sufficient information as to the allegations against them, thus depriving the applicants of sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness in the ensuing expulsion proceedings. Secondly, they complained that as a result of the expulsion proceedings there had been a disproportional interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life. The Court will examine these complaints in turn.

(a) Proceedings leading to the applicants’ inclusion in the blacklist (the blacklisting proceedings)

76. The Court reiterates that even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society require measures interfering with the rights guaranteed by Article 8 to be subject to “some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence, if need be with appropriate procedural limitations on the use of classified information” (see Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, § 123, 20 June 2002, and case-law cited herein). In the light of the above, the Court considers that the allegations regarding a lack of sufficient safeguards in the blacklisting proceedings fall within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.

77. The Government invoked that the applicants should have lodged an individual constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. The applicants contested that. The Court reiterates that the purpose of Article 35 of the Convention is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to it (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 142, ECHR 2010; for a recent summary of general principles pertaining to the exhaustion of domestic remedies see, for example, Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], no. 13216/05, §§ 115-116, ECHR 2015). It is appropriate that the national courts should initially have the opportunity to determine questions of the compatibility of domestic law with the Convention and, if an application is nonetheless subsequently brought to Strasbourg, the European Court should have the benefit of the views of the national courts, as being in direct and continuous contact with the forces of their countries (see Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 42, ECHR 2008).

78. In examining whether the applicants had at their disposal an effective remedy, the Court will look at whether the individual complaint mechanism before the Constitutional Court extended to the Convention complaint brought by the applicants and whether such proceedings offered reasonable prospects of success, taking into account in particular that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies is limited to making use of those remedies which are likely to be effective and available, meaning that their existence is sufficiently certain and they are capable of directly redressing the alleged violation of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑IV).

79. The Court has already found that in Latvia it is the Constitutional Court’s practice to examine, inter alia, individual complaints challenging the compatibility of legal provisions not only with the Constitution itself, but also with the Convention (for relevant domestic law and practice see paragraphs 40-44 above, see also Larionovs and Tess v. Latvia (dec.), nos. 45520/04, 19363/05, § 158, 25 November 2014), unless the alleged violation has resulted from erroneous application or interpretation of a provision which, in its content, was not unconstitutional, and therefore fell outside the competence of the Constitutional Court (see Liepājnieks v. Latvia (dec.), no. 37586/06, §§ 73 and 75, 2 November 2010). A comparable conclusion was reached in a series of other cases, in particular, Elberte v. Latvia, no. 61243/08, § 81, ECHR 2015; Nagla v. Latvia, no. 73469/10, § 48, 16 July 2013 and Savičs v. Latvia, no. 17892/03, § 115, 27 November 2012.

80. The Court observes next that following the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 6 December 2004 (see paragraph 53 above), the legislator gradually set up a system under which all decisions adopted by the Minister of Interior to include a person in the blacklist were subjected to administrative court review which was supplemented with several procedural safeguards, including the possibility of having access to State secret information (see paragraph 51 above).

81. An exception was set out in section 61 (8) of the Immigration Law, which provided that decisions adopted by the Minister of Interior on the basis of information the State security institutions had obtained as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence activities were to be reviewed solely by the Prosecutor General whose decision was final. In the Prosecutor General’s review proceedings the restriction on providing access to information obtained as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence activities was regulated by the State secret legislation which strictly limited the scope of its interpretation and application, as it has been demonstrated in practice, including in the present case (see paragraph 14 above).

82. The Court observes that in all the cases where a person has been included in the blacklist on the basis of information which the State security institutions had obtained as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence activities, the authorities had to apply the procedure set out in section 61 (8) of the Immigration Law. The procedure enshrined limited scope of interpretation and application (contrary to, for example, Savičs, cited above, § 115 where the impugned interference did not derive from the provisions of the domestic law). In these circumstances the Court considers that the restriction on providing access to information was determined by operation of domestic law, and the Constitutional Court was not precluded from ruling on the constitutionality of a legal provision whose quality allegedly fell short of the procedural guarantees enshrined by Article 8 of the Convention.

83. On the question of the possible forms of redress, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court proceedings could lead to a re-examination which could remedy the grievances. The Court has recognised that, even though following constitutional proceedings a successful applicant would have to request the reopening of his or her individual case, such a remedy could be considered capable of providing redress, as the domestic authorities would be bound by the Constitutional Court’s judgment (see Larionovs and Tess, cited above, § 162, where a possible reopening of criminal proceedings was concerned). In this connection the Court also refers to the Constitutional Court’s case-law in which – in addition to ruling on the constitutionality of a contested legal provision – an individual measure to the applicant has been introduced pertaining to his contested administrative proceedings (see paragraph 55 above).

84. Finally, the Court finds no other circumstances which could have exempted the applicants from lodging a complaint to the Constitutional Court. As regards the case-law relied on by the applicants (see paragraph 74 above), it must be distinguished from the present application. In those cases the Constitutional Court did not examine the issue of whether the review procedure provided by the Prosecutor’s Office would provide sufficient safeguards against an interference with Article 8 rights. Furthermore, there is no well-established Constitutional Court’s case-law concerning the aspect whether the limits on providing access to information in the supervision proceedings carried out by the Prosecutor General’s Office complies with the guarantees enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention. Accordingly, the applicants were not exempted from availing themselves of this procedure on account of an established domestic courts’ practice. In this connection the Court reiterates that even when a doubt exists as to the effectiveness of a remedy, that remedy has to be tried (see, among other authorities, Reif v. Greece, no. 21782/93, 28 June 1995).

85. The Court considers that by failing to lodge an individual complaint with the Constitutional Court, the applicants did not exhaust domestic remedies.

86. In the light of the aforementioned considerations, the Court concludes that this part of the complaint must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

(b) Expulsion proceedings

87. In relation to the applicants’ complaint that as a result of the expulsion proceedings there had been a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for private and family life, the Court considers that the expulsion orders constituted an interference with the applicants’ rights to respect for their private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. Under 8 § 2 any interference must be in accordance with the law, pursue one or more legitimate aims, and be necessary in a democratic society.

88. The wording “in accordance with the law” implies conditions which go beyond the existence of a legal basis in domestic law and requires that the legal basis be “accessible” and “foreseeable” (see, among other authorities, Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143/06, §§ 227-231, 4 December 2015). In the present case the applicants’ expulsion consisted of several separate and consecutive, albeit linked, proceedings under the Immigration Law. The decisions of the Minister of Interior of 26 July 2012, by which the applicants were included in the blacklist, was at the origin of the applicants’ expulsion proceedings. To the extent that the Court’s examination of the lawfulness of the expulsion order and ensuing administrative proceedings might overlap with the assessment of the complaint pertaining to the alleged shortcoming in the blacklisting proceedings, the Court refers to its earlier findings (see paragraphs 76-86 above). The Court will therefore limit its examination to the administrative proceedings which were triggered by the adoption of expulsion orders with regard to both applicants (see paragraph 22 above).

89. The Court observes that the expulsion orders of 2 August 2012 were adopted on the basis of provisions of the Immigration Law and clearly stated its aim (see paragraph 47 above). The Court therefore concludes that the impugned decisions were adopted “in accordance with the law” in the interest of national security and public safety, which are considered as legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.

90. As regards the question whether the domestic courts struck a fair balance between the relevant interests (see in this relation the principles established in the case of Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, § 57, ECHR 2006‑XII), the Court refers to the judgments adopted by the administrative courts in the expulsion proceedings and observes that they had assessed all the circumstances of the case, such as the applicants’ ties with the expelling State and the receiving State (see paragraph 33 above), as well as the applicants’ family situation (see paragraph 31 above).

91. The Court also notes that the applicants in their later submissions to the Court have not raised any arguments attesting to what extent their expulsion on 3 August 2012 had affected the applicants’ relationships with their family members. Besides, the legislation provides periodic reviews of the continued necessity to uphold the ban from entering and remaining in Latvia (see paragraph 52 above).

92. Taking into account the margin of appreciation afforded to States under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention the Court considers that the reasons relied on by the domestic courts were relevant and sufficient to show that the interference with the applicants right to respect for private and family life was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and, accordingly, was “necessary in a democratic society.

93. It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

C. Article 34 of the Convention

94. In a letter sent to the Court on 21 October 2013 (see paragraph 20 above), the applicants drew the Court’s attention to the interest the national authorities had showed in their application. This submission was communicated to the Government under Article 34 of the Convention.

1. Arguments of the parties

95. The Government emphasised, firstly, that even though at the beginning of 2013 the applicants had found out that a SAB officer in his conversation with a State police officer had allegedly threatened to hinder the applicants’ complaint to the Court, the applicants had decided to draw the Court’s attention to it only in October 2013. In this connection the Government, recognising the procedural nature of Article 34, nevertheless insisted that the six-month rule should be applied. Secondly, the Government argued that the applicants had never explicitly raised an Article 34 complaint before the Court. Thirdly, the Government were of the view that the applicants had not complained about the impugned actions to the domestic authorities.

96. The applicants noted that they had merely drawn the Court’s attention to the SAB’s interest in the first applicant’s complaint to the Court.

2. The Court’s assessment

97. The Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted by Article 34 that applicants or potential applicants be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see, among other authorities, Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654/00, § 115, ECHR 2007‑I).

98. The Court notes that the applicants have not pursued their Article 34 issue before the Court. Moreover, they did not allege that they had been contacted by any domestic authorities in relation to their application, or that they had felt intimidated or prevented from pursuing their complaint to the Court, nor is that supported by any other case material.

99. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that there is no basis to pursue the matter (see, for example, Beçaj v. Albania (dec.), no. 1542/13, 24 June 2014).

D. Other alleged violations of the Convention

100. Lastly, the applicants also made complaints under Article 2, Article 5, Article 6 together with Article 13, and Article 10 of the Convention.

101. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that the remainder of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of any of the Articles of the Convention relied on. It follows that these complaints are inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible;

Decides not to pursue the complaint raised under Article 34 of the Convention.

Done in English and notified in writing on 12 January 2017.

Milan BlaškoAngelika Nußberger
              Deputy RegistrarPresident

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy