THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 21512/03
by Giuliano SINKOVIČ
against Slovenia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 11 October 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
MrC. Bîrsan, President,
MrB.M. Zupančič,
MrsE. Fura-Sandström,
MrsA. Gyulumyan,
MrDavid Thór Björgvinsson,
MrsI. Ziemele,
MrsI. Berro-Lefèvre, judges,
and Mr S. Naismith, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 24 June 2003,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Giuliano Sinkovič, is a Slovenian national who was born in 1949 and lives in Piran. He was represented before the Court by Mr E. Dokič, a lawyer practising in Piran.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
In 1992 a company, HIT, published in a local newspaper an invitation to submit proposals for the name of a new casino. A reward of 100,000 Slovenian tolars (approximately 415 euros) was promised to the person whose proposal was chosen.
The applicant sent a list of 107 proposals in the prescribed period.
On 21 August 1992 HIT informed the applicant about the two chosen proposals, neither of which had been picked out of the applicant’s list.
It appears that the name that the new casino was finally given was not one of the chosen ones, but one from the applicant’s list.
Therefore, in 1994 the applicant, relying on the provisions of the Copyright and Related Rights Act (Zakon o avtorski in sorodnih pravicah), requested the Ljubljana District Court to disallow further use of the casino’s name and to order HIT to remove all visible signs containing it. The company would have been exempted from this obligation if it had paid the applicant the amount of 20,000,000 Slovenian tolars (approximately 83,330 euros).
On 25 September 2000 the court rejected the applicant’s claim. It held that the term from the applicant’s list, finally used to name the casino, did not constitute the work of an author and was therefore not protected by copyright. It concluded that the applicant could have claimed the promised reward (see above), but had failed to do so.
On an unspecified date the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani).
On 20 December 2000 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.
On 22 March 2001 the applicant, not represented by a lawyer, lodged a constitutional appeal.
On 18 December 2002 the Constitutional Court (Ustavno sodišče) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant did not indicate the date on which this decision was served on him.
The applicant dated his first letter to the Court 23 June 2003. The applicant posted it, as a registered letter, at 7.05 p.m. on 24 June 2003 at the post office in Piran.
On 27 July 2004 the applicant lodged a duly completed application form, nearly a year after receiving the Court’s letter advising him to do so.
B. Relevant domestic law
Section 25 of the Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without undue Delay (“the 2006 Act”) lays down the following transitional rule in relation to the applications already pending before the Court:
Section 25 - Just satisfaction for damage sustained prior to implementation of this Act
“(1) In cases where a violation of the right to a trial without undue delay has already ceased and the party had filed a claim for just satisfaction with the international court before the date of implementation of this Act, the State Attorney’s Office shall offer the party a settlement on the amount of just satisfaction within four months after the date of receipt of the case referred by the international court for the settlement procedure. The party shall submit a settlement proposal to the State Attorney’s Office within two months of the date of receipt of the proposal of the State Attorney’s Office. The State Attorney’s Office shall decide on the proposal as soon as possible and within a period of four months at the latest. ...
...”
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length and unfairness of the proceedings. He argued that there were no reasons for such a lengthy examination of his claim and that the courts had deliberately erred in applying the domestic law.
THE LAW
According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings in his case was unreasonable. He also complained that the proceedings were unfair by virtue of intentional misinterpretation of the domestic law. He invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides in so far as relevant as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
Following the enactment of the 2006 Act on 1 January 2007, the President decided that information was required concerning the applicability of its section 25 to the present case. Under Rule 54 § 2 (a) of the Rules of the Court the respondent Government was asked to confirm whether Section 25 would be applied as regards the applicant’s complaint about the undue length of the proceedings. In the event of an affirmative answer they were also requested to submit a copy of the settlement proposal made to the applicant.
By their letter of 24 May 2007 the Government informed the Court that Section 25 of the 2006 Act would not be applied in the present case since the applicant had lodged his application with the Court after the expiry of the six-months’ time-limit prescribed by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention which reads in so far as relevant as follows:
“The Court may only deal with the matter...within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.”
The Government argued that the final domestic decision, namely the Constitutional Court’s decision, was served on the applicant on 23 December 2002 and enclosed a copy of the written acknowledgement of a receipt signed by the applicant.
In reply to the Government’s observations, the applicant repeated his complaints. He further argued that the 2006 Act was not applicable to his case. However, he did not contest the Government’s assertions as to the date of service of the final domestic decision and compliance with the six-month rule.
The Court reiterates that where an applicant is entitled to be served ex officio with a written copy of the final domestic decision, the object and purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention are best served by counting the six-month period as running from the date of service of the written judgment (Worm v. Austria, judgment of 29 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V, p. 1547, § 33). The Court further reiterates that the date of the introduction of an application is the date of the first letter indicating an intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the nature of the application (Chalkley v. the United Kingdom (dec), no. 63831/00, 26 September 2002).
The Court notes, and this is not disputed by the applicant, that the Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 23 December 2002. The applicant should thus have initiated proceeding before the Court within six months from that date, and therefore on 23 June 2003 at the latest.
In this connection the Court notes that the applicant dated his first letter to the Court 23 June 2003, but posted it on 24 June 2003.
Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the application was introduced on 24 June 2003. It accordingly concludes that the application is out of time for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention by one day and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Stanley NaismithCorneliu Bîrsan Registrar President
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy