FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Applications nos. 44305/98 and 49150/99
by Christopher W. SNOOKS
and Francis D.J. DOWSE
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 8 October 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrM. Pellonpää, President,
SirNicolas Bratza,
MrA. Pastor Ridruejo,
MrsE. Palm,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrS. Pavlovschi, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above applications lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 17 November 1997 and with the European Court of Human Rights on 15 March 1999 respectively,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the first application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The first applicant is a British national, born in 1971 and living in Ashford, Kent. He is represented before the Court by Bailhache Labesse, lawyers practising in St Helier, Jersey. The second applicant is a British national living in Jersey. He is represented before the Court by Bedell Cristin, lawyers practising in St Helier, Jersey. The respondent Government were represented by Mr D. Walton of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. The first applicant
At about 15.30 hours on 12 September 1996 the first applicant collected two bags containing approximately 11.8 kg of cannabis resin from an accomplice in a car park in Jersey. He transferred those bags to a car and was arrested at about 15.36 hours while attempting to make a telephone call from a kiosk. He said that he thought the bags contained money as he had previously been involved in similar exchanges of money with the accomplice as part of a tax evasion scheme. He contended that he did not have an opportunity to examine the contents of the bags before his arrest. He maintained that he had been surprised to have been given the bags by the accomplice on the occasion concerned as he had on previous occasions normally given bags to that person. He said that the telephone call was an attempt to clarify the situation with another accomplice.
The first applicant’s trial was in the Royal Court of Jersey before the inferior number, which consisted of a judge of law (the “deputy bailiff”) and two judges of fact (the “jurats”). His defence was that he did not know that the bags contained drugs and had no reason to believe that this was the case. At the end of a three day trial the deputy bailiff delivered a summing up in open court before retiring with the jurats. The first applicant was convicted on 21 May 1997 of offences of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on importation of cannabis resin and of being in possession of a controlled drug. No reasons were given for the verdict. He was sentenced to five years, six months’ imprisonment.
In a judgment delivered on 26 September 1997 the Court of Appeal allowed his appeal against conviction for being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on importation of cannabis on the ground that the deputy bailiff had failed to direct the jurats fully on the ingredients of that offence. It dismissed his appeal against the conviction of being in possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply and substituted a sentence of five years’ imprisonment.
The principal grounds of appeal related to alleged deficiencies in the summing up by the deputy bailiff. One allegation was that the summing up had contained a number of factual deficiencies because it had referred to the first applicant’s defence counsel as having implied that the purpose of the first applicant’s going to the telephone kiosk was to telephone an accomplice to ask him what was in the bags and because it stated that part of his evidence was that a woman had rushed in and out of the kiosk “within seconds of his being there”. The Court of Appeal concluded that:
“In our judgment these minor factual errors are not significant and could not possibly have affected the verdict of the jurats.”
Another allegation was that the summing up had not fairly put the defence case. For example, it indicated that it would have been “very easy” for the first applicant to inspect the bags before his arrest without referring to the defence counsel’s contentions to the contrary. In this regard the court concluded:
“We have examined carefully the points made by [the first applicant’s counsel] in relation to this submission but we find no force in it. Some of the points which were alleged to be unfavourable to the appellant on analysis proved to be neutral or even favourable to him... .While it is true that the jurats were not reminded of every piece of evidence which was favourable to the defence, the deputy bailiff was under no duty to do so. What we do find is that the deputy bailiff was at pains to remind the jurats throughout the summing up that the appellant’s defence was that he did not know that the bags contained cannabis resin and that it was his state of mind at the relevant time which was important. The deputy bailiff also reminded the jurats on more than one occasion that the appellant’s version of events was supported by other witnesses. We accordingly reject this criticism of the summing up”.
In the course of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, argument was also heard on the question whether, having delivered a summing up in open court, the presiding judge (in this case the deputy bailiff) should retire with the jurats, who are initially the sole judges of fact (see below). The court made no observations on this point other than to suggest that
“...this is an issue which merits careful consideration by the Royal Court”.
The Court of Appeal concluded that:
“There was ample evidence upon which the jurats could make a finding of guilt. The appeal against conviction for possession of the cannabis resin with intent to supply was accordingly dismissed.”
The first applicant petitioned the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for special leave to appeal against his conviction. On 30 March 1998, after an oral hearing, this was refused.
2. The second applicant
The second applicant was arrested on the evening of 23 February 1996 following a stop and search by police on a street in Jersey. He was found to be in possession of two packages of diamorphine (heroin) valued at GBP 113,040. He had travelled to London and back earlier that day. He said at his trial that he had gone there to visit an exhibition at the Imperial War Museum and maintained that he had only found the packages upon his return to his flat that evening. He said that he initially thought that the packages contained diamonds, as he had previously carried them for a man called Dr Ambrose between Jersey and London, where he had handed them over to a man called Jan. He had met Jan at Victoria railway station in London that day but had explained to him that, at that time, he had no diamonds. He maintained that, at the time of his arrest, he was on his way with a friend to a public house to try to find Dr Ambrose because he did not know what was in the packages and had not examined their contents.
The second applicant’s trial commenced before the inferior number of the Royal Court of Jersey on 16 December 1996. At the conclusion of the closing speeches of the defence and prosecution counsel, the deputy bailiff and two jurats retired. The deputy bailiff’s summing up was delivered in private. On 20 January 1997 the second applicant was convicted of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on importation of a controlled drug and of being in possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply it to another. No reasons were given for the verdict. He was sentenced to thirteen years, six months’ imprisonment.
The second applicant appealed on a number of grounds, including the fact that the deputy bailiff summed up in private. However, shortly before the appeal hearing, in a letter dated 16 May 1997, he withdrew four of the five grounds of appeal, and elected to proceed only on the question whether there had been sufficient evidence that the applicant had imported the heroin to form the basis of a conviction on the first charge.
A few days before the appeal hearing the Solicitor General disclosed to the second applicant’s representatives the existence of witness statements given by seven English police officers who had observed his movements in the United Kingdom on the day in question. Those statements confirmed, inter alia, that the second applicant had met Jan at Victoria station that day and had gone on to the Imperial War Museum.
On 11 July 1997 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against the conviction of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on importation of cannabis on the ground that the prosecution should have disclosed this evidence before, or at least during, the trial and that the non-disclosure had led to a substantial miscarriage of justice in relation to that conviction. It dismissed the appeal against the conviction of being in possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply on the ground that the non-disclosure did not affect that conviction. It stated that the new evidence:
“...could not go to substantiate either directly or indirectly [the second applicant’s] claim to have an entirely separate relationship with Dr Ambrose as a diamond courier. Nor could it explain his behaviour in relation to the two packages on the evening of that day after they had been left in his flat according to [him] by some unidentified person and without any explanation”.
The Court of Appeal substituted a sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment.
The second applicant petitioned the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for special leave to appeal against his conviction, reverting, inter alia, to the question whether the summing up in private had been fair. There was a hearing before the Privy Council on 29 October 1998, which was attended by the applicant’s counsel and a representative of the Solicitor General. An account of this hearing prepared by the Solicitor General’s representative states:
“... Their Lordships after hearing counsel on both sides and a short deliberation informed the parties that the Petition would be dismissed.
I should point out that Lord Steyn [the presiding judge] remarked with great surprise at there being no summing-up by the Bailiff in open court, but went on to say that since the matter had not been raised before the Court of Appeal, he did not believe that it would be appropriate for the Privy Council to intervene in this regard at this stage without having any views from the Court of Appeal.
I rather got the impression from Advocate Young for the Petitioner, who attended at the hearing, that someone may well be looking at raising this subject again in an appropriate case in the Court of Appeal, so that the matter may be raised yet again before the Privy Council. ...”
B.Relevant domestic law and practice
1.Jersey and the Convention
The Convention was first extended to the Bailiwick of Jersey, under Article 63 (now Article 56) of the Convention, by a declaration registered at the Secretariat General on 23 October 1953. Protocol No. 11 was extended to Jersey with effect from 1 November 1998.
2.The bailiff and deputy bailiff
There is one bailiff and one deputy bailiff in Jersey. They are appointed by the Queen and can only be removed from office by her. The deputy bailiff is able to perform all the bailiff’s functions, on the authority of the bailiff.
3.The jurats
The Royal Court, comprised of bailiff and jurats, has existed in Jersey since the middle of the 13th century. Jurats are charged with the execution of a range of judicial tasks. They are not required to decide legal issues, but instead represent the lay element in the process of judicial decision-making. They also form part of the Liquor Licensing Assembly and the Gambling Licensing Authority. They have powers, inter alia, to authorise the removal of arrested persons to prison in certain circumstances, to supervise dealings in the property of persons under certain forms of legal disability and to supervise the conduct of public elections.
Jurats are not chosen at random from the electoral roll, as in the case of ordinary jurors both in Jersey and the United Kingdom. Rather, they are elected by a special electoral college whose members include the bailiff, the jurats, advocates and solicitors of the Royal Court and members of Jersey’s legislature, the States Assembly. Jurats do not necessarily have a legal qualification, but are usually individuals with a known history of sound judgment and integrity, which has been consistently demonstrated throughout a lengthy professional, business or civic life.
The qualifications required for election to the office of jurat are governed by Article 3 of the Royal Court (Jersey) Law, 1948 as amended (Annex 3A, pp. 164-165) (“the 1948 Law”), which currently provides as follows:
“QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF JURAT
1) A person shall, unless disqualified under the provisions of this Law or any other enactment, be qualified to be appointed Jurat if he has attained the age of forty years and is a British subject and -
(a) was born in the Island; or
(b) has during the five years preceding the day of appointment been ordinarily resident in the Island.
2) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that -
(a) a person, by reason of the fact that he is not a member of the Established Church, shall not be disqualified for being appointed Jurat;
(b) a woman, by reason of her sex or marriage, shall not be disqualified for being appointed Jurat;”
Disqualifications for the office of jurat are governed by Article 4 of the 1948 Law. Grounds for disqualification include the holding of any paid office or other place of profit under the Crown or the States or any other administration of the States, or any parochial authority: Article 4 (a)(b).
Retirement of jurats is governed by Article 10 (1) of the 1948 Law as amended, which provides as follows:
“RETIREMENT OF JURATS
A Jurat shall cease to hold office on the day upon which he attains the age of seventy-two years:
Provided that a Jurat who, for a continuous period of twelve months fails, without good reason, to discharge the duties of his office, or who, in the opinion of the Court, is permanently unable, through physical or mental incapacity, or for any other reason, efficiently to carry out the duties of his office, may be called upon by the Court to resign and, unless he, within a reasonable time, presents to the Bailiff, for transmission to Her Majesty in Council, a petition praying that Her Majesty may be pleased to permit him to resign his office, he shall be removable by Order of Her Majesty in Council on the petition of the Superior Number of the Royal Court.”
4.Respective roles of the bailiff and jurats at trial by inferior number
Other than trial in the Magistrate’s Court, there are two forms of criminal trial in Jersey, namely an “assize trial” before a judge and jury, and “trial by the inferior number” before a bailiff (or deputy bailiff) and two jurats. In the case of serious statutory offences, including those of which both applicants were accused, trial is always before the Royal Court by the inferior number.
The roles of the bailiff and jurats at trial by inferior number are set out in Article 13 of the 1948 Law, which provides:
“POWERS OF THE BAILIFF AND JURATS
1) In all causes and matters, civil, criminal and mixed, the Bailiff shall be the sole judge of law and shall award costs, if any.
2) In all causes and matters, civil, criminal and mixed, other than criminal causes tried before the Criminal Assizes, in which causes the jury shall... find the verdict, the Jurats... shall be the sole Judges of fact and shall assess the damages, if any.
3) In all criminal and mixed cases, the Jurats shall determine the sentence, fine or other sanction to be pronounced or imposed.
4) In all causes and matters, civil, criminal and mixed, the Bailiff shall have a casting vote whenever the Jurats -
(a) being two in number, are divided in opinion as to the facts or as to the damages to be awarded or as to the sentence, fine or other sanction to be pronounced or imposed; or
(b) (...)”
5. Bailiff’s summing up
Since the entry into force of the 1948 Law, the bailiff has - as a consequence of his own role as the sole judge of the law - been obliged to give the jurats guidance or directions on relevant matters of law. These directions are generally known as a summing up.
In giving his directions on the law, it is common for the bailiff or deputy bailiff to advert to the issues of fact which are crucial to the legal issues upon which the directions are given. As a matter of practice, it is not usual for the bailiff to give a full and formal summing up of the facts, in the manner common in jury trials. The summing up used normally (though not invariably) to be given in private, after the trial itself - including the closing speeches of prosecuting and defence counsel - had taken place in public. However in the first applicant’s case it was given in public. As a consequence of the comments of the Court of Appeal in that case, it has been given in public in subsequent cases.
6.The deliberation
After the trial, the bailiff (or deputy bailiff) and jurats retire together. This practice was referred to by the Court of Appeal in the first applicant’s case. The President stated in his judgment:
“... we heard some argument as to whether, having delivered a summing up in open court, the presiding judge should any longer retire with the Jurats [since initially they alone are the judges of fact]. We make no observations on this point other than to suggest that this is an issue which merits careful consideration by the Royal Court.”
The following year, in the case of Attorney General v. Young and Williams (1998 1 JLR 111), the Royal Court held that the presiding judge should retire with the jurats when they consider their verdict, since by virtue of Article 13 (4) of the 1948 Law, he was given a casting vote whenever the jurats were divided on an issue of fact. However, the Royal Court also held that it was the presiding judge’s responsibility to ensure that when he retired with the jurats, he limited his contribution to their discussion to matters of law, so that the decision on the facts was theirs alone, as stipulated by Article 13 (2) of the 1948 Law.
COMPLAINTS
Both applicants complain under Article 6 § 1 that they were denied a fair and public hearing before the inferior number. They contend that the inferior number did not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal and that it did not give adequate reasons for its verdict. They also submit that the failure of the inferior number to provide a fully public hearing “as of right” violated Article 6 § 1. The first applicant also draws attention to prejudicial and inaccurate comments made by the deputy bailiff in the course of his trial, and of the deputy bailiff’s failure to direct the jurats as to the standard of proof in relation to the statutory defences submitted on the first applicant’s behalf. The second applicant highlights the prosecution’s failure to disclose material evidence in full until shortly before the hearing of his appeal.
Both applicants also complain under Article 13 that they were denied an effective remedy in respect of the above alleged violations of Article 6 § 1.
THE LAW
A.Independent and impartial tribunal
The applicants complained, first, that, having regard to the manner of appointment of the jurats and their terms of office, and the fact that the deputy bailiff and the jurats retired together, the Royal Court did not constitute an “independent and impartial” tribunal, contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
The Government submitted that the Royal Court was independent of the executive, legislature and parties to the criminal proceedings, as required by Article 6 § 1. The jurats were appointed by an electoral college, in which advocates and solicitors predominated, and remained in office until retirement age: they could not be removed unless the bailiff and at least seven other jurats petitioned the Queen in Council.
The Government pointed out that no complaint had been made about the independence of the deputy bailiff who sat in each applicant’s case. The deputy bailiff and the jurats retired together before passing verdict, just as the members of any tribunal may be expected to deliberate in private on the case for their decision. Both elements - the deputy bailiff and the jurats - were independent and impartial, and there was no reason to suppose that either would be rendered any less independent or impartial through retiring together. In addition, there was a right of appeal to the Jersey Court of Appeal from the decisions of the inferior number.
The applicants submitted that the jurats were selected, in part, by the legislature and could not, therefore, be said to be independent of Parliament. The retirement together of the judge and jurats was objectionable, since, in the absence of disagreement between them, the jurats were the sole judges of fact, but in the circumstances the applicants could never be sure that the deputy bailiff had limited his contribution to questions of law or that his legal directions had been correct and appropriate.
The Court recalls that in order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered as “independent”, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and its term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence (see the Findlay v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, § 73).
In the present case neither applicant has called into question the independence and impartiality of the deputy bailiff, but they have raised doubts about the position of the jurats. However, the Court notes that the jurats are appointed by an electoral college made up all existing members of the Royal Court, advocates and solicitors of the Royal Court and members of Jersey’s legislature. The jurats hold office until retirement age, in the absence of exceptional circumstances. There are thus a number of guarantees of structural independence and impartiality sufficient to satisfy Article 6 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, McGonnell v. the United Kingdom, no. 28488/95, Report of the Commission, 20 October 1998, § 58).
The Court does not consider it incompatible with Article 6 § 1 in this case that two independent and impartial constituent parts of a single tribunal retired together to deliberate on the decisions before them (see Mort v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 44564/98, 6 September 2001, where the Court held that “no problem arises in the normal course of events if a justices’ clerk retires with the justices and it is not known what assistance, if any, he or she in fact furnishes to them”.).
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
B.Summing up in open court
1.First applicant
The first applicant complained that the failure of the deputy bailiff to sum up to the jurats in open court “as of right” deprived him of a “fair and public hearing”, as required by Article 6 § 1.
The Government pointed out that in the first applicant’s case the deputy bailiff did sum up in public.
The Court agrees with the Government. At the conclusion of the first applicant’s trial, the deputy bailiff summed up to the jurats in public, and various aspects of this summing up were subsequently relied upon by the applicant on appeal. The fact that at the time in question it was not usual practice in the Royal Court to sum up in public is immaterial to the applicant’s case under the Convention. The Court cannot examine domestic law or practice in abstracto, but must direct its attention to the facts of the case before it (see the Findlay v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, § 67).
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
2.Second applicant
The second applicant also complained that he was deprived of a “fair and public hearing” by virtue of the deputy bailiff’s failure to sum up in public.
The Government contended that the second applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies on this point by raising it before the Court of Appeal.
The applicant submitted that he was not required to raise the issue before the Court of Appeal because no appeal had ever been allowed on the basis that a summing up to jurats had not been given in public, and it could therefore be assumed that the Court of Appeal would not have provided an effective remedy for this complaint.
The Court recalls that in order to comply with the requirement in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to exhaust all domestic remedies before applying to the Court, it is necessary for the applicant to have had normal recourse to the national remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. Complaints intended to be made subsequently at Strasbourg should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance, and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law (see the Akdivar v. Turkey judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, § 66). It is initially for the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time. Thereafter, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from the requirement (op. cit., § 68).
At the second applicant’s trial the summing up was made by the deputy bailiff in private after he retired with the jurats. This summing up in Chambers originally formed one of the applicant’s grounds of appeal to the Jersey Court of Appeal, but his advocate withdrew it prior to the appeal hearing, as confirmed in a letter dated 16 May 1997. Following the decision of the Court of Appeal the applicant petitioned the Privy Council on three issues, including the question whether it had been fair for the deputy bailiff to sum up in private. The Privy Council dismissed the petition. According to the note prepared on behalf of the prosecution, which account is not disputed by the applicant, the Privy Council did not consider that it would be appropriate for it to examine the matter without first having received the views of the Court of Appeal.
The Court does not accept the applicant’s argument that he was dispensed from raising his complaint before the Court of Appeal because no appeal had ever been allowed on the ground of failure of the bailiff to sum up in public. The applicant has not provided the Court with any case-law of the Court of Appeal or Privy Council upholding the practice of summing up in private, and indeed the note of the hearing before the Privy Council suggests that such a complaint, properly advanced, would not have met with an unfavourable reception.
Since the applicant did not raise the substance of this complaint before the Court of Appeal, it follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
C.Failure to give reasons
The applicants also complained about the failure of the Royal Court to give reasons for its decisions.
The Government denied that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on this ground.
The Court notes that the jurats did not give a reasoned verdict for its findings of guilt, but, as with the failure of juries to give reasons, this cannot in itself be considered contrary to the Convention (see Saric v. Denmark (dec.), no. 31913/96, 2 February1999). There is nothing in either case to suggest that the jurats’ verdicts were arbitrary, and in each case the safety of the convictions were examined on appeal. In each case the deputy bailiff gave full reasons for the sentences he passed, and, again, the sentences were reviewed by the Court of Appeal.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
D.Fairness of the proceedings
1.First applicant
The first applicant complained that his trial in the Royal Court was unfair, in that during the summing up the deputy bailiff failed to direct the jurats on the standard of proof, made several factual mistakes and made prejudicial and disparaging comments about the defence case, suggesting that aspects of it were incredible.
The Government pointed out that each of these allegations had been examined and rejected by the Court of Appeal.
The Court recalls that, in assessing compliance with Article 6, it must consider the proceedings as a whole including the decision of the appellate court. It is not within the province of the European Court to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them. The Court’s task is to ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety were fair (see the Edwards v. the United Kingdom judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 247-B, pp. 34-35, § 34).
As the Government observed, the first applicant’s complaints about the contents of the summing up were fully examined by the Court of Appeal, which found them to be of no real substance, except one complaint regarding the deputy bailiff’s failure to direct the jurats on the ingredients of the offence of importation. The Court of Appeal duly quashed the applicant’s conviction of this charge. The Court considers that particular weight must be attached to the assessment of the national appellate court, which because of its knowledge and experience of the conduct of jury trials, is especially well placed to determine whether a trial judge’s handling of a trial resulted in unfairness (see C.G. v. the United Kingdom, no. 43373/98, 19.12.2001, § 36), and, in any event, the Court does not consider that the minor errors complained of by the applicant were sufficient to render the proceedings unfair.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
2.Second applicant
Finally, the second applicant complained that he was deprived of a fair trial by reason of the prosecution’s failure to disclose all the material evidence at first instance.
The Government submitted that this defect had been remedied on appeal.
The Court notes that in the present case, having examined the undisclosed material with the benefit of full argument of the parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal against conviction of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on importation of cannabis, on the ground that the non-disclosure had led to a miscarriage of justice. However, it dismissed the applicant’s appeal against conviction of being in possession with intent to supply a controlled drug, finding that the non-disclosure of evidence did not affect the conviction since the evidence could not go to substantiate directly or indirectly the applicant’s defence to the charge.
The Court recalls that Article 6 § 1 requires that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defence all material evidence in their possession for or against the accused (see Rowe and Davies v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28901/95, § 60, ECHR 2000-II). However, where, as in the applicant’s case, full disclosure is made prior to the hearing of an appeal, and the Court of Appeal is able to consider the impact of the new material on the safety of the conviction in the light of informed argument from the defence, the appeal proceedings are adequate to remedy the defects at first instance (see Rowe and Davies, cited above, § 66 and the Edwards judgment, cited above, p. 35, §§ 36-37).
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the applications inadmissible.
Michael O’BoyleMatti Pellonpää
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy