Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 93
January 2007
Sotiropoulou v. Greece (dec.) - 40225/02
Decision 18.1.2007 [Section I]
Article 3
Degrading treatment
Inhuman treatment
Conditions of detention of a terrorist suspect: inadmissible
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Disciplinary penalty on remand prisoner for contacting media without prior judicial authorisation: inadmissible
In 2002 the applicant was remanded in custody on suspicion of belonging to a particularly dangerous terrorist group. Special detention arrangements were made by the prison in order to protect the presumed members of this group against any potential risk of being harmed by other detainees or by third parties involved in the terrorist group. Some months later the applicant went on a hunger strike to protest against the conditions of her detention and was transferred to the prison clinic. Using the prison's public telephone she gave an interview to a journalist in the course of which she complained of the conditions of her detention. Her statements were broadcast by a television channel and published in a political weekly. A disciplinary penalty of five days' solitary confinement was imposed on her for having given the interview without the prior authorisation of the competent judicial authority. Complaints by the applicant about the conditions of her detention and about the penalty imposed were dismissed as unfounded by the criminal court. In 2003 the applicant's criminal case was set down for trial and all the specific restrictions affecting her were lifted. She was then accorded the same detention arrangements as the “ordinary” detainees in the prison. The criminal proceedings are currently pending before the Court of Appeal.
Article 3 – The applicant's pre-trial detention had caused major difficulties for the authorities. As a suspected member of a terrorist group, the applicant had had to be placed in detention under conditions that guaranteed both her personal safety and the smooth conduct of the judicial investigation. In such circumstances special detention arrangements had been justified. The parties had disagreed as to the space allotted to the applicant in the prison. The criminal court examining the case had found that the cell in question had a surface area of about 10 sq.m. In view of the applicant's contradictory allegations on this point, the Court could not dismiss the domestic court's finding. Even supposing that the cell had measured 6 sq.m., as the applicant had claimed, that fact by itself would not have entailed the finding of a violation of Article 3, as she was detained there alone and was allowed three hours of exercise every day in a prison courtyard. In addition, the cell had a window through which daylight could pass and was adequately ventilated, as the domestic court had also observed. The cell moreover contained a bed, a table, a chair, an individual toilet separated by a wall from the rest of the cell, and heating. Its furnishings and fittings were thus not open to criticism. The applicant had therefore been held in material conditions that complied with the European Prison Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers and did not breach Article 3 of the Convention.
Unlike the arrangements applicable to “ordinary” detainees, the applicant had not been allowed contact with other prisoners and the frequency of visits by family members had been restricted. As a result her isolation had been partial and relative; it had not been complete sensory isolation, coupled with total social isolation – a measure which in itself would entail a breach of the Convention. As regards the severity of the arrangements imposed, the applicant had been allowed to receive visits from family members twice a week and visits from her lawyer for an hour and a half every day. She had also been able to receive newspapers and magazines and listen to the radio. Lastly, she had been allowed to make telephone contact with anyone who was entitled to visit her. As a result, the only absolute prohibition imposed on the applicant had concerned her contact with other detainees – a measure justified by the objective pursued, namely to guarantee her security and to ensure the smooth conduct of the pending judicial investigation. There was no indication in the case file that her mental or physical health had declined to such a point that the responsibility of the prison authorities was engaged. Nor had she complained about the lack of medical supervision during this period. The imposition of the special arrangements had only lasted for four months and nineteen days.
In the course of the judicial investigation, the competent authorities had gradually relaxed the restrictions imposed on the applicant: she had been accorded better conditions in which to see her child and had been allowed visits from her husband, who was accused of belonging to the same terrorist group. She had also been authorised to make an unlimited number of calls using the prison telephones and to use an electric hotplate in her cell. Lastly, from the very day the judicial investigation ended, normal detention arrangements had been restored. The steps taken by the competent authorities, when considered as a whole, thus proved that the special detention arrangements were not applied to her with the intention of humiliating or degrading her, but reflected a concern to find a solution that was adapted to her character and to the requirements of the investigation. Accordingly, the material conditions and special detention arrangements in question had not reached the minimum level of severity required to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3: manifestly ill-founded.
Article 10 – The impugned penalty amounted to “interference” with the applicant's right to freedom of expression, that interference being prescribed by law and pursuing a legitimate aim: to prevent disorder and to maintain the authority of the judiciary. The penalty in issue did not impose an absolute restriction on the applicant's right to communicate with third parties during the period of her pre-trial detention – a restriction that could have raised an Article 10 issue. She had not been penalised for her communication per se with a daily newspaper and with a television channel but rather because she had not sought the requisite authorisation beforehand. That requirement had been justified in the present case by the serious and specific nature of the charges laid against the applicant (membership of a terrorist group) and because the judicial proceedings were still at an early stage. It had thus been reasonable for the authorities to impose harsher restrictions on her right of communication, in order to prevent any contact through third parties with other presumed members of the terrorist group or the disclosure of information on the conditions of her detention. That eventuality might have undermined the smooth conduct of the on-going investigation and have endangered the safety of the applicant or other detainees. Accordingly, the grounds put forward by the national authorities to justify the interference were “relevant and sufficient” and the penalty imposed on the applicant, namely the five-day period of solitary confinement in her cell, was in this case “proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued”: manifestly ill-founded.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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