THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 33675/03
by Roberto ŠPEGELJ
against Slovenia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 7 September 2010 as a Committee composed of:
Elisabet Fura, President,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Ineta Ziemele, judges,
and Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 30 September 2003,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Roberto Špegelj, is a Slovenian national who was born in 1977 and lives in Velenje. He was represented before the Court by Ms M. Končan Verstovšek, a lawyer practising in Celje. The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Lucijan Bembič, State Attorney-General.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
3. On 12 April 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings with the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking compensation for damages sustained while doing military service as a conscript.
4. Between 30 November 2001 and 11 September 2003 the applicant lodged five preliminary written submissions and made two requests for a date to be set for a hearing. The first-instance court held three hearings.
5. On 14 October 2004 the Celje District Court delivered a judgment upholding the applicant's request in part. Both parties appealed.
6. On 20 December 2006 the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju) delivered a judgment allowing the appeals in part. The remainder of the appeal was dismissed. A part of the claim and the question of costs of proceedings were remitted for re-examination.
7. On 16 January 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the dismissed part of the appeal.
8. On 23 February 2007 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal under the Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without undue Delay (“the 2006 Act”) with the Celje District Court.
9. On 23 March 2007 the President of the District Court informed the applicant that the case file was with the Supreme Court owing to the appeal on points of law and dismissed the supervisory appeal as unfounded.
10. On 1 October 2008 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal under the 2006 Act with the Celje District Court.
11. On 8 October 2008 the President of the Celje District Court dismissed the supervisory appeal as unfounded, since the proceedings were pending before the Supreme Court.
12. On 9 October 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law. The proceedings continued before the first-instance court (see paragraph 6 above).
13. On 13 March 2009 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal, which was dismissed on 19 March 2009 on procedural grounds as premature.
14. On 19 May 2009 the Celje District Court delivered a judgment concerning the part that was remitted for re-examination (see paragraph 6 above). Both parties appealed.
15. On 21 October 2009 the Celje Higher Court gave a judgment. The judgment was served on the applicant on 22 December 2009.
B. Relevant domestic law
16. A description of the relevant domestic law can be found in the judgment of Lesjak v. Slovenia (no. 33946/03, 21 July 2009).
THE LAW
17. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the civil proceedings.
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
18. He further complained that the remedies available in Slovenia in length-of-proceedings cases were ineffective.
Article 13 of the Convention provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
19. The Court observes that on 1 January 2007 when the new legislation providing remedies for the length of proceedings (the 2006 Act) entered into force, the proceedings were pending before the Supreme Court. The proceedings before the Supreme Court lasted for one year and nine months (from 16 January 2007 to 9 October 2008), during which time the proceedings before the first-instance court were stayed. After the proceedings continued at first instance, a judgment was delivered on 19 May 2009. Following an appeal, the proceedings were concluded on 22 December 2009, when the second-instance judgment was served on the applicant.
20. The Court notes that unlike in the case of Lesjak (no. 33946/03, 21 October 2009) the proceedings in the present case were finally resolved on 22 December 2009. After that, the applicant could have claimed compensation for the overall length of proceedings, provided that he had used the acceleratory remedies, namely a supervisory appeal and a motion for deadline, in accordance with the procedural rules laid down in the 2006 Act. The applicant, however, did not use the acceleratory remedies in the prescribed manner after the proceedings continued at first and second instance.
21. The Court must now examine whether the applicant had the opportunity to properly exhaust acceleratory remedies in order to be able to claim compensation for the violation of the reasonable time requirement after the final resolution of the proceedings (see Nezirović v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 16400/06, § 41, 25 November 2008). In this connection, the Court notes that, following the judgment of the Supreme Court, the proceedings continued for approximately one year before the first and second-instance courts and that the applicant therefore had enough time to properly avail himself of the acceleratory remedies, and by doing so fulfil the conditions for lodging a just satisfaction claim (ibid.). Since he failed to do so, this part of the complaint should be rejected under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
22. As regards the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the Court notes that their length was absorbed by the length of the proceedings before the lower courts which were stayed while the case was pending before the Supreme Court. The conclusion reached above should therefore apply likewise to the proceedings before the Supreme Court. In any event, the Court notes that the Supreme Court proceedings, which lasted one year and nine months, cannot be considered as having been excessively lengthy (see Tričković v. Slovenia, no. 39914/98, 12 June 2001) and that this part of the complaint should also be rejected as manifestly ill-founded under Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
23. As regards the complaint under Article 13, the Court has found that the 2006 Act did afford the applicant an effective remedy in respect of his complaint about the length of proceedings (see Grzinčič v. Slovenia, no. 26867/02, 3 May 2007). That finding is also valid in the context of his complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
24. The application must therefore be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Santiago QuesadaElisabet Fura
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy