SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 32650/96
by SIT Srl
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 15 March 2001 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrG. Bonello,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 4 April 1996 and registered on 19 August 1996,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian company, having its registered seat in Pisa. It is represented before the Court by Mrs I. Saba, a lawyer practising in Pisa.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Livorno, which it had let to R.G.
In a registered letter of 29 March 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that it intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.
In a writ served on the tenant on 29 April 1984, the applicant reiterated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Livorno Magistrate.
On 7 May 1984, the Livorno Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 28 February 1985. That decision was made enforceable on 21 May 1984.
On 5 January 1986, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.
On 20 February 1986, it served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 14 March 1986.
Between 14 March 1986 and 6 June 1997, the bailiff made 21 attempts to recover possession, on 14 March 1986, 22 July 1986, 22 January 1987, 25 June 1987, 10 November 1987, 18 May 1988, 6 April 1989, 26 October 1989, 14 June 1990, 30 November 1990, 15 July 1991, 11 February 1992, 29 September 1992, 3 June 1993, 18 January 1994, 8 July 1994, 14 February 1995, 20 October 1995, 10 October 1996, 15 November 1996, and 6 June 1997.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On an unspecified date after 6 June 1997, the applicant repossessed the apartment.
B. Relevant domestic law
The relevant domestic law is described in the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, 28.7.99, §§ 18-35, ECHR-V.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about its prolonged inability - through lack of police assistance - to recover possession of its apartment.
2. The applicant further complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that its inability to recover possession of its apartment amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The applicant further complains about the duration of the eviction proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies. They submit that it has failed to issue proceedings in the administrative courts challenging the refusal of police assistance and to raise, in the same proceedings, the constitutionality of the legislative provisions concerned.
The applicant contests the Government’s arguments. It argues that the prefectoral committee never adopted a formal decision refusing police assistance and that, at any event, the proceedings in the administrative courts would not have been effective, given the length of these proceedings before Italian courts.
The Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the Immobiliare Saffi judgment cited above, §§ 40-42). As the Government have not submitted any new argument in support of their objection, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This exception should therefore be rejected.
On the merits, the Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate.
The applicant argues that the impossibility to repossess its apartment during 12 years from the issue of the order for possession amounts to a violation of its right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It argues that in the Italian legal system tenants are overprotected.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy