AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 27567/95
by Nicholas STAMOULAKATOS
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 9 April 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. J. LIDDY, President
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs. M. HION
Mr. R. NICOLINI
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 25 May 1995 by
Nicholas STAMOULAKATOS against the United Kingdom and registered on
12 June 1995 under file No. 27567/95;
Having regard to:
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
15 March 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 6 April 1996;
- the Commission's decision of 16 October 1996 to invite the
parties to submit further written observations on the
admissibility and merits of the complaint concerning the length
of the above proceedings;
- the further observations submitted by the applicant on
27 October 1996 and by the respondent Government on
22 November 1996;
- the further comments provided by the applicant on
29 December 1996 and 11 January and 8 February 1997;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Greek citizen and a journalist. He was born
in 1936 in Greece and is currently resident in London. This is his
seventeenth application before the Commission. He has since lodged
fourteen additional applications.
The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the
parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 31 December 1990 the applicant lodged an action against the
"International League for Human Rights of United Nations", the
"International Intelligence S.A.", Mrs. E.I and Mrs. H.J before the
High Court for the recovery of a debt.
On 2 July 1991 a Master in chambers gave directions in the
applicant's action.
By letter of 12 August 1991 the solicitors of Mrs. H.S, E.I's
sister, informed the applicant that E.I had died.
On 2 October 1991 a judge proposed that the action be transferred
to a County Court. On 14 October 1991 the High Court examined the
matter and decided not to make an order for the transfer of the action
to a County Court.
The applicant's action would have been called for trial on
11 December 1991. On that date the High Court heard the applicant and
Mrs. W.T as representative of the first two defendants. It decided,
however, to adjourn the trial to enable the applicant to take such
steps as he thought appropriate to amend the writ and subsequent
pleadings in relation to E.I. It also requested the Attorney General
to appoint an amicus curiae to make submissions on the following
issues: first, the capacity of the first and second defendants to be
sued before the High Court, secondly, whether the first two defendants
had been properly served and thirdly, whether Mrs. W.T was duly
authorised to represent them. Finally, the court ordered that an
affidavit be sworn on behalf of the first two defendants dealing with
their constitution, all matters relating to their capacity to be sued
before the High Court and Mrs. W.T's capacity to represent them.
On 30 March 1992 the Attorney General suggested that, as a number
of detailed inquiries needed to be carried out in order to assist the
court, assistance might be better provided by the Official Solicitor.
On 1 April 1992 the court agreed to this course of action.
In an undated report filed with the court the Official Solicitor
noted, inter alia, that it had not been possible to establish whether
either of the first or second defendants was a corporate body and in
the absence of evidence to the contrary it could be presumed that the
organisations were unincorporated associations which had no legal
existence, apart from the members of which they were composed. The
Official Solicitor also noted that a letter of inquiry addressed to the
first defendant received a reply signed by or on behalf of the
applicant himself.
In October 1992 the Central Office of the Royal Courts of Justice
wrote to the applicant asking about the progress of the proceedings.
On 1 November 1992 the applicant informed the court that there had been
no settlement and that he was taking the matter to the European Court.
The court wrote to the applicant in the same terms in October 1993. In
a letter of reply of 14 November 1993 the applicant asked for his
documents to be returned and for a new hearing date.
On 24 February 1994 the High Court heard the applicant and
Mrs H.S in her capacity as personal representative of E.I. The court
ordered the adjournment of the action to enable Mrs. H.S to make an
application for the striking out of the applicant's claim. The earlier
request for the assistance of an amicus curiae was assigned to the
Official Solicitor.
On 12 June 1994 the applicant lodged an application for leave to
appeal and an extension of time for appealing the order of
24 February 1994. On 24 June 1994 the Civil Appeals Office informed the
applicant that a fee of 50 pounds, an affidavit in support and a sealed
copy of the order of 24 February 1994 would be required. The applicant
did not lodge the required fee, order and affidavit until 3 May 1995.
In May 1995 there was further correspondence between the applicant and
the Civil Appeals Office concerning the cost of certain transcripts
which the applicant was required to produce in support of the appeal
he intended to lodge. Once the transcripts were obtained the file was
referred back to the Registrar of Civil Appeals for further directions
in October 1995.
The application for leave to appeal was refused by a single judge
of the Court of Appeal on 5 February 1997. According to the Government,
the application was not in a fit state to list because the bundles were
so muddled and it was exceedingly difficult to follow what the case was
about. It is claimed that, to assist the applicant, a leaflet
explaining in simple terms what was required was sent to him. However,
the applicant refused to comply with the instructions given.
The proceedings before the High Court are apparently still
pending.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention about
the length of the proceedings in the United Kingdom.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 25 May 1995 and registered on
12 June 1995.
On 29 November 1995 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to
communicate the applicant's complaint concerning the length of the
proceedings in the United Kingdom and to declare the remainder of the
application inadmissible.
The written observations of the respondent Government were
submitted on 15 March 1996, after an extension of the time-limit fixed
for that purpose. The applicant replied on 6 April 1996.
On 16 October 1996 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to
invite the parties to submit further written observations on the
admissibility and merits of the complaint regarding the length of the
above proceedings.
The applicant submitted such further observations on 27 October
1996. The observations of the respondent Government were submitted on
22 November 1996, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that
purpose.
On 29 December 1996, 11 January 1997 and 8 February 1997 the
applicant provided further comments.
On 13 February 1997 the respondent Government protested about the
language used by the applicant in his observations and comments.
The respondent Government's letter of 13 February 1997 was
transmitted to the applicant on 28 February 1997.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention about the length of the proceedings in the United Kingdom.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as
relevant, provides as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time
..."
The respondent Government request the Commission to declare the
remainder of the application inadmissible under Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention as an abuse of the right of petition.
They submit in this connection that the applicant has had previous
unsuccessful proceedings under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention. These related to the fairness of ten separate sets of
criminal proceedings brought against the applicant in Greece which had
taken place in his absence. The present application concerns civil
proceedings initiated by the applicant in the United Kingdom in 1990
which have, as far as the Government can establish, no substance to
them. Two of the defendants, whom the applicant purports to sue for the
recovery of a debt, do not exist as legal entities and appear to have
been represented by an agent of the applicant. The third defendant in
the proceedings is now deceased. The fourth defendant, purportedly a
former president of one of the non-existent entities, is alleged to be
in collusion with the applicant in taking out nonsensical actions
against various non-existent companies and individuals.
The respondent Government further submit that, since his arrival
in that country, the applicant has initiated numerous proceedings. All
his other actions have been struck out and in one case one of the
defendants successfully counterclaimed against the applicant. As
regards the proceedings complained of in the present application the
Government was faced with two alternatives, allow them to have run the
length of time that they have or have them struck out as an abuse of
process, like the others. It follows that the applicant has not
suffered any actual prejudice because, if the proceedings had not been
allowed to continue, they would have been determined against him.
The respondent Government finally submit that the applicant's
response to the Government's observations on the admissibility of the
application contains provocative and insulting language concerning the
Government and its Agent which, in accordance with previous case-law
of the Commission, constitutes an abuse of the right of petition.
The applicant contests the submissions of the respondent
Government.
The Commission notes that in the observations filed by the
applicant in response to the Government's observations the applicant
has made a series of allegations of criminal and dishonest conduct in
language which is both insulting and abusive against the respondent
Government and, more particularly, the Government's Agent. There is no
evidence whatever to support the allegations made and nothing to
warrant the language used, which in the Commission's view is wholly
without justification. In this connection the Commission recalls that
the persistent use of insulting or provocative language by an applicant
may be considered an abuse of the right of petition (No. 2724/66,
Dec. 10.2.67, Collection 22, p. 89; No. 2625/65, Dec. 30.9.68,
Collection 28 p. 26).
The Commission considers that this is the case with the present
application. The application must be, therefore, rejected as an abuse
of the right of petition in accordance with Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy