FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 16244/03
by Bronisława STANEK
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 6 November 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrL. Garlicki,
MsL. Mijović,
MrJ. Šikuta,
MrsP. Hirvelä, judges
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 9 May 2003,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having regard to the decision to grant priority to the above application under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the formal declarations accepting a friendly settlement of the case,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mrs Bronisława Stanek, is a Polish national who was born in 1936 and lives in Wrocław. She was represented before the Court by Ms K. Burska, a lawyer practising in Tyniec Mały. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant’s husband, W.S., worked as a technician at a telephone exchange of the Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (TPSA) in Wrocław.
On 30 December 1996 he fainted during work and was taken to hospital, where he stayed until 7 January 1997. He was subsequently treated in hospital between 18 April and 28 May 1997 and between 7 and 16 October 1997. On 27 March 1998 W.S. was again taken to hospital where he died of a heart attack the next day.Proceedings against TPSA
On 21 October 1997 W.S. requested his employer TPSA for compensation for an occupational accident.
On 23 December 1997 W.S. filed an action with the Wrocław District Court against TPSA aimed at establishing that the incident of 30 December 1996 had been work-related. On 28 March 1998 W.S. died.
On 6 May 1998 the applicant notified the court that she intended to pursue the proceedings as the legal successor of her late husband. The proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of inheritance proceedings.
On 6 January 1999 the District Court declared that the applicant and her children had become W.S.’s legal successors.
The proceedings were resumed on 6 April 1999.
On 6 December 2002 the Wrocław District Court declared that it was not competent to examine the case further. The court noted that the relevant legal provisions had changed and according to the Constitutional Court judgment of 24 April 2002 (P 5/01) claims for compensation should henceforth be brought against the Social Insurance Authority. The decision was served on the applicant on 19 December 2002.
On 6 January 2003 the applicant complained to the President of Wrocław Regional Court about the protracted length of the proceedings. On 15 January 2003 she received a reply from the President of the District Court stating that the length of the case had been justified by its complexity. He also pointed to the fact that the court no longer had jurisdiction to deal with the case and that the case file would soon be forwarded to the Social Insurance Authority for a decision.Proceedings against the Social Insurance Authority
On 20 February 2003 the Social Insurance Authority refused to award the applicant compensation on the ground that according to the protocol of 20 October 1997 the accident had not been work-related.
On 3 March 2003 the applicant appealed against the decision to the District Court. According to the new legal provisions applicable at that time, the Social Insurance Authority was the defendant in the case.
On 14 January 2004 the District Court summoned the employer company to participate in the proceedings.
On 24 May 2004 the Wrocław District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed.
On 24 February 2005 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed her appeal. The written grounds for the judgment were served on the applicant six weeks later.
The applicant requested an advocate’s opinion on the possibility of lodging a cassation appeal in her case. The lawyer prepared an opinion in which she explained that cassation in this case would have been futile since there had been no indication that the lower courts had infringed the substantive or procedural law, which was a prerequisite for lodging an appeal to the Supreme Court.Proceedings under the 2004 Act
On 8 November 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Wrocław Court of Appeal under the 2004 Act about the excessive length of the proceedings concerning her husband’s alleged occupational accident.
On 30 December 2004 the Court of Appeal found that the proceedings had been excessively lengthy. However, the court observed that two sets of proceedings had been held in the case. It noted that the proceedings against the employer company had been terminated on 6 December 2002 by the decision to refer the case to the Social Insurance Authority and the applicant had not appealed against the decision. Therefore, the complaint about this set of proceedings was inadmissible under section 5 of the 2004 Act.
With regard to the second set of proceedings the court observed that, on the whole, it had not been excessively lengthy. Nevertheless, there was no justification for the period of several months of inactivity on the part of the Regional Court after the applicant’s appeal. In this part the applicant’s complaint was well-founded. The court, however, observed that the applicant’s complaint under the 2004 Act could have in itself delayed the scheduling of a hearing. With this in mind, the court found that the applicant was not entitled to compensation under the provisions of the 2004 Act and that the sole finding of undue delay in the proceedings before the Regional Court was sufficient just satisfaction.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the excessive length of the proceedings.
2. The applicant also complained about the unfavourable outcome of the proceedings.
THE LAW
On 26 June 2007 the Court received the following declaration from the Government:
“I, Jakub Wołąsiewicz, Agent of the Government, declare that the Government of Poland offer to pay 16,000 PLN to Ms Bronisława Stanek with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the above-mentioned case pending before the European Court of Human Rights.
This sum, which is to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses, will be free of any taxes that may be applicable and payable within three months from the date of notification of the decision taken by the Court pursuant to Article 37 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the event of failure to pay this sum within the said three-month period, the Government undertake to pay simple interest on it, from expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. The payment will constitute the final resolution of the case.”
On 3 July 2007 the Court received the following declaration signed by the applicant:
“I, Bronisława Stanek, note that the Government of Poland are prepared to pay me the sum of 16,000 PLN with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the above‑mentioned case pending before the European Court of Human Rights.
This sum, which is to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses, will be free of any taxes that may be applicable and payable within three months from the date of notification of the decision taken by the Court pursuant to Article 37 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. From the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
I accept the proposal and waive any further claims against Poland in respect of the facts of this application. I declare that this constitutes a final resolution of the case.”
The Court takes note of the friendly settlement reached between the parties. It is satisfied that the settlement is based on respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols and finds no reasons to justify a continued examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine of the Convention). In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 and to strike the case out of the list.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases.
T.L. EarlyNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy