FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 71744/14
Blagoj STOJČEV
against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 25 September 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Aleš Pejchal, President,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Jovan Ilievski, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 November 2014,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Blagoj Stojčev, is a Macedonian national, who was born in 1970 and lives in Vinica. He was represented before the Court by Mr S. Risteski, a lawyer practising in Skopje.
2. The Macedonian Government (“the Government”) were initially represented by their former Agent, Mr K. Bogdanov, later succeeded by Ms D. Djonova.
The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. On 7 December 2012 the Kočani Court of First Instance (Основен суд Кочани – “the trial court”) convicted the applicant (who was represented by a lawyer of his own choosing) of theft and imposed a fine of 2,000 euros (EUR).
5. The applicant appealed against that judgment and requested to be notified of a hearing, should the appeal court decide to hold one. The public prosecutor also appealed against the trial court’s judgment seeking a more severe sentence for the applicant.
6. At a session held on 10 June 2013 in the absence of the parties, the Štip Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Штип – “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal; it partly allowed the public prosecutor’s appeal and replaced the fine with a prison sentence of one year.
7. The applicant, represented by another lawyer, lodged a request for extraordinary review of the final judgment (барање за вонредно преиспитување на правосилна пресуда), which the Supreme Court dismissed in a judgment of 18 February 2014. That judgment was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 2 May 2014 and on the applicant on 5 May 2014.
COMPLAINT
8. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the Court of Appeal having decided in his absence.
THE LAW
9. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the Court of Appeal had decided in his absence. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“1. In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal...
...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
...”
A. The parties’ arguments
10. The Government maintained that the Supreme Court’s judgment had been received by the applicant’s lawyer on 2 May 2014. In this connection they submitted a copy of a receipt slip (доставница) signed by the applicant’s lawyer. For this reason, they argued that the application had been lodged outside the six-month time-limit.
11. The applicant admitted that his lawyer had received the Supreme Court’s judgment on the date indicated by the Government. However, he referred to domestic procedural rules under which time-limits were to be extended when the last day thereof coincided with a non-working day. Since the six-month time-limit for lodging the application with the Court had ended on 2 November 2014, which fell on a Sunday, the applicant argued that the application had been submitted within the six month time-limit given that it had been lodged on 3 November 2014, the first working day thereafter.
B. The Court’s assessment
12. The Court reiterates its established case-law pertaining to the requirements of the six-month rule. The purpose of the six-month rule is to promote legal certainty, ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are examined within a reasonable time, and protect the authorities and other persons concerned from being in a situation of uncertainty for a long period of time (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, §§ 39-42, 29 June 2012; see also Shirinova v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 31876/11, § 14, 12 November 2011).
13. Furthermore, in a situation where the applicant is represented by a lawyer, the six-month period runs from the date on which the applicant’s lawyer became aware of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant only became aware of the decision later (see Çelik v. Turkey (dec.), no. 52991/99, ECHR 2004‑X, with further references).
14. The Court notes that in the instant case there is no dispute between the parties that the final judgment in the domestic proceedings was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 2 May 2014. Accordingly, the six-month period started to run on 3 May 2014 and ended on 2 November 2014. The application was lodged on 3 November 2014, that is, after the expiry of the six-month time-limit.
15. As far as the Court is concerned, the fact that the last day of the six‑month time-limit, that is 2 November 2014, fell on a Sunday and that in such circumstances, under domestic law, time-limits are extended to the following working day, does not affect the determination of the dies ad quem (see Sabri Güneş, cited above, § 61).
16. In view of the above, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaint is inadmissible for non-compliance with the six‑month rule set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 18 October 2018.
Renata DegenerAleš Pejchal
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy