FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 40535/14
Gregor ŠTRLEKAR
against Slovenia
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 4 October 2016 as a Chamber composed of:
András Sajó, President,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Iulia Motoc,
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,
Marko Bošnjak, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 15 May 2014,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Gregor Štrlekar, is a Slovenian national who was born in 1986 and lives in Ljubljana. He is represented before the Court by Mr M. Verce, a lawyer practising in Ljubljana.
2. The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Mrs J. Morela, State Attorney.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. The applicant has suffered from a psychotic disorder since 2008. He has mainly received outpatient psychiatric treatment; however, in 2010, he spent a week in a psychiatric hospital because of a delusional disorder and suicidal thoughts.
5. On 9 August 2013 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of aggravated theft. The next day he was brought before the investigating judge of the Ljubljana District Court who opened a judicial investigation against him and ordered his detention.
6. From 10 August until 21 October 2013 the applicant was detained in the remand section of Ljubljana Prison. During this time, he was hospitalised in Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital from 15 until 20 August 2013.
7. On 30 August 2013 the applicant’s court-appointed counsel wrote a letter to the remand section of Ljubljana Prison, informing the authorities that the applicant had written a number of letters to her in which he mentioned having had suicidal thoughts. Accordingly, the counsel asked the prison authorities to provide her with a copy of the applicant’s medical documents and to inform her of his mental condition.
8. On 16 September 2013 the investigating judge of the Ljubljana District Court appointed an expert in psychiatry to give his opinion on whether the applicant had been capable of understanding the nature and effect of his actions at the time of the events in issue and whether he was capable of participating in the proceedings.
9. At the expert’s recommendation, the court ordered, on 21 October 2013, that the applicant be transferred to the forensic psychiatric unit of Maribor University Medical Centre (hereinafter “the Psychiatric Unit”) for the purpose of further observation and diagnosis. On his admission to the Psychiatric Unit, on 22 October 2013, he was placed in the most secure area, a three-bed room which could be monitored through a glass window. He had access to a large hallway shared by twelve patients which led to, inter alia, bathrooms, a living room, a doctor’s office and a smoking room. On his first day in the Psychiatric Unit he was assessed by Dr. M.P. On 25 and 29 October 2013 he was assessed by Dr. T.C.S. and Dr. A.F.C. respectively. The doctors noted that the applicant had reported occasional hallucinations and had mentioned a previous suicide attempt, but they considered that he was not acutely psychotic and did not at that time have suicidal tendencies. On 30 October 2013 Dr. A.F.C. noted that the applicant had, according to the Psychiatric Unit’s guards, been testing the fence and windows in the yard. Citing attempts he had previously made to abscond, the doctor noted that the applicant would no longer be allowed to access the yard.
10. On 3 November 2013, at around 9 p.m. the applicant jumped through the window in the smoking room and landed on the concrete staircase leading to the basement. On 3 November 2013, following the incident, a report was prepared by the special security officer, Mrs B.V.V. Another report was prepared by four staff members on 4 November 2013. The reports were based on the observations of the staff, an inspection of the premises and interviews with patients. The reports found that the applicant, with the help of some of the patients, had displaced the bars on the window by loosening the screws. The applicant had then used a sheet to lower himself from the second to the first floor. One of the patients had then untied the sheet from the second-floor window so that the applicant was able to tie it to the first-floor window in order to climb down from the first floor. During the latter attempt he had landed on the staircase, which had not been visible from the window and could therefore not have been anticipated by the applicant. According to the above-mentioned reports, as well as the medical report drawn up by Dr. A.F.C., following the jump the applicant had been found lying on the concrete floor under the window, unable to move, and complaining that he was in pain. Two medical officers had come to his assistance and had shortly thereafter been joined by Dr. A.F.C. and other health professionals from the Psychiatric Unit who had administered first aid to him and called for an ambulance. As the paramedics had been positioning the applicant on the stretcher and cutting through his pajamas, they had found that he had been wearing civilian clothes underneath. The applicant, accompanied by a security officer, had been taken to hospital. Furthermore, upon an inspection of the smoking room, it had been found that the bar covering the window had shifted (one of the screws holding it in place having been removed) and a sheet was hanging from the window (which is clearly visible in the photos attached to the reports and submitted to the Court). According to the reports, a patient, Mr D.T., had told the staff that the applicant had earlier asked him for a hex key and that another patient, Mr. Z.H., had helped the applicant with his escape; Mr Z.H. denied this. The special security officer who drew up the report of 3 November 2013 also noted in that report that immediately after the incident she had seen a car with four young men waiting next to the Psychiatric Unit building. According to her report, the men had driven off after being approached by her.
11. The applicant denied that he had attempted to escape and alleged that the incident of 3 November 2013 was in reality a suicide attempt. In a letter of 11 March 2014, which he sent to his lawyer for the purposes of the legal proceedings, he explained that he had put on pajamas over his sweatshirt and sweatpants because he had been feeling cold. In that letter he further denied that there had been any sheets hanging from the window and accused the police officers and the medical staff of the Psychiatric Unit of lying in order to avoid their responsibility for the incident. He also alleged that he had been maltreated, strapped to the bed, and forcibly medicated and that because of this he had attempted to kill himself.
12. As a result of the above-mentioned fall, the applicant sustained a number of injuries, including a fracture of a lumbar vertebra and fractures of both heel bones (calcanei), and suffered temporary paralysis. His lumbar vertebra was operated on immediately after the fall. On 5 November 2013 he was transferred from the intensive care unit to the traumatology unit, where he stayed until 23 December 2013.
13. In the meantime, on 18 December 2013, the applicant lodged an application (no. 256/14) with the Court complaining about the overcrowding, inadequate ventilation and limited out-of-cell time allowed to inmates in Ljubljana Prison during the period from 10 August 2013 to 21 October 2013. On 28 January 2015 he further complained to the Court about inadequate conditions in the Psychiatric Unit during the period from 22 October 2012 until 16 January 2014.
14. Meanwhile, on 23 December 2013 the applicant was examined by an expert psychiatrist, who judged that he was able to participate in the trial. On the same day he was again detained in the Psychiatric Unit, from where he was released on 16 January 2014. The medical discharge letter noted that the applicant was not psychotic and was not at risk of suicide.
15. According to the Government’s submissions, Mrs B.S.H., the mother of a detainee who had spent one day in the Psychiatric Unit, complained to the police in February 2014 in general terms about the “torture and overdosing” of the patients by the Psychiatric Unit’s staff. Mrs B.S.H. also mentioned that one of the patients, identified as the applicant, had – according to her son – jumped through a window after undergoing two days of torture. On 9 March 2015 the Maribor district prosecutor’s office issued a decision dismissing the complaint, a copy of which was sent to the applicant. The prosecutor’s office noted that on the basis of her allegations the Medical Chamber of Slovenia had reviewed the medical files of the relevant patients, including the applicant, on 24 June 2004. It reiterated the findings of the above-mentioned reports of 3 and 4 November 2013 (see paragraph 10 above), as summarised by the Medical Chamber, noting that they showed that the applicant had undoubtedly attempted to escape and not to commit suicide.
16. From 17 February 2014 until 4 April 2014 the applicant underwent rehabilitation in the Soča University Rehabilitation Institute. When discharged he was able to walk with aid of crutches.
COMPLAINTS
17. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the forensic psychiatric unit in which he had been placed as a pre-trial detainee had failed to take appropriate measures to prevent his alleged attempt to commit suicide. He also complained under Article 13 of the Convention that the State had failed to implement remedies which would have led to an improvement in the allegedly inadequate care that he had received.
THE LAW
18. The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to prevent his alleged suicide attempt, in violation of Article 3, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
19. The applicant also complained that he had had no effective remedy, in violation of Article 13, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
20. The Government argued that the applicant had not complied with the six-month time limit because he had raised his complaints concerning his attempted suicide (which had taken place on 3 November 2013) only in his written submissions of 15 May 2014.
21. The applicant, on the other hand, argued that the six-month time limit should have started running from 16 January 2014, when his detention was discontinued by the court (see paragraph 14 above). Until then he had been under the supervision of the security officers and the only effective remedy would have been one that could have improved his conditions of detention.
22. The Court recalls that the object of the six-month time limit under Article 35 § 1 is to promote legal certainty by ensuring that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with in a reasonable time and that past decisions are not continually open to challenge. It also reiterates that the rule affords the prospective applicant time to consider whether to lodge an application and, if so, to decide on the specific complaints and arguments to be raised (see, among many others, Dennis and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 76573/01, 2 July 2002).
23. The Court’s case-law indicates that while normally the six-month period runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies, where it is clear from the outset that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its effect or prejudice on the applicant (see, for example, Petrie and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 29703/05, 6 February 2007, and Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 157, ECHR 2009-V). Moreover, the Court recalls that Article 35 § 1 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to bring his complaint before the Court before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level (see M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, no. 12060/12, § 69, 12 April 2016).
24. The Court notes that the applicant complained on three occasions to the Court. On 18 December 2013 he complained about the overcrowding, inadequate ventilation and limited out-of-cell time allowed to inmates in Ljubljana Prison during the period from 10 August 2013 to 21 October 2013. On 28 January 2015 he complained about inadequate conditions in the Psychiatric Unit during the period from 22 October 2012 until 16 January 2014 (see paragraph 13 above). Both complaints were rejected by the Court for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (Štrlekar v. Slovenia (dec), no. 256/14, 30 June 2015). The complaint of 28 January 2015 was also rejected on the grounds that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month time limit. In the meantime, on 15 May 2014, the applicant raised the complaints concerned in the instant case.
25. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaints of 15 May 2014 are limited to the circumstances which led to the incident of 3 November 2013. The applicant did not complain of the lack of an investigation with respect to this incident. It moreover does not appear that he took any steps in order to ensure that such an investigation was undertaken. The only inquiry into the events took place internally, immediately after the applicant’s fall, and ended with the two reports prepared on 3 and 4 November 2013 respectively (see paragraph 10 above). The Medical Chamber’s report and the prosecutor’s decision, submitted by the Government, were not prompted by the applicant’s actions but by general complaints made by Mrs. B.S.H. More importantly, they relied on the two above-mentioned reports; they did not appear to have entailed any further investigative steps (see paragraph 15 above). The Court, for its part, does not consider, in light of the information in the case-file and the initial findings after the incident, that the authorities were under an obligation to investigate the incident further (compare and contrast with Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, §§ 91 and 97, ECHR 2001-III, and Trubnikov v. Russia, no. 49790/99, §§ 88-89, 5 July 2005).
26. In the light of the above circumstances and, in particular, having regard to the fact that the applicant’s complaints concern a particular event in time and the alleged failure to take measures to prevent it, the Court considers that he should have raised them within six months of the incident, had he considered that he had no means of obtaining an effective investigation of the alleged violation. In addition to that, the Court notes that in the instant case the applicant explicitly stated that he did not have any other effective domestic remedy at his disposal (see paragraphs 17 and 19 above).
27. The applicant did not put forward any argument as to why he need not or could not have raised the present complaints within the six months from the date of the incident, except for submitting that six-month time limit should have started running on 16 January 2014, when his detention was discontinued (see paragraphs 14 and 21 above). The Court notes in this connection that, as mentioned above, the present applicant’s complaints are not concerned with the general conditions of detention (see paragraph 24 above), nor with its compliance with Article 5 of the Convention, but with the particular incident which took place on 3 November 2013. Furthermore, the Court observes that the applicant introduced his application no. 256/14 on 18 December 2013 (see paragraph 24 above) but made no mention of the incident of 3 November 2013. Thus, in the absence of any further explanation on the part of the applicant, the Government’s objection must be upheld.
28. Accordingly, the application must be declared inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 27 October 2016.
Andrea Tamietti András Sajó
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy