FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 7913/07
by Gerhard STUMPE
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 9 December 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Ledi Bianku,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 31 January 2007,
Having regard to its decision in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (no. 47550/06) of 7 October 2008,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Gerhard Stumpe, is a German national who was born in 1929 and lives in Eppendorf. He is represented before the Court by Mr T. Gertner, a lawyer practising in Bad Ems.
A. Historical background
A summary account of historical events in which the present application originated can be found in the Court’s decision on admissibility in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (see Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (dec.), no. 47550/06, 7 October 2008, §§ 4-5, ECHR-2008-...).
B. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant submits that he and his family were forced to leave their 7.96 hectare farm in Falkenhain (at present Sokołowiec in Poland). Each person was allowed to take only the barest personal essentials that they could hold in their hands.
This region before and during the Second World War belonged to the German Reich. After the defeat of Germany at the end of the war, when the border between Germany and Poland was drawn along the Oder-Neisse line, it was included in the territory of Poland (see Preussische Treuhand Gmb & CO. Kg A. A., cited above, § 3).
Afterwards, they were interned in Jelenia Góra where they were required to perform forced labour and seriously ill-treated by the Polish militia. Finally, they were expelled from Poland. On 6 December 1945 they reached the Soviet occupation zone. The family’s property was confiscated by the Poles.
The applicant has still not been allowed to return to his home and has been refused restitution of his family’s property.
C. Relevant international and domestic law
A detailed description of the relevant international and domestic law is set out in the above-mentioned case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (ibid. §§ 31-41).
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant in essence complained that he and his predecessors in title were forced by the Polish authorities to leave their home and property, which are at present situated within Poland’s borders, in circumstances which amounted to ethnic cleansing – if not genocide – and also to collective extra-judicial punishment, inhuman treatment and, in consequence, a crime against humanity. This made the actions complained of inherently unlawful and produced a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
2. The applicant further complained that although his and his family members’ human rights were seriously violated, the Polish Parliament refuses to pass a rehabilitation law rescinding the confiscation of their property and a restitution law to correct the effects of this confiscation in the sphere of their ownership rights.
In support of both complaints, the applicant relied on the same arguments as those put forward by the applicants in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (ibid. §§ 42-44).
THE LAW
1. The applicant first complained of a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that originated in his and his family’s unlawful expulsion and which was accompanied by ethnic cleansing measures and the expropriation of their property by the Polish authorities.
The Court observes that the events that gave rise to this complaint started on an unspecified date in 1945 when, according to the applicant, he and his family had been expelled from their home and subsequently interned by the Polish authorities. The date of the confiscation of their property has not been specified either. In that context, it is to be noted that in 1945-46 the Polish State enacted several expropriation laws whereby all German property situated in the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which were included in the territory of Poland following the Yalta Conference and the undertakings under the Potsdam Agreement in respect of war reparations and delimitation of borders, was taken over by the State (see Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A., cited above, §§ 3, 5 and 38-41).
The applicant argued that the situation complained of, although it originated before the entry into force of Protocol No. 1 in respect of Poland, produced continuing effects.
However, the Court has already dealt at length with the same arguments as to the alleged existence of a continuing violation of property rights, put forward by the applicants in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A.A. v. Poland, and rejected them. It held that the purported individual acts of violence, expulsion, dispossession and seizure or confiscation were instantaneous acts which occurred before the ratification of Protocol No. 1 by Poland and which did not produce any continuing effects that could have consequences for its jurisdiction ratione temporis (ibid. 55-62). Having regard to the facts before it, the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
2. The applicant further complained about Poland’s failure to enact any rehabilitation or restitution laws that would put right the injustices suffered by him and his family and compensate them for loss of their property.
However, as the Court has already held on many occasions, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cannot be interpreted as imposing any general obligation on the Contracting States to return property which was transferred to them before they ratified the Convention. Nor does this provision impose any restrictions on the Contracting States’ freedom to determine the scope of property restitution or rehabilitation laws. The Convention imposes no specific obligation on them to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to their ratification of the Convention (see Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. cited above, §§ 63-64, with further references).
Accordingly, the Polish State has no duty under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to enact laws providing for rehabilitation, restitution of confiscated property or compensation for property lost by the applicant’s family.
It follows that the remainder of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Lawrence EarlyNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy