AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 27521/95
by Walter STÜRM
against Switzerland
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 14 January 1998, the following members being present:
MM M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President
S. TRECHSEL
N. BRATZA
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs J. LIDDY
MM L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs M. HION
Mr R. NICOLINI
Mrs M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 13 April 1995 by
Walter Stürm against Switzerland and registered on 6 June 1995 under
file No. 27521/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Swiss citizen, born in 1942 and currently
detained in Martigny prison in Switzerland. Before the Commission he
is represented by Ms B. Hug, a lawyer practising in Zürich, and
Mr Th. Burgener, a lawyer practising in Visp.
The applicant's previous Applications Nos. 20231/92, 20545/92,
23117/93 and 23223/94 concerned complaints under Articles 5 and 6 of
the Convention of the length of the applicant's detention on remand;
the delays of the authorities in dealing with his requests for release
from detention; his request for damages; and the length of the criminal
proceedings in which he was involved. The joined applications were
declared admissible on 28 June 1995. In its report of 16 January 1996
the Commission expressed the opinion that there had been violations of
Article 5 para. 3 and Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention; and that
there had been no violations of Article 5 paras. 4 and 5 of the
Convention. In its Interim Resolution of 13 September 1996 the
Committee of Ministers agreed with the Commission's opinion.
The present application concerns complaints under Article 6 of
the Convention about the unfairness of the proceedings in which the
applicant was involved.
The facts of the present case, as submitted by the applicant, may
be summarised as follows.
Investigations instituted against the applicant
On 2 November 1984 the investigating judge (Untersuchungsrichter)
of the Ering and Gundis Districts in the Canton of Valais issued a
warrant of arrest against the applicant on suspicion of theft of a car.
The preliminary investigations against the applicant were eventually
extended to over 100 offences, including theft and robbery. In one
such instance the applicant and another person had allegedly broken
into a police station at Haute Nendaz in Switzerland on 22 April 1985
and stolen identity documents, whereby a third person had been injured.
On 31 August 1985 a certain R. was arrested. At one stage, R.
apparently incriminated the applicant as having been an accomplice.
Following R.'s statements, investigations were undertaken in Italy
which proved unsuccessful. Upon another occasion, R. apparently stated
that he had only been with the applicant "on holidays".
On 5 March 1986 the applicant was arrested in Lausanne. On
12 March 1986 the investigating judge of the Ering and Gundis Districts
ordered his detention on remand.
Following his arrest, various newspaper articles on the applicant
were published. An article in the newspaper "La Suisse" of 24 April
1985 referred to the applicant as a suspect ("suspecté"), though it
quoted the Cantonal Police of the Canton of Valais as stating "no
comment" on the case. The "Tribune de Genève" referred on 25 April
1985 to his involvement (impliqué) in certain events. The "Hébdo"
questioned in respect of the events at the police station at Haute
Nendaz whether this had to do with the applicant. "La Suisse" stated
in an article of 6 March 1986 that the applicant had seemingly
committed certain offences ("il aurait emporté quelques 35 000 francs
en tout ..."), though upon instruction of the investigating judge the
police remained silent.
During the ensuing proceedings the applicant refused to express
himself on the charges brought against him. The applicant filed
various requests for release from detention which were dealt with, and
refused, by the Federal Court in decisions dated 9 January and
27 November 1991, 31 July, 1 September and 31 December 1992; and
9 February, 24 August and 21 December 1993.
On 1 March 1990 the applicant was confronted with R.
On 10 September 1992 the investigating judge of the Ering and
Gundis Districts terminated the investigations.
Applicant's Indictment
On 16 September 1992 the Public Prosecutor filed the bill of
indictment. The latter first listed nine categories of offences of
which the applicant was indicted and the respective statutory
provisions of the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) and the Federal Road
Traffic Act (Strassenverkehrsgesetz). Thus, it was stated that the
applicant was indicted of having committed simple bodily injury; theft;
attempted theft; aggravated robbery; damage to property; forging
documents; appropriating another person's car; driving without a
driving licence; and unlawfully using car number-plates.
The bill of indictment then listed on altogether 18 pages the
various occasions where the applicant had committed these offences.
For instance, it was stated in respect of the events at the police
station in Haute Nendaz on 22 April 1985 that the applicant and R.
"pénétrèrent par effraction dans le poste de gendarmerie de la
police cantonale, à Haute-Nendaz. Là, ils dérobèrent divers
documents officiels. Alors que (le requérant) se trouvait à
l'extérieur des locaux, R. fut surpris par A., sergent à la
police cantonale, revenu inopinément au poste. R. l'ayant menacé
avec son pistolet Bernardelli (calibre 7,65), A. se jeta
courageusement sur lui. Les deux hommes tombèrent à terre et R.
tira un premier puis un second coup de feu qui atteint A. au
bras. Le policier lâcha alors son agresseur qui s'enfuit en
menaçant encore de son pistolet O.D. et P.D. qui tentaient de
l'arrêter."
Trial before the Ering and Gundis District Court
On 22 September 1992 the President of the Ering and Gundis
District Court invited the applicant to submit before 15 October 1992
any evidence which he wished to produce at the trial which was
provisionally fixed for 16 and 17 November 1992.
Meanwhile, the applicant was sentenced on 30 November 1992 in
separate criminal proceedings by the Jura Criminal Court to 12 years'
imprisonment, inter alia, on account of robbery and theft.
The trial before the Ering and Gundis District Court took place
on 29 March 1993.
On 31 March 1993 the Ering and Gundis District Court convicted
the applicant for over 100 offences, inter alia, robbery, theft and
damage to property, and sentenced him to 13 years' imprisonment. The
judgment, mentioning 23 private parties, numbered 98 pages.
In its judgment the District Court dismissed the applicant's
complaint that the bill of indictment was incomplete. Insofar as the
applicant questioned the reliability of R.'s statements, the Court
referred to a psychiatric opinion which concluded that at the relevant
time R. had been "completely normal" (völlig normal). When dealing
with the various offences at issue, the Court relied, inter alia, on
the statements of R. and of other witnesses, on handwritten documents
in the applicant's handwriting, on finger-prints and shoe-marks, and
on the typical manner ("modus operandi") in which various offences had
been committed.
In its judgment the District Court mentioned various instances
of robbery which the applicant had committed, inter alia, at the police
station at Haute Nendaz. In this respect, the Court considered that
the applicant had committed the offence jointly with R.; that he had
accepted at least as a possibility that R. would use a pistol
(Eventualvorsatz); that he was therefore responsible for the whole act;
and that the victim, A. had been injured as a result of the shot.
In view of the conviction by the Jura Criminal Court which had
then not yet entered into legal force, the District Court pronounced
the sentence subject to Section 350 of the Penal Code. According to
this provision, if a person is convicted of different offences by
different courts, the court which has pronounced the most severe
punishment shall determine the entire punishment.
Appeal proceedings before the Cantonal Court of the Canton of Valais
The applicant appealed against this judgment to the Cantonal
Court of the Canton of Valais, complaining, inter alia, that the bill
of indictment had been insufficiently motivated, that there had been
various procedural errors in the taking of evidence, and that the court
had relied on R.'s statements although the latter had stated, at the
outset that he had not committed any offences together with the
applicant, and that he had "only been on holidays with him". The
applicant also requested the hearing of various witnesses. The Court
of Appeal had full powers to decide on all aspects of the case.
The appeal hearing before that Cantonal Court took place on
30 May and 1 June 1994.
On 1 June 1994 the Cantonal Court pronounced its judgment. It
partly upheld the applicant's appeal in that he was acquitted of
certain offences, inter alia, of damage to property. On the other
hand, the Court convicted him of altogether 95 offences. The Court
considered, for instance, that the applicant had committed robbery when
obtaining official documents, among them identity documents, from the
police station at Haute Nendaz, and thereby injuring a third person.
As a result, the applicant was sentenced to ten and a half years'
imprisonment.
In its judgment the Court dismissed the applicant's request to
hear R., as the latter had already been heard during the investigations
and at the trial before the District Court. Moreover, R. and the
applicant had been confronted with one another. Thus, the applicant
had had the possibility of putting questions to R., but had failed to
do so. In respect of the allegedly insufficient bill of indictment,
the Court found that after pronouncement of the judgment of the
District Court the applicant no longer claimed that he was unaware of
the various charges. The Court also assessed the value of the evidence
taken and the incriminating statements made.
Proceedings before the Federal Court
On 7 September 1994 the applicant filed a public law appeal
(staatsrechtliche Beschwerde, recours en droit public) with the Federal
Court (Bundesgericht) in which he complained, inter alia, of a breach
of his right to a fair hearing, of the arbitrary application of
cantonal law, and of the arbitrary appreciation of evidence. He also
requested his release from detention on remand. The applicant
furthermore filed a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde, pourvoi
en nullité) in which he complained of the incorrect legal qualification
of the various offences, and of the sentence.
On 17 November 1994 the Federal Court dismissed the public law
appeal. On the same day, it also dismissed the applicant's plea of
nullity. Both judgments were served on one lawyer of the applicant on
20 December 1994; the other lawyer received them on 21 December 1994.
In its detailed judgment on the applicant's public law appeal,
numbering 33 pages, the Federal Court noted at the outset that the
applicant had been able to consult the various police files. Insofar
as the applicant complained that the investigating authorities might
have breached their duty of confidentiality by disclosing information
to the press, the Court found that these issues fell to be examined in
disciplinary proceedings, but had manifestly not influenced the outcome
of the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant. The
Court also considered that no procedural rules had been breached during
the investigations and in particular in the establishment of the
various police reports and in the hearing of the various witnesses.
The Court then dealt with the applicant's complaint of a breach
of the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6 para. 2 of the
Convention in that the investigating authorities had disclosed
information on the proceedings to the press. The Court found that the
investigating authorities had a duty to inform the public as to
suspicions against certain persons. Insofar as the applicant
complained that the courts based themselves on a particular manner
("modus operandi") in which he had committed various offences, the
Court considered that this information stemmed from R., and that the
applicant had not been convicted solely on the basis of this
information.
In respect of the allegedly incomplete bill of indictment, the
Federal Court found that this complaint was inadmissible as not
complying with the statutory requirements for filing such a complaint.
In any event, the bill of indictment need not separately state the
legal qualification of every offence mentioned. The Court also
considered that the applicant had had sufficient opportunity both
before the District Court and the Cantonal Court of Appeal to request
the taking of evidence, and that the assessment of the evidence
concerned had not been arbitrary. Insofar as the applicant complained
that two witnesses Mas. and Maz. had only been shown photos of himself
and not of other persons, the Court found that the statements of these
witnesses were not the only elements leading to the applicant's
conviction in respect of the particular offence concerned.
In its judgment on the applicant's plea of nullity, the Federal
Court found, inter alia, that when the applicant had broken into the
police station at Haute Nendaz, he had obtained identity documents
which were not without value; in particular, such documents could be
sold in criminal circles. Even if the applicant intended to keep
thedocuments for himself, he had had the requisite intention to enrich
himself, as he was relieved from purchasing such documents among
criminal circles.
The applicant's request for the reopening of the Federal Court
proceedings was dismissed by the Federal Court on 7 March 1995.
Insofar as the applicant complained that the documents obtained at the
police station at Haute Nendaz had not been identity papers, the Court
found that the applicant had failed to complain thereof in his public
law appeal before the Federal Court. Moreover, the applicant could not
seriously claim that he had broken into the police station without
having had the intention of enriching himself.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant raises various complaints under Article 6 of the
Convention.
1. The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
about the incomplete state of the case-file prepared in the various
court proceedings.
a) The applicant complains that he was convicted on the basis of his
finger-prints and shoe-marks. No confirmation of such prints could be
found in the case-file. They were only mentioned in the police-files.
For instance, a police report stated that certain finger-prints
belonged to the applicant. However, neither the object and manner of
the investigation nor the technical means which the police employed
transpired from the reports. The investigations should nevertheless
be conducted by the investigating judge rather than the police. The
various courts did not regard it necessary to question the police.
b) The applicant further complains that the case-file gives no
explanation as to the graphological expert opinion which was prepared
on the applicant's handwriting. In particular, there was no statement
as to which handwriting served as a comparison. It was not up to him
to request preparation of a further expert opinion.
c) The applicant also complains that during the investigations
various persons claimed to have recognised the applicant on the basis
of photos. Reference is made in particular to the witnesses Mas. and
Maz. However, the applicant claims that it does not transpire from the
case-file that photos other than those of the applicant were shown to
these persons. It is also unclear, how the authorities proceeded when
asking the various persons to identify the applicant.
2. The applicant raises various complaints under Article 6 paras. 1
and 3 (d) of the Convention about the various police reports,
containing information on finger-prints and shoe-marks, on the
graphological expert opinion, and on statements of third persons.
a) He submits that this information should not have been employed
by the various courts as evidence. In fact, it should have been
discussed before court in the presence of the applicant. It does not
suffice that, as the Federal Court stated, the applicant was free to
prove the contrary. It is up to the authorities to prove that the
applicant is guilty.
b) The applicant complains that he could only insufficiently put
questions to the expert and the third persons who testified in his
case. Moreover, it was up to the authorities, not to him, to invite
the relevant persons to appear before court.
3. The applicant raises various complaints under Article 6 para. 1
of the Convention about the insufficient reasons given in the various
judgments.
a) The applicant complains that the judgment of the Cantonal Court
of Appeal of 1 June 1994 stated that the applicant had committed the
offence of robbery at the police station of Haute Nendaz. In this
respect, it would have been essential to demonstrate that the applicant
had intended to enrich himself. However, the judgment only states that
the applicant had "dérobé divers documents officiels". It did not
state precisely how the applicant should have obtained a pecuniary
advantage (Vermögensvorteil). The Federal Court's decision of 7 March
1995 was insufficient when it stated that the applicant could not
seriously claim that he had entered the particular building without
having had the purpose of enriching himself.
b) The applicant points out that the investigating judge divulged
confidential information to the press. The Federal Court, while
accepting that there had been a breach of confidentiality, found that
the latter did not affect the criminal proceedings against the
applicant; rather, that breach should be pursued in separate
disciplinary proceedings. The applicant complains that the Federal
Court did not explain why the breach of confidentiality did not
influence the outcome of his proceedings.
4. The applicant raises various complaints under Article 6 para. 2
of the Convention of a breach of the presumption of innocence.
a) The applicant submits that, after the warrant of arrest was
issued, a newspaper article stated that the applicant had been present
when persons had broken into the police station at Haute Nendaz.
b) The applicant complains of a report of a meeting of Swiss police
of 30 March 1985 which referred to the "modus operandi" of the
applicant. However, it is unclear how such a conclusion could have
been reached, particularly as the applicant had at that stage only been
convicted by a Zürich court in 1972.
c) The applicant complains that after his arrest various newspaper
articles were published in which attention was drawn to the applicant's
activities. This confirmed that from the outset the investigating
judge in fact regarded the applicant as being guilty. The courts also
took over the views expressed by the police, the press and the
investigating judge.
5. The applicant complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (b) of the
Convention that the bill of indictment mentioned the facts concerning
the applicant, but did not legally qualify them (juristische
Qualifikation). The bill of indictment merely mentioned altogether
nine provisions of the Criminal Code. It was not stated, however,
which fact fell under which provision of the Criminal Code. For
instance, the applicant was unaware of the legal qualification of the
act of breaking in at the police station at Haute Nendaz.
6. Under Article 6 para. 3 (b) the applicant complains that he was
not able personally to consult the case-file. It was insufficient if
only his lawyers could do so, as he was actively involved in his own
defence.
7. The applicant raises various complaints under Article 6 paras. 1,
2 and 3 of the Convention of the manner in which evidence was assessed.
a) He complains that the domestic authorities convicted him too
easily (unkritisch) on the basis of his "modus operandi", i.e. the
typical manner in which he had allegedly committed certain offences.
b) He further complains that one person was incorrectly heard as a
"witness", as he had been heard during proceedings concerning himself.
The applicant had not been confronted with this person.
c) The applicant complains of the Federal Court's statement
according to which R. had incriminated the applicant. However, this
was incorrect. Thus, when questioned whether he, R., had committed
offences with the applicant, R. had replied: "I was with him on
holidays."
d) The applicant points out that the expert graphologist employed
in these proceedings was a police officer of the Canton of Valais. He
could not be considered neutral, and his opinion should not have been
considered as evidence.
e) The applicant also complains that the courts did not consider any
mitigating evidence.
f) The applicant complains that the domestic courts always spoke of
"witnesses" and "statements of witnesses". However, this technically
incorrect, none of the persons having been properly heard as witnesses.
THE LAW
1. The applicant raises various complaints about the unfairness of
the criminal proceedings in which he was involved. He invokes
Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 subparas. (b) and (d)
(Art. 6-2, 6-2, 6-3-b, 6-3-d) which, insofar as relevant, state as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law ...
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights: ...
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence;
...
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him."
The Commission finds it appropriate to examine the applicant's
various complaints about the proceedings from the points of view of
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6-1+6-2+6-3) taken together,
especially as the guarantees in paragraphs 2 and 3 represent aspects
of the concept of a fair trial contained in paragraph 1 (see Eur. Court
HR, Unterpertinger v. Austria judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A
no. 110, p. 14, para. 29).
2. The applicant complains that the bill of indictment mentioned the
facts concerning the applicant, but did not specify their legal
qualification. For instance, the applicant was not aware how the act
of breaking into the police station at Haute Nendaz was to be
qualified.
The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a)
of the Convention gives an accused person the right to be informed of
the cause of the accusation, i.e. the acts with which he is charged and
on which his indictment is based, and of the nature of the accusation,
i.e. the legal classification of the acts in question. In addition,
because of the logical link between paragraphs 3 (a) and 3 (b) of
Article 6 (Art. 6-3-a, 6-3-b), the information about the nature and
cause of the accusation must be adequate to enable the accused to
prepare his defence accordingly (see No. 10857/84, Dec. 15.7.86, D.R.
48, p. 149).
In the present case, the bill of indictment of 16 September 1992
listed nine categories of offences of which the applicant was indicted
together with the respective statutory provisions. It then listed on
18 pages the various occasions on which the applicant had committed
these offences. This manner of organising the bill of indictment can
be explained, in the Commission's view, by the great number of charges
brought against the applicant.
Insofar as the applicant complains that he was unaware of the
legal qualification, for instance, of the events at Haute Nendaz, the
Commission considers that the respective statements in the bill of
indictment enabled the applicant and his lawyers to determine the
offence at issue with which he was charged.
In these circumstances, it has not been shown that the applicant
was unable duly to prepare and conduct his defence in respect of the
charges raised against him.
3. The applicant complains about the incomplete state of the case-
file prepared in the various court proceedings. Thus, insofar as he
was convicted on the basis of his finger-prints and shoe-marks, of a
graphological analysis of his handwriting, these elements were only
mentioned in the police reports. Moreover, the case-file was only
shown to his lawyers, although he was actively involved in his defence.
However, the Commission notes the decision of the Federal Court
of 17 November 1994 - not contested by the applicant - according to
which he was in fact able to consult the police reports. He was
moreover given the opportunity before the District Court and the Court
of Appeal to request the taking of evidence.
On the whole, the applicant has not shown that the manner in
which he and his lawyers were able to consult the case-file - including
the police reports - unduly hampered his defence.
4. The applicant raises various complaints about the taking of
evidence, and about its assessment. Thus, the various police reports,
containing information on finger-prints and shoe-marks, on the
graphological expert opinion, and on statements of third persons,
should not have been employed as evidence. He was furthermore too
easily convicted on the basis of his "modus operandi", and certain
persons had not properly been heard as witnesses. He complains that
in fact he had not been incriminated by R., and that no mitigating
evidence was considered. He submits that it is unclear whether the
witnesses Mas. and Maz. were shown photos of persons other than
himself.
The Commission recalls the Convention organs' case-law according
to which, as a rule, it is for the national courts to assess the
evidence before them. The Convention organs' task is to ascertain
whether the proceedings considered as a whole, including the way in
which evidence was taken, were fair (see Eur. Court HR, Asch v. Austria
judgment of 26 April 1991, Series A no. 203, p. 10, para. 26).
In the present case, there is no indication that the applicant,
who was represented by two lawyers, could not sufficiently put forward
his point of view. The Commission notes in particular that the
applicant was granted the possibility to request the taking of
evidence, and that the various courts carefully assessed the evidence
taken in the light of the applicant's submissions.
As regards the complaint about the photos shown to the two
witnesses Mas. and Maz., the Commission notes the judgment of the
Federal Court of 17 November 1994 according to which the statements of
these witnesses were not the only elements leading to the applicant's
conviction.
There is, therefore, no indication of unfairness in the manner
in which evidence was taken in the applicant's case.
5. The applicant complains about the insufficient reasons given in
the various judgments. He submits in particular that it had not
sufficiently been demonstrated that, when breaking into the police
station at Haute Nendaz, he had had the intention of enriching himself.
The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention obliges States to give reasons for their judgments.
However, this provision cannot be understood as requiring a detailed
answer to every argument. The extent to which this duty to give
reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision. The
question whether or not a court has failed to fulfil the obligation,
deriving from Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, to state reasons
can only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case
(see Eur. Court HR, Hiro Balami v. Spain judgment of 9 December 1994,
Series A no. 303-B, p. 29 et seq., para. 27).
In the present case, the Commission considers that the Federal
Court's decision of 17 November 1994 on the applicant's plea of nullity
sufficiently stated that the identity documents stolen at the police
station had a certain value and could either be sold, or could be used
by the applicant himself who would then be relieved from purchasing
such documents elsewhere.
As a result, there is no indication that the domestic courts did
not give sufficient reasons for the applicant's conviction.
6. The applicant raises various complaints about a breach of the
presumption of innocence as guaranteed by Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2)
of the Convention. He submits that information was divulged to the
press according to which he had committed various offences. One
newspaper article stated that he had been among those who had broken
into the police station at Haute Nendaz. At a meeting of Swiss police,
reference was made to the "modus operandi" of the applicant. The
applicant complains that this information stemmed from the
investigating judge who in fact considered him to be guilty.
The principle of the presumption of innocence is first of all a
procedural guarantee applying in any kind of criminal procedure.
However, in a wider sense it protects everybody against being treated
by public officials as being guilty of an offence before this is
established according to law by a competent court (see No. 10857/84,
Dec. 15.7.86, D.R. 48 p. 106).
In the present case, the Commission notes that the various
newspaper articles concerning the applicant employed formulations
implying that criminal proceedings against the applicant were still
pending.
In any event, there is no indication that the investigating
authorities, when informing the press, had in fact made such statements
which assumed the applicant's guilt. The Commission notes in this
respect that according to two newspaper articles the police refused to
comment on the applicant's case.
The applicant's submissions do not, therefore, disclose any
appearance of a violation of the presumption of innocence which could
have had repercussions on his right to a fair trial.
7. In sum, taken individually none of the matters complained of by
the applicant discloses any appearance of a violation of the rights of
the defence under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. Furthermore,
the Commission finds that, taken cumulatively, the alleged procedural
deficiencies did not result in rendering unfair, for the purposes of
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the criminal proceedings
considered as a whole.
It follows that the applicant's complaints are manifestly ill-
founded and must be rejected according to Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy