AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 28356/95
by Stanislaw STYK
against Poland
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 16 April 1998, the following members being present:
MM J.-C. GEUS, President
M.A. NOWICKI
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
Mrs G.H. THUNE
MM F. MARTINEZ
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 30 May 1995 by
Stanislaw Styk against Poland and registered on 29 August 1995 under
file No. 28356/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, a Polish citizen born in 1926, is a retired
military academy teacher, residing in Warsaw.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows:
Particular circumstances of the case
On 25 November 1992 the Veterans' and Persecuted Persons' Office
(Urz*d do Spraw Kombatantów i Osób Represjonowanych) informed the
applicant that on the same date the Office was instituting ex officio
proceedings pursuant to the February 1991 Act on Veterans and
Persecuted Persons in order to verify whether under this legislation
he was entitled to maintain his veteran status. The applicant was
asked to furnish information relating to the grounds on which he had
acquired this status in 1985 on the basis of the 1982 Veterans' Act.
By a decision of 26 February 1993 the Director of the Veterans'
and Persecuted Persons' Office (Kierownik Urz*du ds. Kombatantów i Osób
Represjonowanych) took away the applicant's veteran status. This
decision was taken in accordance with Article 25 read together with
Article 21 of the Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons of February
1991 which provided, inter alia, that a person who had served in the
former internal security services ("aparat bezpieczenstwa publicznego")
was not entitled to veteran status. As in 1944 the applicant had
served in the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczenstwa
Wewn*trznego), he fell into the category of persons who, under those
provisions, were to be deprived of this status.
The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the
Supreme Administrative Court, submitting that he had not obtained
veteran status exclusively for his service in the security services,
but also due to the fact that he had previously served in the anti-Nazi
resistance, the People's Army (Armia Ludowa) and, subsequently, in the
regular Polish Army. He had only served in the security services for
a short period in 1944 as his army unit had been incorporated therein.
He had had no influence on this decision. He submitted that his
service in the Army had been exemplary throughout his career, that he
had served the independence of Poland and had never been subject to any
disciplinary or criminal conviction until his retirement in 1973. The
applicant finally submitted that the impugned decision was unfair, that
it amounted to a form of collective liability and that it was in breach
of the rule of law as it had deprived him of his validly acquired
rights.
In its reply of 14 April 1994, the Veterans' and Persecuted
Persons' Office submitted that the circumstances relied on by the
applicant as to his service were of no relevance to the case. It was
not in dispute between the parties that the applicant had served in the
internal security forces from July to November 1944. This circumstance
was confirmed by the curriculum vitae which the applicant had prepared
in 1989, in which he had further stated that he had participated in the
fight with "reactionary underground" ("reakcyjne podziemie"). As under
the legislation of February 1991 persons having served in the security
services lost their veteran status, the decision contested by the
applicant was lawful.
In a judgment of 20 February 1995 the Supreme Administrative
Court (Najwyzszy S*d Administracyjny) dismissed the applicant's appeal.
The Court considered that its jurisdiction was limited to examining
whether the impugned decision was in conformity with applicable
substantive law and with the procedural provisions insofar as any
procedural irregularities could have adversely affected the outcome of
the proceedings. In the present case it clearly transpired from the
applicant's curricula vitae prepared in 1978 and 1985 that in 1944 he
had been a member of the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczenstwa
Wewn*trznego). Therefore the administrative authority had had
sufficient grounds for a finding that the applicant had in fact served
therein. The assessment of the evidence in this respect was not
arbitrary. The relevant provisions of the 1991 Veterans' Act provided
that persons having served in the former internal security services
were not eligible to acquire veteran status and that those who had
acquired it were to be stripped thereof, regardless of their function
and grade within those services. This interpretation had been
reinforced by the Constitutional Court which in its judgment of
15 February 1994 had ruled that service in the former internal
security services, in the light of the latter's activities directed
against independence organisations, had to be assessed negatively,
regardless of the actual status of persons having served therein.
Thus, under the relevant legislation the very fact of the applicant's
service in the Internal Security Corps, whose purpose was to suppress
organisations fighting for the national independence of Poland, must
have entailed the loss of his veteran status. The Court concluded that
the impugned decision was in conformity with the law.
Relevant domestic law
The February 1991 Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons took
away entitlement to the veteran status accorded by virtue of the
Veterans' Acts of 1982 from certain categories of persons who had
served in the 1940s and 1950s in various organisations and State organs
whose purpose was to combat the political opponents of the communist
regime. In particular, Article 25 of the Act provides, inter alia,
that a person who had served in the internal security services ("aparat
bezpieczenstwa publicznego") was not entitled to acquire veteran
status, and those persons who had acquired it, were to lose it.
Under the Veterans' Acts of 1982, which was subsequently replaced
by the February 1991 Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons, veteran
status gives rise to various special employee and social insurance
entitlements. The periods of veteran service are taken into account
in calculating the periods giving rise to seniority. The same periods
are multiplied by two in calculating periods giving rise to a
retirement pension. The veterans who remain in employment are entitled
to ten days' additional paid leave per year. The veterans are entitled
to retire earlier than other employees: women at the age of 55, and men
at the age of 60, if they have satisfied another requirement for the
acquisition of a retirement pension, i.e. if they have worked for
periods set out in the Retirement Pensions Act. The retired veterans
are further entitled to the special veterans' benefit, paid together
with their retirement pension as a certain fixed sum.
Article 26 of the Veterans' Act provides that persons who have
lost their veteran status retain their social insurance benefits to
which they are entitled pursuant to the generally applicable social
insurance laws, in particular the laws governing retirement pensions.
Pursuant to Article 25 para. 4 of the February 1991 Act, if a decision
is appealed against to the Supreme Administrative Court, the rights
stemming from the veteran status are suspended until a final judgment
is taken.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 that he was denied a fair
hearing as the decisions concerned deprived him of his status of a
veteran. He complains that this decision was unfair and to his
detriment. He complains under Article 14 of the Convention that he was
deprived of this status, whereas members of other armed forces and
organisations were not.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention that the decisions concerned deprived him of his veteran
status.
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention in its relevant part reads:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing
... ."
The Commission must first ascertain whether Article 6 (Art. 6)
of the Convention is applicable to the proceedings concerned and
whether there was a dispute over a "right" which can be said, at least
on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The dispute
must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual
existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its
exercise. Finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly
decisive for the right in question (Eur. Court HR, Kerojärvi v. Finland
judgment of 19 July 1995, Series A no. 322, p. 12, para. 32).
In the present case the Commission observes that under Polish law
the veteran status had a direct bearing on the applicant's pecuniary
interests in that the persons having such a status enjoy certain
special employment and social insurance benefits. The decision which
took this status away from the applicant automatically deprived him of
those benefits. The Commission concludes that the dispute at issue was
decisive for the scope of the applicant's civil rights and that,
consequently, Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is applicable in the
instant case.
However, the Commission observes that the applicant does not
allege any particular shortcomings in the procedure followed, but
challenges the outcome of the proceedings. The Commission recalls in
this respect that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the
Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the
obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In
particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging
that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,
except where it considers that such errors might have involved a
possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention. The Commission refers, on this point, to its established
case-law (see e.g. No. 25062/94, Dec. 18.10.95, D.R. 83, p. 77).
The applicant's complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6) is therefore
in this respect manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. Insofar as the applicant could be understood as complaining that
the result of the above proceedings amounted to an interference with
his property rights as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)
to the Convention, the Commission observes that Poland ratified this
Protocol only on 10 October 1994. The first-instance administrative
decision which deprived the applicant of his veteran status was taken
on 26 February 1993. Pursuant to Article 25 para. 4 of the February
1991 Act, if a decision is appealed against to the Supreme
Administrative Court, the rights stemming from the veteran status are
suspended until a final judgment is taken. Thus, the Commission is
competent ratione temporis to examine this complaint, regard being had
to the fact that the final decision in the case, the judgment of the
Supreme Administrative Court, was taken on 20 February 1995 and that
it was only this decision which definitely deprived the applicant of
his veteran status and his social insurance rights stemming therefrom.
It is true that, according to the Convention organs' case-law,
the making of contributions to a pension fund may, in certain
circumstances, create a property right in a portion of such fund and
such right may be affected by the manner in which the fund is
distributed (No. 4130/69, Yearbook 14, pp. 224 and 240 et seq.;
No. 5849/72, Dec. 16.12.74, D.R. 1, p. 46; No. 9776/82, Dec. 3.10.83,
D.R. 34, p. 153; No. 12264/86, Dec. 13.7.88, D.R. 57, p. 131). The
Commission further recalls that the rights stemming from paying
contributions to social insurance system are pecuniary rights for the
purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention (Eur.
Court HR, Gaygusuz v. Austria judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports
1996-IV, no. 14, p. 1142, paras. 39-41). However, even if it is
assumed that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) guarantees persons who
have paid contributions to a social insurance system the right to
derive benefits from the system, it cannot be interpreted as entitling
that person to a pension of a particular amount (5849/72, Müller v.
Austria, Comm. Report 1.10.75, D.R. 3, p. 25; No. 10671/83,
Dec. 4.3.85, D.R. 42, p. 229).
In the present case the applicant lost only his entitlement to
the social insurance benefits due to veterans, but, in accordance with
Article 26 of the Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons of February
1991, he retained his rights to the ordinary retirement benefits due
under the general social insurance system. Thus, it was only the
special privileged status which the applicant lost, his principal
social security entitlements having remained intact. The Commission
observes that the February 1991 Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons
was partly intended as a condemnation of the political role which the
communist security services had played in establishing the communist
regime and in repression of political opposition thereto. This
legislation was based on the consideration that the members of these
services, whose function was to combat the political or armed
organisations fighting for the independence of Poland in the 1940s and
1950s, did not merit the special privileges which were accorded to them
by the 1982 Veterans Act. The Commission considers that such
considerations of public policy, even if the operation of laws
resulting therefrom entails a reduction in social insurance benefits,
do not affect the property rights stemming from the social insurance
system in a manner contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
Insofar as the applicant complains under Article 14 (Art. 14) of
the Convention that he was deprived of veteran status whereas members
of other armed forces were not, the Commission, having regard to its
findings concerning the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(P1-1) to the Convention, considers that the present complaint does
not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of
the Convention. It follows that this complaint is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.-T. SCHOEPFER J.-C. GEUS
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy