AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 27788/95
by Basoodeo SUJEEUN
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 18 January 1996, the following members being present:
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 30 September 1992
by Basoodeo SUJEEUN against the United Kingdom and registered on
5 July 1995 under file No. 27788/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1950. He lives in
Tupsley, in Hereford. The facts of the case, as submitted by the
applicant in his various application forms, may be summarised as
follows.
I. In an application form submitted on 7 August 1993, the applicant
complained inter alia that he had been denied legal aid to defend the
petition for divorce brought by his wife. From the documents attached
to the application form, it appears that legal aid for proceedings
before the Commission was twice refused by the Legal Aid Area Office
in Bristol in 1992, and that three applications for leave to apply for
judicial review of decisions of the South Glamorgan County Council and
the "U.K. Government and Crown" were refused on 12 February 1993. No
further details were submitted.
II. In an application form submitted on 12 April 1994, the applicant
complained inter alia of a prohibition order made against him on
26 October 1993. The prohibition order took the form of a direction
by the Legal Aid Board to Area Committees that the applicant had been
abusing legal aid facilities and that exceptional circumstances
existed, and that for five years, no civil legal aid application from
the applicant should be considered. On 25 February 1994, the Legal Aid
Head Office informed the applicant that his request for complete or
partial revocation (in connection with specific proceedings) of the
prohibition order had been put to the Legal Aid Board on 22 February
1994, and that the Board had declined to revoke or vary the order. The
Board continued that if the Board's legal director was of the opinion
that further representations did not disclose sufficient information
to justify the matter being put before the Board again, the matter
would not go to the Board.
From papers submitted by the applicant, it appears that between
1984 and 1987, the applicant applied for legal aid on 48 occasions.
A prohibition order was made on 8 December 1987, relating to six
specified civil matters in respect of which the applicant had made
applications for legal aid. That order, which was valid for five
years, expressly excluded six particular sets of pending proceedings.
The 1987 prohibition order was amended on 22 May 1990 to permit an
application for legal aid in connection with one specific matter, and
on 28 July 1992 it was again amended to permit an application in
connection with a separate matter.
A report by the secretary to the Area Committee in (apparently)
late 1992 noted that the applicant had made 38 applications for legal
aid since 8 December 1987. The report set out the various
applications, noting that of the 38, eight had been covered by the
existing prohibitory direction, 16 had been refused on substantive
grounds and appeals had been dismissed; two had been refused as
duplication; one had been refused as legal aid was not available, one
had been adjourned, and ten had been granted, of which two had since
been discharged. The report appears to have formed the basis of the
prohibition order of 26 October 1993.
III. In an application form submitted on 14 July 1994, the applicant
claimed that he was entitled under the Convention to the same treatment
as the Queen, and in particular to her income of £10,700,000.00 p.a.
IV. In a second application form dated 14 July 1994, the applicant
made further complaints that he was not being treated in the same way
as the Queen, in particular with respect to taxation.
V. In an application form dated 21 November 1994, the applicant
complained about criminal proceedings in which he had been convicted
of driving without due care and attention. He stated that he had been
convicted on 22 November 1993, that on appeal to the Crown Court his
conviction was confirmed on 1 July 1994, that he applied for a case to
be stated, but that the Crown Court judge refused to state a case on
27 September 1994. The applicant complained in particular that he had
been denied full transcripts of the hearing on 1 July 1994, that the
Crown Court judge refused to transfer the applicant's legal aid to
another solicitor, that he had been refused an appeal, and that he was
innocent. He also claimed that the police perjured themselves and that
he had been discriminated against. He regarded himself as innocent.
VI. In a second application form dated 21 November 1994, the
applicant complained about two sets of civil proceedings before the
Court of Appeal. He submitted an ex parte application to the Court of
Appeal in an action in which he was the appellant and his former wife
was the respondent, and an ex parte application in a case involving two
individuals.
VII. In an application form dated 18 May 1995, the applicant
complained about a refusal by the Legal Aid Board of 28 April 1995 to
grant legal aid for proceedings before the Commission, and about a
refusal by the police (confirmed by the Deputy Clerk to the Justices
by letter of 31 October 1994) to bring a number of prosecutions on the
applicant's behalf. The letter of 31 October 1994 noted that the
applicant was entitled to bring private prosecutions.
COMPLAINTS
I, II, III, IV. The applicant alleges violation of Articles 1, 2, 3,
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention, and of Article 2
of Protocol No. 1 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
V. The applicant alleges violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8,
10, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention.
VI. The applicant alleges violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 12, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention, and of Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
VII. The applicant alleges violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10,
12, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention, and of Article 2 of Protocol No.
1 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains of the making of a prohibition order
against him.
The Commission notes that the prohibition order stated that no
civil legal aid application was to be considered from the applicant for
a period of five years from 26 October 1993. It will consider this
complaint in the context of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention which provides, so far as relevant, as follows.
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law."
The Commission next notes that the prohibition order was an order
which related only to civil legal aid: the right to free legal
assistance in criminal cases, guaranteed by Article 6 para. 3 (c)
(Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention, is not at issue. In the context of
civil proceedings, the Commission recalls that the State is not
required to provide free legal aid for every dispute relating to a
"civil right", but must nevertheless guarantee to litigants an
effective right of access to the courts for the determination their
"civil rights and obligations" (see Eur. Court H.R., Airey judgment of
9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 15, para. 26).
In the present case, the legal aid board made an order that no
application for civil legal aid from the applicant was to be
entertained for a period of five years. The background was that the
applicant had made a remarkable number of applications for legal aid
in the past, which had led to an earlier, limited prohibition order for
five years. Notwithstanding that earlier order, the applicant
continued to make large numbers of applications for legal aid.
The Commission has previously recalled that access to court is
frequently regulated in respect of minors, vexatious litigants, persons
of unsound mind and persons declared bankrupt, and that such regulation
is compatible with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention where the aim
pursued is legitimate and the means employed to achieve it are
proportionate (No. 12040/86, Dec. 4.5.87, D.R. 52, p. 269). The
prohibition order in the present case is of a similar nature, save that
it affects the applicant's dealings not with the courts as such, but
his ability - in the bulk of cases, before the courts ever become aware
of a potential action - to apply for legal aid in civil proceedings he
wishes to bring.
The aim of the prohibition order of 26 October 1993 was to
prevent the abuse of legal aid facilities found by the Legal Aid Board.
Such an aim is, in itself, compatible with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention.
As to proportionality, the Commission considers that an absolute,
rigorously enforced prohibition on applications for legal aid from a
particular person would raise serious problems of access to court under
the Convention - however much an individual has abused the system in
the past, it is impossible to discount the possibility that he may in
the future have a claim with merit in respect of which the requirements
of Article 6 (Art. 6) call for legal aid to be available.
The prohibition order made against the applicant was not, in
fact, as absolute as it appeared. In particular, he was able to apply
for a revocation of the order, and that application was considered by
the Legal Aid Board on its merits. At the same time as refusing the
revocation requested, the Legal Aid Board stated that further
applications would only be put to it if the Board's legal director was
of the opinion that such action was justified. Even in refusing the
request for revocation, therefore, the Board was leaving open the
possibility of an application for legal aid being considered and
granted.
Given that the Convention does not contain an express right to
legal aid in civil cases, that the applicant remains free to pursue
cases before the civil courts without the benefit of legal aid, and
that the prohibition order leaves open the possibility of a grant of
legal aid, the Commission finds that the prohibition order in the
present cases did not limit the applicant's access to court in a way
incompatible with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention.
2. In connection with the criminal proceedings in which the
applicant was convicted of driving without due care and attention, the
Commission notes that the applicant claims that he applied for a case
to be stated to the High Court, but that the Crown Court judge refused
to state a case.
The Commission finds that if the Crown Court judge refused to
state a case for consideration by the High Court, the applicant could
have applied to the High Court for judicial review of that refusal.
In connection with this part of the application, the applicant has
therefore failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible and
must be rejected pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the
Convention.
3. The Commission has also examined the applicant's other complaints
as they have been submitted by him. However, after considering them
as a whole, the Commission finds that they do not generally disclose
any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention.
It follows that the remainder of the application must be rejected
as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)
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