FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 60233/00
by Milan ŠULVA
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 28 September 2004 as a Chamber composed of:
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrR. Maruste,
MsL. Mijović,
MrD. Spielmann, judges,
and Mr M. O'Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 May 2000,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Milan Šulva, is a Slovakian national, who was born in 1953 and lives in Bratislava. He is represented before the Court by Ms I. Abelovská, a lawyer practising in Bratislava.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant acted as receiver in bankruptcy of a State-owned company. On 12 January 1999 he submitted his final report to the Bratislava Regional Court for approval. It indicated the sum obtained from the sale of the company's assets and also the receiver's costs and his remuneration. The bankrupt company and its creditors filed no objections to the report.
On 28 April 1999 the Regional Court heard the applicant and a representative of the bankrupt company. The latter stated that he did not object to the receiver's report subject to its conformity with the relevant law. On the same day the Regional Court delivered a decision in which it approved of the report with a modification concerning the applicant's remuneration. The decision stated that the applicant had not determined the sum due to him in accordance with Sections 6(a) and 7(1) of Regulation No. 493/1991 as amended.
In the Regional Court's view, the applicant had mistakenly included in the sum obtained through realisation of the bankrupt's assets (which serves as the first component for determination of a receiver's remuneration) the sum of 591,451.65 Slovakian korunas (SKK) which the company in bankruptcy had in its bank account at the moment of adjudication of bankruptcy. The receiver calculated the second part of his remuneration (based on the sum reserved for satisfying the creditors' claims obtained as a result of receiver's activities) in that he had repeatedly included in it the sum obtained as a result of realisation of the assets after deduction of claims relating to those assets, of sums to which the bankrupt's employees had been entitled as well as of other items. The Regional Court therefore modified the calculation of remuneration submitted by the applicant in that it deducted SKK 591,451.65 from the sum representing the income from realising the bankrupt's assets and administration of its property. The remaining sum, which included SKK 361,256,579.04 (obtained as a result of realising the assets) and SKK 44,066,825, 23 (sum reserved for satisfying the creditors' claims obtained in the course of the administration in bankruptcy), served as the basis for determining the receiver's remuneration. Considering that the administration in bankruptcy carried out by the applicant had been complex, the Regional Court increased the remuneration by 20 per cent as the relevant law permitted.
On 16 June 1999 the applicant appealed. He submitted reasons for the appeal on 7 July 1999. He argued that the Regional Court had disregarded the fact that no objections had been filed to his report and concluded that the court had exceeded its power in that it had modified a part thereof. He further submitted that the Regional Court had incorrectly interpreted Section 6(a) of Regulation No. 493/1991, as amended by Regulation No. 358/1996, in that it had excluded from the second component of his remuneration the sum obtained as a result of realisation of the bankrupt's property and that the sum which the bankrupt had had in its account at the moment of adjudication of bankruptcy had not been taken into consideration when determining the sum on the basis of which his remuneration was to be calculated. In support of his argument the applicant referred to two decisions delivered by the Banská Bystrica Regional Court in 1998 and in 1999. He also referred to doctrinal interpretation of the relevant law published in the Slovak Bar Bulletin in 1998 and in a law review.
On 23 November 1999 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court's decision concerning the sum which was due to the applicant. In its judgment the Supreme Court summed up the reasoning of the first instance court and the arguments put forward in the appeal without mentioning, however, the above two Banská Bystrica Regional Court's decisions of 1998 and 1999 relied upon by the applicant. The reasons for the Supreme Court's decision read as follows:
“[Under Section 6(a) of Regulation No. 493/1991, as amended,] a bankruptcy receiver's remuneration is composed of the addition of remuneration determined on the basis of the sum obtained as a result of realisation of the bankrupt's property after adjudication of bankruptcy and of remuneration determined on the basis of the sum which is reserved for satisfying the creditors' claims and which the receiver obtained as a result of other activities than realisation of assets, such as filing claims with courts or proposing enforcement of decisions etc.
In the present case the first instance court [in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act] had before it the final report on realisation of assets and on remuneration and expenses and examined it at the hearing held on 28 April 1999 in the course of which the bankrupt's representative stated that he did not object to the receiver's remuneration subject to its second component being in accordance with the law. The first instance court ... came to the conclusion that the remuneration had not been calculated in accordance with Section 6 of Regulation No. 493/1991, as amended by Regulation No. 358/1996, and modified the remuneration due.
The appellate court also reached the conclusion that the sum of SKK 591,451.65 which had been deposited in the bankrupt's bank account prior to adjudication of bankruptcy could not serve as the basis for determining the first part of the receiver's remuneration as that sum had not been obtained as a result of realisation of the bankrupt's assets. The second part of remuneration should be determined on the basis of the sum obtained by the receiver through other activities than realising the assets. In the case under consideration the approved final report indicates that other incomes have amounted to SKK 44,066,825.23. The incomes from realising the assets and from other activities total SKK 405,323,404.27 and this sum serves as the basis for determining the receiver's remuneration under Section 7 of Regulation No. 493/1991, as amended by Regulation No. 358/1996... The first instance court decided correctly when concluding that the receiver's remuneration amounted to the sum mentioned.”
The Supreme Court's decision was subsequently published in the Collection of opinions of the Supreme Court and of courts' decisions under No. 51/2000. The conclusion was emphasised according to which a sum which a debtor had in a bank account prior to adjudication of bankruptcy is not to be included in the sum on the basis of which a receiver's remuneration is determined as it was not obtained as a result of realisation of the bankrupt's assets.
B. Relevant domestic law
Regulation No. 493/1991, as amended by Regulation No. 358/1996, governs the implementation of certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1991.
Section 6(a) provides that the basis for determining the remuneration of a receiver in bankruptcy is composed of the sum obtained through realisation of the bankrupt's assets and of the sum reserved for satisfying the creditors' claims which the receiver obtained in the course of carrying out his or her duties.
Under Section 7(1) of Regulation No. 493/1991, as amended, a receiver in bankruptcy is entitled to remuneration equal to 10 per cent of the sum mentioned in Section 6(a), the minimum remuneration being SKK 50,000.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained that his right to a fair hearing had been violated in that the Supreme Court had failed to give sufficient reasons for its judgment and that, as a result, its decision was arbitrary. He argued, in particular, that in the reasons for its decision the Supreme Court had failed to invoke the relevant facts and to address the argument that in the applicant's case the Bratislava Regional Court had applied the relevant law in a manner different from that of the Banská Bystrica Regional Court in two earlier decisions in similar cases. The applicant further invoked two decisions in different cases given by the Supreme Court in June and August 2002 respectively arguing that they proved that in his original report submitted for approval to the Bratislava Regional Court his remuneration had been determined correctly. The applicant relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention and on Articles 2 § 3 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained about unfairness of the proceedings before the Supreme Court. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the relevant part of which provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”
In particular, the applicant considered that the Supreme Court had failed to duly address his arguments and to explain clearly the reasons for its decision which he therefore considered to be arbitrary.
The Court recalls that, according to its established case-law reflecting a principle linked to the proper administration of justice, judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based. The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. Although Article 6 § 1 obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Thus, in dismissing an appeal, an appellate court may, in principle, simply endorse the reasons for the lower court's decision (for recapitulation of the relevant principles see Papon v. France (dec.), no. 54210/00, 15 November 2001, with further references).
In its decision on the applicant's appeal the Supreme Court summed up the reasoning of the first instance court, the main arguments of the applicant, referred to the relevant legal provisions and confirmed the Bratislava Regional Court's interpretation of Section 6(a) of Regulation No. 493/1991, as amended, to the effect that a sum of money which had been deposited in a bankrupt's bank account prior to adjudication of bankruptcy could not serve as the basis for determining the first part of the receiver's remuneration within the meaning of that provision. With reference to documents included in the file the Supreme Court then confirmed that the first instance court had correctly decided on the applicant's remuneration.
The Court considers that in its decision the Supreme Court sufficiently stated the reasons on which it was based. It does not attach decisive importance to the fact that the Supreme Court did not explicitly address the applicant's argument that prior to the Bratislava Regional Court's decision on his case the Banská Bystrica Regional Court had twice applied the relevant law in a different way. In fact, the decisions of the Banská Bystrica Regional Court relied upon by the applicant were not subject to a review by the Supreme Court. Those decisions were not binding for the Supreme Court which acted in the applicant's case as a court of appeal and, in doing so, harmonised the case-law on the point in issue.
In these circumstances, and considering that it has only a limited power to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court to which it falls in the first place to interpret and apply domestic law (see the García Ruiz v. Spain, judgment of 21 January 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-I, § 28), the Court finds no ground on which it could accept the applicant's argument that the proceedings complained of were unfair contrary to the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It is thereby irrelevant whether, as argued by the applicant, the Supreme Court changed its practice on the point in issue in the context of different proceedings which ended in 2002, that is after the decision on the applicant's case had become final and binding.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant further complained that he had no effective remedy at his disposal as regards his above complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention which provides as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
According to the Court's case-law, Article 13 applies only where an individual has an “arguable claim” to be the victim of a violation of a Convention right (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, § 52).
The Court has found above that the applicant's complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded. For similar reasons, the applicant did not have an “arguable claim” and Article 13 is therefore inapplicable to his case.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. To the extent that the applicant relied on Articles 2 § 3 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Court recalls that, under Article 34 of the Convention, it can only examine complaints about a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Michael O'BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy