FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 74963/01
by Priska SUPUKOVÁ
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 6 February 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrG. Bonello,
MrK. Traja,
MrL. Garlicki,
MsL. Mijović,
MrJ. Šikuta,
MrsP. Hirvelä, judges,
and Mr T. L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 July 2001,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mrs Priska Supuková, is a Slovakian national who was born in 1939 and lives in Nitra. The respondent Government are represented by Mrs A. Poláčková, their Agent
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Factual background
On 13 October 1994 the applicant’s partner drew up a will which was formally stated to be a “deed of donation” in favour of the applicant.
On 24 November 1994 another will was drawn up in favour of the applicant and several other individuals.
On 14 December 1994 the applicant’s partner died.
2. Civil action
On 10 October 1996 a brother of the applicant’s late partner brought proceedings in the Nitra District Court (Okresný súd) against the applicant and 6 other beneficiaries of the will of November 1994. He sought a judicial ruling declaring the will void.
The District Court subsequently requested the plaintiff to pay the court fee, obtained the defendants’ observations in reply and procured files concerning 3 other sets of proceedings, the subject-matter of which was relevant for the present proceedings.
Between 6 March 1997 and 17 February 1998 the District Court held 5 hearings. They were adjourned due to the absence of some of the parties and/or witnesses and/or with a view to obtaining further evidence. The applicant was absent at 3 of these hearings. In this period the District Court arranged for a hearing of one of the defendants and a witness by a different court in the judicial district where these persons lived.
Between 17 February and 25 September 1998 the District Court appointed 3 experts in psychiatry and neurology to assess the health of the applicant’s late partner at the time of the making of the wills. The report was submitted on 8 February 1999 and the District Court subsequently sought the parties’ observations on it.
In the meantime, on 2 February 1998, one of the defendants died. The District Court then repeatedly sought information from another court and a notary public about the state of the succession proceedings and about that defendant’s lawful heirs. His wife was finally admitted to the proceedings in his stead and the District Court invited her to present her observations.
The District Court held further hearings on 17 June and 9 July 1999, neither of which was attended by the applicant.
On 27 July 1999 one of the defendants lodged a counterclaim seeking a ruling that the will of November 1994 was void only as far as it concerned the deceased defendant.
A hearing held on 3 August 1999 was adjourned with a view to obtaining the parties’ observations in reply to the counterclaim. These observations were obtained and the District Court heard some of the parties.
Between 15 June and 11 August 2000 the District Court held 3 hearings, one of which was not attended by the applicant. The former two were adjourned with a view to calling witnesses and the latter until delivery of the judgment.
On 14 August 2000 the District Court granted the action and dismissed the counterclaim. One of the defendants appealed (odvolanie).
The District Court subsequently requested the appellant to pay the court fee for the appeal, made an order for reimbursement of the costs of the expert evidence and took several steps to secure service of the judgment of 14 August 2000 and of the appeal on all the parties.
On 11 March and 10 April 2002 the Nitra Regional Court (Krajský súd) held hearings on the appeal. Following the latter hearing, on the same day, it overturned the first-instance judgment and dismissed the action.
On 19 August 2002 the plaintiff challenged the judgment of 10 April 2002 by way of an appeal on points of law (dovolanie).
On 26 February 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law after having examined its merits.
3. Constitutional complaint
By a letter of 27 August 2002 the applicant seized the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) with a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution about the length of the proceedings in the action of 1996.
On 5 November 2002 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible on the ground that, despite its previous request and warning, the applicant had failed to bring the complaint into line with the applicable procedural requirements.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings had been excessive.
THE LAW
The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government objected that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in that she had not complained of the length of the proceedings by means of a correctly formulated complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements. Moreover, they considered that the overall length of the proceedings had not been excessive.
The applicant made two written submissions after notice of the application had been given to the respondent Government. From their contents it could be concluded that she wished to maintain the application. However, she addressed neither the Government’s arguments nor the questions of admissibility and merits of her application.
The Court considers that it is not called upon to determine separately whether the applicant exhausted domestic remedies as, in any event, the application is inadmissible for the following reason.
The period to be taken into consideration began on 10 October 1996 when the action was lodged and ended on 26 February 2003 when the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law. It thus lasted less than 6 years and 5 months.
The “reasonableness” of this period must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court observes that the case was of some procedural complexity. This was due inter alia to the fact that case files concerning three other cases had to be examined in connection with the assessment of the present case and that there were 7 defendants one of whom died in the course of the proceedings with the result that questions of succession had to be determined.
As for the conduct of the applicant, it is to be noted that she did not appear at 5 of the hearings held in this case.
As regards the conduct of the authorities, the action was examined once at three levels of jurisdiction. The case was with the District Court from 10 October 1996 until 14 September 2000 (i.e. about 3 years and 11 months). In that period 7 hearings were held, complex expert evidence was obtained, succession questions in respect of the deceased defendant had to be resolved, some witnesses had to be heard by a different court and a tardy counterclaim had to be examined. The appellate proceedings lasted from 14 September 2000 until 14 April 2002 (i.e. about 1 year and 7 months). In this period 2 hearings were held and technical difficulties in securing the service of the first-instance judgment and a copy of the appeal on the parties had to be overcome. Finally, it took the Supreme Court less than 11 months (from 10 April 2002 to 26 February 2003) to determine the appeal on points of law.
Having regard to the foregoing considerations, in particular the procedural complexity of the case, and in so far as the application has been substantiated, the Court finds no indication that the overall length of the proceedings in the present case was contrary to the requirements laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, for comparison, Kandráčová and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 48674/99, 27 January 2004 and Bleyová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 69353/01, 17 October 2006).
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded. Accordingly, Article 29 § 3 of the Convention should no longer apply and the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
T.L. EarlyNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy