FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 47131/99
by Stina Lise-Lott SVED and Others
against Finland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 21 May 2002 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrA. Pastor Ridruejo,
MrsE. Palm,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrS. Pavlovschi, judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 24 February 1999,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants, Mrs Stina Lise-Lott Sved, Ms Erika Sved, Ms Elin Sved and Mr Markus Sved, are Finnish nationals, who were born in 1957, 1985, 1987 and 1988 respectively and live in Närpiö, Finland. They are the widow and the three children of the late Mr Rune Sved.
They are represented before the Court by Mr Matias Wallgren, a lawyer practising in Helsinki, Finland.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
On 8 November 1995 Mr Rune Sved, who was a farmer, applied for a subsidy to give up greenhouse farming. On 19 January 1996 the Pension Fund for Farming Industry (maatalousyrittäjien eläkelaitos, lantbruksföretagarnas pensionsanstalt) decided to grant Mr Sved a subsidy of FIM 263,800 (approximately 44,400 euros) on condition that the greenhouses were demolished or otherwise permanently taken out of production and the relevant area adjusted to the surrounding landscape. Written information when these measures had been carried out was requested as a condition of payment.
Mr Rune Sved died on 21 January 1996 without knowing about the decision.
On 6 March 1996 Mr Sved’s widow requested that the subsidy be paid to his estate. On 15 March 1996 the Pension Fund refused to pay the subsidy as the greenhouses had not been demolished before the death of Mr Rune Sved. The applicants appealed to the Pension Board (eläkelautakunta, pensionsnämnden), requesting payment of the subsidy. The Board decided, on 12 February 1997, that the subsidy could not be paid to Mr Sved’s estate since he had not demolished the greenhouses himself during his lifetime.
On 27 March 1997, the applicants appealed to the Insurance Court (vakuutusoikeus, försäkringsdomstolen), contending that the Board’s decision was unreasonable as Mr Rune Sved had not been able to demolish the greenhouses as he had not even known about the decision before he died. They noted that they had no other choice than to continue the greenhouse production or to let the greenhouses to another farmer if the court’s decision was not favourable to them. It appears from the statement of appeal that the greenhouses had not been demolished by 27 March 1997.
On 2 September 1998 the Insurance Court upheld the Board’s decision.
B. Relevant domestic law
According to Section 4, subsections 1 and 2, of the Act on Subsidy for Reducing Greenhouse Production and Apple Farming (laki kasvihuonetuotannon ja omenanviljelyn lopettamistuesta, lag om stöd för nedläggning av växthusproduktion och äppelodling), a subsidy shall be paid to an applicant on condition that his greenhouses are permanently demolished or otherwise taken out of greenhouse production and the relevant areas adjusted to the landscape.
According to Section 3 of the above-mentioned Act, the subsidy can only be granted if the applicant has been farming for a minimum period of ten years immediately before giving up this activity, and on condition that commercial greenhouse farming has been carried out in an area exceeding 500 square metres and the greenhouse farmer has been insured for this activity as a private entrepreneur within the meaning of the Act on Pensions for Private Entrepreneurs (yrittäjien eläkelaki, lag om pension för företagare) or as a farmer within the meaning of the Act on Pensions for Farmers (maatalousyrittäjien eläkelaki, lag om pension för lantbruksföretagare).
According to Section 10 of the above-mentioned Act, the subsidy is paid after the greenhouse production or apple farming has ceased.
COMPLAINT
The applicants complain, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that they have been unlawfully deprived of their possessions as it is not prescribed by law that a subsidy cannot be paid to an estate of a late farmer who has already had an established right to receive such a subsidy.
THE LAW
The applicants complained about the deprivation of their possessions as the payment to his estate of a subsidy already granted to Mr Rune Sved was refused for a reason which is not in accordance with the law. They invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The applicants emphasised that it is not mentioned in the relevant Act on Subsidy for Reducing Greenhouse Production and Apple Farming that the farmer who has applied for the subsidy shall be personally obliged to carry out the final demolition work of the greenhouses. Especially in a case in which a farmer has died before even having learned about the decision, it is unreasonable if the subsidy is not paid to his estate as the aim of the payment of the subsidy, i.e. reduction of greenhouse production, is achieved in any event. In the applicants’ opinion the right to receive the subsidy became part of Mr Rune Sved’s possessions on the day it was granted, i.e. on 19 January 1996, and this right was subsequently inherited by his estate on his death. Thus, the estate was deprived of its legal possessions by the relevant domestic decisions which were not based on law.
The Court recalls, first, that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention guarantees the right of property. It comprises three rules. The first rule, which is set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, which is set out in the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions. The third rule, which is set out in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three rules are connected. The second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and are therefore to be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule.
The Court further recalls that an applicant cannot allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention unless the alleged interference relates to his or her “possessions” or “property” within the meaning of that provision. A conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition is not “a possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (c.f. Brežny v. Slovak Republic, application no. 23131/93, Commission decision of 4 March 1996, Decisions and Reports (DR) 85-B, pp. 80-81; and Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII).
In the present case the subsidy in question was granted to Mr Rune Sved on condition that the greenhouses were demolished or otherwise permanently taken out of production and the relevant area adjusted to the surrounding landscape. These conditions were not fulfilled by the time Mr Sved died and the applicants became co-owners of his estate. In these circumstances the applicants did not inherit from Mr Sved any claim which could be considered to constitute “a possession” within the meaning of the Court’s case-law. The Court finds that the interpretation of domestic law by the national authorities, including the Insurance Court, leading to this result cannot be regarded as arbitrary.
It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court by a majority
Declares the application inadmissible.
T.L. EarlyNicolas Bratza
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy