FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 48369/09
Danuta SZWED-WÓJTOWICZ
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 21 April 2015 as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi Bianku,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Paul Mahoney,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Faris Vehabović, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 September 2009,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms Danuta Szwed-Wójtowicz, is a Polish national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Łódź. She was represented before the Court by Ms A. Podciechowska, a lawyer practising in Łódź.
2. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
4. On 1 February 1995 a prosecutor of the District Prosecutor’s Office in Łódź held a press conference and informed the public that company A., of which the applicant owned 90 per cent of shares, had been issuing short‑term obligations without a necessary licence to run a bank-like operations.
5. On 6 April 1995 the prosecutor charged the applicant with offences of running bank-like operations without licence and of issuing obligations without permission by the Securities Commission (Komisja Papierów Wartościowych).
6. On 5 February 1998 a bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Łódź District Court. The applicant was accused of six various offences connected with the running a company conducting bank‑like activities without necessary licences. Another bill of indictment, concerning further similar charges, was lodged with the same court on 26 March 1998. The Łódź District Court examined the cases jointly.
7. By a judgment of 27 June 2006 the applicant was acquitted of two charges and convicted of two other charges of fraud. She was sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed.
8. On 26 November 2007 the Łódź Regional Court dismissed her appeal.
9. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. On 6 March 2009 the Supreme Court held a hearing and dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that it was manifestly ill‑founded. Having heard the parties, the court gave orally brief grounds for its decision.
10. The copy of the decision contained information that under Article 535 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no written grounds for that decision shall be prepared.
2. The applicant’s medical history prior to her imprisonment
11. In 1995 the applicant had a stroke (udar niedokrwienny mózgu). Subsequently, she was diagnosed with chronic insufficiency of brain blood vessels (przewlekła niewydolność naczyń mózgowych) resulting in multiple brain strokes with successive left-side paresis (udar mózgu z niedowładem lewostronnym), narrowing of carotid arteries (zwężenie tętnic szyjnych) as a result of arteriosclerosis (miażdżyca), chronic pancreatitis (przewlekłe zapalenie trzustki), degenerative vertebral alterations of the pectoral and lumbar part (zmiany zwyrodnieniowe kręgosłupa w odcinku piersiowym i lędźwiowym), widening of abdominal aorta with mural thrombus (poszerzenie aorty brzusznej ze skrzepliną przyścienną), hypertension and depressive disorders.
12. Since 1995 the applicant has been treated in hospital several times. For the last time before her detention she was hospitalised between 22 and 28 April 2010. She was admitted to hospital because of severe abdominal pain. She was discharged with a recommendation to remain under the medical care of an internist, gastroenterologist, vascular surgeon and psychologist. She was also advised to follow a special diet and to regularly take medication.
13. On 22 June 2009 the Disability Board gave a decision, attesting that the applicant was suffering from significant disability (niepełnosprawność stopnia znacznego). This decision was granted for a period until 30 June 2012.
3. Medical care in prison
14. On 5 November 2010 the applicant was arrested and taken to the Łódź Prison no. 1 in order to serve her sentence of imprisonment. She was detained in that establishment until 14 December 2010. On the later date she was transferred to the Grudziądz Prison no. 1 where she remained until 15 February 2011. On 16 February 2011 the applicant was transferred to the Łódź Prison no. 1.
15. On the date of her admission to prison, the applicant was examined by a prison doctor, a psychiatrist and a cardiologist. A prison doctor recommended a course of medication and a light diet. He also advised that the applicant be provided with a lower bed in a cell. Moreover, a cardiologist stated that the applicant did not need to be detained in a prison hospital.
16. On 6 November 2010 the applicant was examined by a neurologist and subsequently on 9 and 15 November 2010 by an internist.
17. On 13, 14, 15 and 16 December 2010 the applicant had further medical consultations. On 21 December 2010 she had appointment with a psychiatrist and on 27 December 2010 she was examined by a prison doctor. On 12 January 2011 she was consulted by an internist, on 17 January by a dermatologist and on 18 January by a surgeon. On 19 January 2011 she had blood tests and abdominal ultrasonography. On 26 January 2011 she was again consulted by an internist.
18. On 3 February 2011 a prison doctor certified that the applicant could be treated in prison.
19. On 10 February 2011 she had consultation with a neurologist and on 14 February 2011 with an internist. On 23 February 2011 she underwent laboratory tests. She had further medical appointments on 28 February 2011; 7, 8, 18 and 22 March (private consultation with a vascular surgeon); 23 and 31 March; 7 April; 4, 9 and 23 May 2011. On 2 and 30 March 2011 she had blood tests.
20. On 9 May 2011 a prison doctor opined that the applicant might be treated in the conditions of detention. On the same day she underwent Doppler ultrasonography of carotid and vertebral arteries. She had further medical consultations on 7, 20 and 21 June 2011. On 1 July 2011 she underwent electroencephalography (EEG).
21. On 22 July 2011 she was consulted by a prison doctor. On 8 August 2011 the prison doctor decided to maintain the same pharmacological treatment for the applicant.
22. On 9 August 2011 the applicant had a computed tomography (CT) of the head. On 19 September 2011 she had neurological and on 5 January 2012 gastrological consultations.
23. On 21 September 2011 a prison doctor ascertained that the applicant may be treated in prison.
24. On 12 October 2011 the applicant had blood tests. On 19 October 2011 she was examined by a prison doctor. On 20 October 2011 she underwent a computed tomography of her chest.
25. On 27 October and 4 November 2011 the applicant had bacteriological tests. On 21 November she underwent abdominal ultrasonography.
26. On 6 and 22 December 2011 she was consulted by a pulmonologist and a prison doctor respectively.
27. On 10 January 2012 a prison doctor, after conducting psychiatric and gastrological consultations (on 2 and 5 January 2012 respectively), issued a medical certificate on the applicant’s condition for the purposes of the judicial proceedings concerning the applicant’s request for temporary release (see paragraphs 33-38 below). The certificate stated that the applicant could be treated in prison.
28. On 30 and 31 January 2012 the applicant was taken for one-day observation in the hospital of the Łódź Prison no. 2 after having fainted in the court. She stayed under cardiological surveillance and had neurological consultation. Moreover, she had blood tests, electrocardiography (ECG) and CT of the head. The CT of the head indicated no fresh blood incidents in the central nervous system. After those examinations doctors concluded that the applicant could remain in prison and that there was no need for further hospitalisation. They noticed that the applicant exaggerated her condition.
29. On 3 and 7 February 2012 the applicant was consulted by a psychiatrist and in internist respectively who recommend the continuation of the previous pharmacological treatment.
30. On 19 March 2012 the applicant underwent abdominal CT. On 28 March 2012 she had blood tests. Those examinations indicated the presence of gallstones in bile duct. Having regard to those results, on 11 April 2012 a prison doctor referred the applicant to a surgeon. The consultation took place on the same day. Subsequently, the applicant was consulted by an internist on 16 April, 7 May and 3 and 16 July 2012.
31. Since the beginning of her detention the applicant has been receiving light diet.
32. The Government submitted that according to the information provided by the Director of the Medical Service of the Łódź Prison no. 1, the applicant was able to move around independently. She did not need help from third parties. She never reported to the prison authorities that she needed assistance in her basic daily activities. She has been constantly receiving pharmacological treatment.
4. The applicant’s request for temporary release
33. On 29 November 2010 the applicant requested to be granted temporary release (przerwa w karze). She referred to her numerous ailments and the need to have them treated properly which, in her submission, was impossible in prison, in particular in respect of her persistent neurological condition resulting from repeated strokes. In February 2011 the applicant repeated her request.
34. On 16 June 2011 the Łódź Regional Court refused to allow the applicant’s request. It was of the view that the grounds for allowing a temporary release, provided for by Article 153 § 2 of the Code of Execution of Sentences, did not obtain in the case. On the basis of two certificates issued by doctors working for the prison medical service, the court found that despite being of fragile state of health, the applicant had appropriate medical care in detention. In particular, she was consulted by various specialists and underwent necessary examinations. Both certificates stated that the applicant was fit for detention. The court stressed that the applicant remained under constant medical care. Importantly, the court noted that the applicant was not entirely interested in improving her state of health as on several occasions she had been disciplinary punished for storing medication and for refusing to take it in the presence of a nurse.
35. The applicant appealed. She argued, inter alia, that the Regional Court had erred in the establishment of facts. In this respect, she contested the lower court’s finding that the applicant was fit for detention despite her numerous ailments. She also complained about the Regional Court’s reliance on the opinions of prison doctors and its refusal to admit expert opinions relevant for the applicant’s condition.
36. On 31 August 2011 the Łódź Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court’s decision and remitted the case. It concurred with the lower court that the applicant’s state of health was under constant monitoring and that she had access to specialised treatment in detention. However, given the character of the applicant’s ailments, her state of health needed to be also assessed by relevant specialists, in particular, a neurologist and a gastroenterologist. The medical opinions relied on by the Regional Court did not contain this kind of assessment.
37. In its decision of 24 February 2012 the Łódź Regional Court refused to grant the applicant a temporary release. It was of the view that the applicant’s condition could be treated in detention, having regard to a medical certificate of 10 January 2012 (see paragraph 27 above). It noted that the applicant received necessary medical care, including consultations by specialists. The applicant’s medical documentation did not substantiate a conclusion that her continued detention would seriously endanger her life or health.
38. The applicant appealed. The Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal on 24 April 2012. It shared the conclusions of the lower court as to the applicant’s state of health and her being fit for detention. The appellate court stressed that it transpired from the medical opinion of 10 January 2012 that the applicant had been examined not only by general practitioners but also by specialists in surgery, psychiatry, neurology and gastroenterology. The opinions of the specialists confirmed that the applicant could be treated in detention. The Court of Appeal also noted that further examinations and consultations had been planned which indicated that the applicant received adequate medical care.
39. It appears that the applicant was released on an unspecified date in 2014.
B. Relevant domestic law
40. The provisions pertaining to medical care in detention facilities and general conditions of detention, and the relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the Court’s judgments in the cases of Kaprykowski v. Poland, no. 23052/05, §§ 36-39, 3 February 2009; Sławomir Musiał v. Poland, no. 28300/06, §§ 48-61 ECHR 2009‑... (extracts); and Orchowski v. Poland, no. 17885/04, §§ 74-85, 13 October 2009. More recent developments are described in the Court’s decision in the case of Łatak v. Poland (dec.) (no. 52070/08, §§ 25-54, 12 October 2010).
COMPLAINTS
A. Complaint under Article 3 submitted on 25 June 2012
41. In her application dated 25 June 2012, the applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention about inadequate medical care provided to her in detention and about the courts’ refusal to grant her temporary release on medical grounds.
B. Complaints submitted on 3 September 2009
42. In her application of 3 September 2009, the applicant complained about the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against her.
43. The applicant also submitted that the criminal courts had committed serious breaches of substantive law in convicting her, essentially because they had based her conviction on untenable interpretation of applicable provisions of criminal law and had wrongly assessed the evidence against her. She argued that issuing short-term obligations could not, at the relevant time, be regarded as unlawful.
44. The applicant further complained, relying on Article 6 of the Convention, that the Supreme Court’s decision dismissing her cassation appeal contained no written grounds and that no such grounds would have been prepared at her request. This, in her view, amounted to a violation of her right to a fair hearing as knowing the grounds for a judicial decision on the merits of a case constituted a crucial element of that right.
C. Remaining complaints
45. In February 2011 the applicant complained under Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention that on 5 November 2010 the police had arrested her and brought her to prison where she started serving her sentence. She alleged that she had not received any prior notice concerning the execution of her sentence. This failure of the authorities made it impossible for the applicant to apply for suspension of the service of her sentence on medical grounds. She was further unsuccessful in her efforts to challenge the arrest.
46. In February 2013 the applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the Łódź Regional Prosecutor’s Office had induced the Łódź Tax Office to issue groundless enforcement writs against her company and to seize its property. She alleged that the above actions amounted further to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The applicant also complained under Article 7 of the Convention that the criminal acts imputed to her dating to 1994-1995 had been adjudicated pursuant to the provisions of the new Criminal Code which entered into force in September 1998.
THE LAW
A. Complaint under Article 3 of the Convention
47. In her application dated 25 June 2012, the applicant complained under Article 3 that she had not received adequate medical care in detention and that the courts had refused to grant her a temporary release on medical grounds.
1. The Government’s submissions
48. The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies with regard to her complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. She failed to bring a civil action for compensation under Articles 23 and 24 read in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code whereby persons deprived of their liberty who had suffered a violation of their personal rights as a result of the conditions of their detention may bring a civil action against the State Treasury. The Government further argued that the adequacy of remedy invoked by them should be assessed in the light of the present-day situation. They maintained that the present case fell within the exception from the rule that the assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted was normally carried out with reference to the date of the lodging of application.
49. With regard to the merits of the complaint under Article 3, the Government submitted that it was manifestly ill‑founded since the authorities had regularly monitored the applicant’s health and provided her with appropriate medical assistance and treatment. They commented in turn on the relevant criteria identified in the Court’s case-law.
50. In so far as the applicant’s medical condition was concerned, the Government agreed with the domestic courts that the applicant’s state of health was fragile. However, according to the medical opinions, the applicant’s condition in detention was generally good and she did not require any specialised medical assistance. The applicant was physically and mentally slowed, but she was able to move independently despite her ailments. In this respect the Government relied on the medical certificate of 29 October 2012.
51. The Government further submitted that in some instances the applicant had tended to take advantage of the good will of the medical staff. In particular, she exaggerated her actual condition (see the medical information of 31 January 2012 and memorandum of 23 March 2011). On many occasions the applicant refused to be treated, even in a situation of risk to her life (see memorandum of 23 March 2011, information card from the Łódź hospital dated 27 January 2010 and the applicant’s statement in her medical report of 11 April 2012). Moreover, she used to reproach doctors for being incompetent and refused to take her medicines on several occasions (see medical reports of 18-19 July and 27 August 2012; medical information card of 29 October 2012).
52. With regard to the medical care provided to the applicant in detention, it transpired from numerous expert opinions that she had received appropriate care. On the day of the applicant’s admission to prison, she was thoroughly examined by a prison doctor and several specialists. Since the beginning of her detention, the applicant has been under pharmacological treatment. She was also provided with a light diet. During her imprisonment, the applicant had numerous medical consultations, regular blood tests as well as specialised examinations (ultrasonography, tomography, electrocardiography etc.). Thus, the applicant has been provided with adequate medical care since the very beginning of her incarceration.
53. As far as the advisability of maintaining the detention measure in view of the applicant’s state of health was concerned, the Government, relying on opinions of medical experts, maintained that the applicant’s condition could have been properly treated in detention. The applicant’s state of health was assessed on the date of her admission to prison and subsequently on 3 February and 9 May 2011 and on 10 January 2012. Each time the doctors stated that the applicant could be treated in prison and that she did not require any specialised care outside prison. The doctors recommended pharmacological treatment and special diet. The above medical certificates constituted a basis for the domestic courts’ decisions to refuse the applicant’s request for temporary release. It was established in those proceedings that the applicant’s imprisonment would not pose a threat to her life or health.
54. The Government stressed that the authorities had demonstrated a constant concern for the applicant’s condition and had duly executed all recommendations of impartial experts in order to alleviate the effects of the applicant’s illness. The applicant’s state of health was constantly monitored not only by an internist, but also by specialists (a neurologist, surgeon, gastroenterologist and cardiologist). The authorities never took arbitrary decisions but always relied on impartial and well-grounded medical opinions. Having regard to the above, the Government was strongly convinced that the medical assistance and care provided to the applicant during her detention had been adequate and never undermined her dignity or entailed a particularly acute hardship.
2. The applicant’s submissions
55. The applicant claimed that there was a breach of Article 3 in her case. She alleged that she did not receive adequate medical care in detention. The quality of the prison health care fell short of the standards adopted in the civil establishments. Nurses and doctors of the prison medical service were not sufficiently qualified. In addition, the prison medical service did not have modern medical equipment and specialised medical staff. As a person who had suffered from several strokes, her life was at risk on account of another possible stroke. During her stay in the Łódź Prison the applicant lost consciousness on several occasions. She was taken to the hospital of the Łódź Prison no. 2 but refused to stay there because the hospital did not employ specialists relevant for her condition, in particular neurologists and gastroenterologists.
56. The applicant alleged that the medical care provided to her in detention consisted of administering to her medication supplied by her husband. In February 2013 her state of health deteriorated significantly. She had to walk with crutches because of the lack of physiotherapy and her spine hernia. This disease together with chronic pancreatitis caused her a lot of pain. The applicant claimed that she received no nursing care in her daily activities and she had to rely on the assistance of other prisoners. Furthermore, the food provided to her did not meet the dietetic requirements and she had to buy additional food.
3. The Court’s assessment
57. The Court notes that in the Government’s submission the applicant failed to bring a civil action in order to seek compensation for the alleged infringement of her personal rights in relation to the inadequate medical care provided to her in detention. The Court finds it unnecessary to rule on the Government’s preliminary objection in respect of exhaustion of domestic remedies since, in any event, it considers the applicant’s complaint to be manifestly ill‑founded. Its reasons for that conclusion are as follows.
58. The Court recalls that Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to transfer him to a civil hospital, even if he is suffering from an illness that is particularly difficult to treat (see, among others, Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR 2002‑IX). However, this provision does require the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000‑XI; Sławomir Musiał v. Poland, no. 28300/06, § 86, 20 January 2009; and Kaprykowski v. Poland, no. 23052/05, § 69, 3 February 2009). There are three particular elements to be considered in relation to the compatibility of the applicant’s health with his stay in detention: (a) the medical condition of the prisoner, (b) the adequacy of the medical assistance and care provided in detention and (c) the advisability of maintaining the detention measure in view of the state of health of the applicant (see Mouisel v. France, cited above, §§ 40‑42; Sakkopoulos v. Greece, no. 61828/00, § 39, 15 January 2004; and Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01, § 94, 28 March 2006). The authorities must also ensure that where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy that seeks, to the extent possible, to cure the detainee’s diseases or to avoid aggravating them, rather than to address them on a symptomatic basis (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852/03 and 13413/04, § 114, 29 November 2007; Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456/05, § 79, 4 October 2005; Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, § 211, 13 July 2006; Mikalauskas v. Malta, no. 4458/10, § 63, 23 July 2013; Pozaić v. Croatia, no. 5901/13, § 53, 4 December 2014; and Kushnir v. Ukraine, no. 42184/09, § 135, 11 December 2014).
59. The Court notes that it is undisputed that the applicant suffered from a stroke in 1995 and subsequently developed a number of complications and ailments, including left-side paresis and chronic pancreatitis (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant was further certified as suffering from significant disability (see paragraph 13 above).
60. The Court will next examine whether the applicant was provided with adequate medical assistance and care in detention. It notes in this respect that on her admission to prison, and shortly thereafter, the applicant was examined by a prison doctor and four different specialists. In the subsequent period she was regularly examined by prison doctors and consulted by various specialists (psychiatrist, cardiologist, neurologist, internist, surgeon, gastroenterologist and pulmonologist). The applicant further underwent a number of specialised examinations (ultrasonography, electroencephalography and computed tomography). She received regular pharmacological treatment. All these undertakings demonstrate that the authorities were attentive to and constantly monitored the applicant’s specific medical condition. In their view, the applicant received appropriate medical care in detention (see paragraphs 34 and 36-38 above – in the context of request for temporary release) and the Court discerns no reason to find otherwise.
61. The applicant made certain allegations concerning the substandard quality of prison doctors, medical equipment and food. She also alleged that she received no nursing care in her daily activities. However, the Court notes that these assertions are not supported by any evidence in the file and therefore remain unsubstantiated. On the evidence before it, the Court does not find any indication that the medical care provided to the applicant was deficient or below the standard level of health care available to the population generally (see Nitecki v. Poland (dec.), no. 65653/01, 21 March 2002; Kaprykowski, cited above, § 75; Michajlov v. Austria (dec.), no. 13796/09, 27 March 2012, § 35; Turzyński v. Poland (dec.), no. 61254/09, 17 April 2012; and Stettner v. Poland, no. 38510/06, 24 March 2015, § 53).
62. With regard to the advisability of the applicant’s detention in view of her medical condition, the Court notes that this issue was under regular review. From the first examination carried out on the day of the applicant’s admission to prison and subsequently throughout the period of her incarceration, all medical practitioners consistently expressed an opinion that the applicant could be treated in detention. The same issue was also examined in the context of the applicant’s request for temporary release on health grounds. The request was dismissed since the domestic courts found, having regard to the medical opinion of 10 January 2012, that the applicant had received necessary medical care in detention and that her continued detention did not pose a risk to her life or health (see paragraph 37 above). In view of these consistent findings throughout the whole relevant period, the Court finds that there were no grounds to consider that the applicant’s detention was excluded on medical grounds (compare and contrast, Rokosz v. Poland, no. 15952/09, §§ 39‑40, 27 July 2010; and Turzyński, cited above).
63. It follows that the complaint under Article 3 is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Complaints submitted on 3 September 2009
64. In her application form of 3 September 2009 the applicant alleged that the criminal proceedings against her had been unreasonably lengthy. However, the Court notes that she failed to lodge a complaint under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (“the 2004 Act”).
It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
65. The applicant further complained under Article 6 that the criminal courts had committed serious breaches of substantive law in convicting her, essentially because they had based her conviction on untenable interpretation of applicable provisions of criminal law and had wrongly assessed the evidence against her. However, the Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national court (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I, with further references).
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
66. The applicant also complained about a breach of her right to a fair hearing on the ground that the Supreme Court’s decision dismissing her cassation appeal contained no written grounds. The Court notes that the Supreme Court held a hearing and explained orally the essential motives of its decision. It recalls that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, but cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. The extent to which this duty applies may vary according to the nature of the decision. Where the highest court in a country refuses to accept a case or where it examines a remedy on its merits and dismisses it on the basis that the legal grounds for amending or quashing a contested judgment are not made out, very limited reasoning may satisfy the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention (see Helle v. Finland, 19 December 1997, § 55, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII; Nerva and Others v. the United Kingdom, (dec.), no. 42295/98, 11 July 2000; Wnuk v. Poland (dec.) no. 38308/05, 1 September 2009; and Janusz Leszek Kozłowski v. Poland, no. 47611/07, § 30, 8 June 2010). Moreover, the Court has already examined similar complaints against Poland and declared them to be manifestly ill-founded (see Walczak v. Poland (dec.), no. 77395/01, 7 May 2002; Guz v. Poland (dec.), no. 29293/02, 19 May 2005; Makuszewski v. Poland, no. 35556/05, 13 January 2009; and Bachowski v. Poland (dec.), no. 32463/06, 2 November 2010).
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
C. Remaining complaints
67. The applicant introduced further complaints under Articles 3, 5, 6, 7 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in February 2011 and in February 2013 (see paragraphs 45 and 46 above). However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 21 May 2015.
Françoise Elens-PassosGuido Raimondi
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy