SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 34714/97
by Eugenio TACCHINO and Maria Rosa SCORZA
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 4 October 2001 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrG. Bonello,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler, judges,
MrsM. Del Tufo, ad hoc judge,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 19 October 1996 and registered on 3 February 1997,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are Italian nationals, born in 1929 and 1932, living in Rome.
They are represented before the Court by Mr Orazio Gentile, a lawyer practising in Rome.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:
Mrs G.F. was the owner of an apartment in Rome, which she had let to L.N.
In a writ served on the tenant on 15 April 1983, she communicated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.
By a decision of 12 May 1983, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 September 1984. Upon the tenant’s request, the Rome Magistrate postponed the execution of the order for possession to 31 January 1985.
On 4 February 1986, Mrs G.F. served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. On 27 February 1986, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 30 April 1986.
Between 30 April 1986 and 26 October 1989, the bailiff made sixteen attempts to recover possession.
On 15 November 1989, the applicants became the owners of the apartment.
After four unsuccessful attempts by the bailiff to evict the tenant, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for their daughter.
Between 14 November 1990 and 23 October 1998, the bailiff made thirty-six attempts to recover possession.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.
On 26 November 1998, the tenant vacated the premises.
THE LAW
The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that their inability to recover possession of their apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicants further complain under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
The Government argue that the arrangements for staggering the police assistance were an administrative issue, entirely separate from and independent of the judicial process and therefore outside the scope of Article 6.
The Court recalls that it has already held that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable to the tenants’ eviction proceedings (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 62-63, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
On the merits, the Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicants’ property rights was not disproportionate.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest.
The applicants argue that the refusal of the administration to enforce the order issued by the magistrate has interfered with the power of the judiciary.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy