Published on 30 June 2025
FIRST SECTION
Application no. 36645/24
Sauro TARQUINI
against Italy
lodged on 5 December 2024
communicated on 11 June 2025
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The applicant’s son, T.G., committed suicide on 11 December 2008 while detained in the criminal psychiatric hospital (ospedale psichiatrico giudiziario) of Castiglione delle Stiviere.
He had been placed under custodial security measures following criminal proceedings initiated in 2007. From the date of his admission to the facility on 3 November 2007 until 9 September 2008, T.G. received pharmacological treatment and underwent psychiatric evaluations. Between 12 September 2008 (the date of his last surgical consultation) and 3 December 2008 (the date of the second and final “Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale” – BPRS test), T.G. was not subjected to any medical examination. On the day of his death, he was informed of the rejection of his request for a non-custodial measure. He was later found hanging in his room.
In 2011, the applicant brought a civil action against the Ministry of Justice, alleging liability for his son’s death. The domestic courts dismissed the claim, considering the event to be unforeseeable. By judgment no. 22970/2024, delivered on 20 August 2024, the Court of Cassation gave the final decision, dismissing the applicant’s appeal.
The applicant alleges a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, under the State’s positive obligations to adopt preventive operational measures to protect his son’s life. More specifically, the applicant argues that several factors indicate that the hospital staff knew or ought to have known of the real and imminent risk of suicide faced by his son but failed to intensify psychiatric monitoring or implement appropriate surveillance measures tailored to T.G.’s mental health condition. In particular, the applicant complains about the progressive reduction in psychiatric consultations in the final months of T.G.’s life (the so-called “clinical silence”), which has also been highlighted by the court-appointed expert in the first-instance civil proceedings, who had been instructed to assess whether a causal link existed between the conduct of the treating physicians and T.G.’s suicide.
The applicant further complains of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, asserting that T.G. was subjected to therapeutic neglect during the final three months of his life. He also contends that his son was detained in conditions that were incompatible with the standards required by this provision.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Having regard to the authorities’ positive obligations to take measures to protect an individual from himself (see, for example, Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC], no. 78103/14, 31 January 2019; Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, §§ 89-91, ECHR 2001-III; Renolde v. France, no. 5608/05, ECHR 2008 (extracts)), has Article 2 of the Convention been breached in the present case? In particular:
(i) Did the authorities know or ought to have known that there was a real and immediate risk of suicide faced by T.G.?
(ii) If so, did the authorities take all measures which could reasonably have been expected of them to prevent the applicant’s son from committing suicide (see, amongst others, Fernandes de Oliveira, cited above, §§ 108-115)? Given that a BPRS test was conducted eight days prior to the suicide, did the absence of medical visits between 12 September 2008 and 3 December 2008 (the so-called “clinical silence”) have an impact on the assessment of the risk?
In answering these questions, the Government are invited to address the fact that T.G. did not undergo any psychiatric visits between 12 September and 3 December 2008 (the date on which the BPRS test was administered). The Government are further invited to explain whether any consideration was given to the potential relevance of the so-called “clinical silence” in the assessment of the causes of T.G.’s subsequent suicide, in the light of his mental health conditions and the conclusions of the court-appointed expert’s information on the surveillance measures in place at Castiglione delle Stiviere psychiatric hospital at the relevant time, as well as on the specific characteristics, security features and layout of the room in which T.G. was accommodated at the time of his death.
2. Has the applicant been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention? In particular, do the material conditions of T.G.’s hospitalisation, and the alleged therapeutic neglect during the last three months of his life, amount to inhuman or degrading treatment (Rooman v. Belgium [GC], no. 18052/11, §§ 141-148, 31 January 2019, Ceesay v. Austria, no. 72126/14, §§ 110-113, 16 November 2017)?