SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 55137/20
TASINO CHESHMICHE BRANKO DOOEL SKOPJE
against North Macedonia
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 5 May 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Péter Paczolay, President,
Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
Hugh Mercer, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 55137/20) against the Republic of North Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 30 November 2020 by Tasino Cheshmiche Branko Dooel Skopje (“the applicant company”), a company registered in Skopje, which was represented by Mr P. Janura, a lawyer practising in Skopje;
the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the alleged lack of access to a court to the Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms D. Djonova, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
the withdrawal of Mr Jovan Ilievski, the judge elected in respect of North Macedonia, from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3 of the Rules of Court);
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the applicant company’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of a breach of the right of access to a court caused by an alleged lack of diligence on the part of the domestic courts resulting in the discontinuation as time‑barred of criminal proceedings against a third party, in which the applicant company had lodged a compensation claim.
2. On an unspecified date the applicant company lodged a criminal complaint against a certain Lj.P. In 2007 a public prosecutor filed an indictment against Lj.P. The prosecutor submitted that in 1999, Lj.P., in his capacity as manager of the U. company – of which, as submitted by the Government and not disputed by the applicant, he was the sole owner – had defrauded the manager of the applicant company (S.K.) into paying a sum of money in two instalments, in 1999 and 2000, for the purchase of an apartment which the U. company was to build, without later transferring the title to or the possession of the apartment to the applicant company. In 2008 the prosecutor withdrew the indictment, finding that Lj.P.’s actions had not constituted fraud. On 18 September 2008 the applicant company took over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor and lodged a compensation claim in the criminal proceedings against Lj.P. for damage suffered as a result of the alleged offence.
3. After two remittals, on 11 September 2019 the Skopje Criminal Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) discontinued the criminal proceedings against Lj.P. on the grounds that the prosecution had become time‑barred. On 17 December 2019, following an appeal by the applicant company, the Skopje Court of Appeal (“the appellate court”) remitted the proceedings, finding that the limitation period for prosecution would expire only on 8 February 2020. On 5 February 2020 the trial court convicted Lj.P., upheld the applicant company’s compensation claim and gave Lj.P. a two‑year suspended prison sentence, which would not be enforced if, inter alia, Lj.P. were to pay the applicant company the relevant compensation. Following an appeal by Lj.P., on 2 June 2020 the appellate court discontinued the criminal proceedings as the prosecution had in the meantime become time‑barred, and advised the applicant company to pursue its compensation claim in civil proceedings.
4. In 2021 the Supreme Court’s panel at two levels of jurisdiction upheld a complaint by the applicant company concerning length of proceedings, finding that the criminal courts had failed to act diligently in the criminal proceedings (described in paragraphs 2 and 3 above) following the subsidiary prosecution. The Supreme Court established, notably, that the trial court had adjourned 64 hearings on account of Lj.P.’s absence or for other reasons not attributable to the applicant company.
5. The Government submitted, and the applicant company did not dispute, that in 2001 and 2005, prior to the indictment against Lj.P., the applicant company had lodged two civil claims against the U. company for terminating the sale contract in respect of the apartment and for unjust enrichment, but that it had withdrawn the claims in 2004 and 2008 respectively. Furthermore, in 2008 the applicant company had also waived a third claim against the U. company related to the same contract in respect of the apartment, submitted in bankruptcy proceedings initiated in respect of the U. company in 2006, and which the U. company had not disputed. It appears that in the bankruptcy proceedings, the applicant company was offered to be reimbursed 17.5% of the sum it had paid for the apartment. The bankruptcy proceedings ended in 2011.
6. The applicant company complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that it had not had access to a court to have its compensation claim decided.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT7. The Court does not consider it necessary to address all the objections to the admissibility of the application raised by the Government (namely that the application had been lodged outside the six‑month time‑limit and that domestic remedies had not been exhausted), as the application is in any event inadmissible for the reasons elaborated below.
8. The general principles concerning access to a court with regard to civil claims brought in the context of criminal proceedings have been summarised in Fabbri and Others v. San Marino ([GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2 others, §§ 124-27 and 137-40, 24 September 2024). In particular, the discontinuance of criminal proceedings, with the result that a civil claim cannot be determined within the ambit of those criminal proceedings, does not – as a rule – result in a violation of the right of access to a court if it is based on lawful grounds which are not applied arbitrarily or unreasonably, and if the applicant had ab initio an alternative avenue of redress capable of determining the civil claim at issue. However, in the exceptional circumstance that the lawful discontinuance of the criminal proceedings was the result of a serious dysfunction of the domestic system (such as, for example, total inaction on the part of the authorities), the Court, after having assessed the applicant’s behaviour, may be called on to examine the availability of any other avenue open to the applicant, so as to determine whether the very essence of the applicant’s right has been impaired. Where the discontinuance of criminal proceedings, with the result that a civil claim could not be determined within the ambit of those criminal proceedings, was only partly the result of a serious dysfunction of the domestic system – the applicant having contributed to that outcome (for example, by means of inaction, negligence, or bad faith) – it would suffice that the applicant had another avenue of redress, either ab initio or after the discontinuance, to find that the essence of the applicant’s right has not been impaired. Exceptionally, when the serious dysfunction of the domestic system is the sole or decisive reason leading to the discontinuance – the applicant having pursued the civil claims diligently via the criminal avenue – it would be open to the Court to find that the applicant had a legitimate expectation to have those claims determined in that avenue irrespective of any other available remedy ab initio (ibid., §§ 137‑40).
9. In the present case, under sections 96 and 101(3) of the Criminal Proceedings Act applicable to the case at hand (see for the content of these provisions Boris Stojanovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 41916/04, §§ 19-23, 6 May 2010), the domestic courts were under no absolute obligation to examine the applicant company’s civil claim within the criminal proceedings. The applicant company did not dispute the calculation of the substantive limitation period and did not argue that the relevant time‑limits had been applied restrictively. The appellate court’s decision to discontinue the case against Lj.P. was therefore based on lawful grounds which were not applied arbitrarily or unreasonably (compare also Fabbri and Others, cited above, § 142). Furthermore, the applicant company did not contest the fact that it had ab initio an alternative avenue of redress capable of determining the civil claim at issue (see Fabbri and Others, cited above, § 137). As a matter of fact and in addition to the bankruptcy proceedings, it had lodged two civil claims against the U. company, both for termination of a sale contract and unjust enrichment, in 2001 and 2005 respectively, but subsequently withdrew those claims (see paragraph 5 above). Those civil proceedings were unrelated to the subsequent criminal proceedings against Lj.P. and the applicant company would not therefore have been required to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings (contrast Boris Stojanovski, cited above, § 56) in order to have its civil claim decided by the civil courts.
10. Assessing the applicant’s behaviour, it cannot be said that the failure to determine the applicant company’s claim in the context of the criminal proceedings was solely or decisively a consequence of the delays identified by the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above). In this connection, the Court notes that the events underpinning the civil claim took place in 1999 and 2000, but that the applicant company did not provide any information as to when it had lodged the criminal complaint against Lj.P. or whether it had pursued it diligently until 2007, when the prosecutor had filed the indictment (see paragraph 2 above). Moreover, the Court notes, firstly, that the applicant company chose to withdraw its civil claims against the U. company, in respect of which the authorities bear no responsibility (see paragraph 5 above). Secondly, the applicant company did not dispute that it could have lodged a civil action against Lj.P., in his capacity as the sole owner of the U. company. In this regard the applicant company merely argued that a civil claim would have been devoid of purpose on account of Lj.P.’s inability to pay. However, it did not explain why it would have had better prospects of success in the context of criminal proceedings other than to submit that a prison sentence could have been imposed on Lj.P. for not honouring his obligations regarding the civil claim. In so far as the applicant company argued that it had chosen to pursue the criminal proceedings in order to obtain justice and recognition as a victim of fraud, the Court reiterates that Article 6 does not confer any right to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence (see Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 70, ECHR 2004-I, and Gorou v. Greece (no. 2) [GC], no. 12686/03, § 24, 20 March 2009).
11. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court sees no reason to find that the applicant company’s right of access to a court has been violated.
12. The application is therefore manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 28 May 2026.
Dorothee von Arnim Péter Paczolay
Deputy Registrar President