FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 47758/99
by Laura TASSINARI
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 31 January 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 16 April 1999 and registered on 27 April 1999,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1960 and living in Rome. She is represented before the Court by Mr E. Sinigaglia, a lawyer practising in Rome.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which she had let to A.D’A.P.
In a registered letter of 29 July 1982, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.
In a writ served on the tenant on 7 October 1985, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.
By a decision of 12 December 1985, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1986.
On 31 October 1986 and 3 November 1986 the applicant served notices on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 25 November 1986 she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 January 1987.
Between 15 January 1987 and 12 November 1992 the bailiff made forty attempts to recover possession.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 6 April 1994 the applicant served another notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 11 May 1994 she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 3 June 1994.
Between 3 June 1994 and 23 October 1998 the bailiff made twenty attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
In the meantime, on 17 August 1998, the tenant died.
On 16 November 1998, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that her inability to recover possession of her apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings and that the delay in the enforcement of the order issued by the Rome Magistrate resulted in a denial of her right of access to a court.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy