Information Note on the Court’s case-law 48
December 2002
Taylor v. the United Kingdom (dec.) - 48864/99
Decision 3.12.2002 [Section II]
Article 7
Article 7-1
Heavier penalty
Imposition of custodial sentence on youth having reached the age of 15 between time of offence and conviction: inadmissible
The applicant and another youth were arrested in March 1997 in connection with a violent assault on a boy aged 11 and the theft of a ring. At that time, the applicant was aged 14 years and 24 days. In April 1997, the applicant was charged with robbery. The first hearing took place before the Youth Court in May 1997. In July 1997, the prosecution decided to press the lesser charges of theft and occasioning actual bodily harm instead. The applicant pleaded not guilty. The trial was scheduled to take place in November 1997, but the applicant failed to show up on the first day, having made a mistake as to the date. In consequence, the trial was rescheduled for the next available dates, which were in March 1998, by which time the applicant had just turned 15. The Youth Court convicted the applicant and committed him to the Crown Court for sentencing, since it lacked the power to impose a sentence appropriate to the severity of the crime. The applicant was subsequently sentenced, in August 1998, to 18 months’ detention in a Young Offenders’ institution. He appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing unsuccessfully that the sentence was unlawful since he was 14 at the date of the commission of the offences of which he was convicted and for that reason a custodial sentence could not be imposed.
Inadmissible under Article 7: The relevant statutory provisions at the time were clear both as regards the offences and the sentencing powers of the courts with respect to young offenders. Long before the offences were committed, the domestic courts had established that the age for determining sentence was the age at the date of conviction. The applicant therefore could not complain that a heavier penalty was imposed on him than the one applicable at the date of commission of the offence. Moreover, it was for the applicant’s lawyers to advise him on the relevant domestic case-law. There was no guarantee that the proceedings would be completed before the applicant’s 15th birthday. The applicant had no legitimate expectation that, in the event of conviction, he would be exempt from a custodial sentence and there was no indication that the prosecution has deliberately delayed the proceedings so as to secure his conviction after the applicant had turned 15: manifestly ill-founded.
Inadmissible under Article 6 § 1: As to the length of the proceedings, the relevant period was from the date the offence was committed to the date of sentence. The case was not complex, but neither the prosecution nor the courts were responsible for any unnecessary delay in the proceedings. Indeed, both wished to proceed with the trial in November 1997. They were prevented from doing so by the applicant’s mistake as to the date initially fixed for the trial. Although this error might be attributable to the applicant’s youth, it engaged his and his lawyer’s responsibility for the fact that the trial had to be adjourned until after his 15th birthday: manifestly ill-founded.
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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