SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 38656/97
by Fiorella TIBERIO
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 22 May 2001 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrG. Bonello,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrE. Levits, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 3 October 1997 and registered on 19 November 1997,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1956 and living in Florence. She is represented before the Court by Mrs C. Calamandrei and Mrs E. Sialino, two lawyers practising in Florence.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows:
Mrs M.M. was the owner of an apartment in Florence, which she had let to P.D.V.
In a writ served on the tenant on 8 April 1987, she communicated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.
By a decision of 30 April 1987, which was made enforceable on 20 May 1987, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 31 October 1988.
On 7 June 1989, Mrs M.M. served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. On 22 June 1989, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 5 September 1989. The enforcement was postponed to 11 May 1990.
Between 11 May 1990 and 31 October 1991, the bailiff made 4 attempts to recover possession.
On 11 November 1991, the applicant became the owner of the apartment.
On 28 December 1991, she made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.
Between 30 April 1992 and 16 September 1997, the bailiff made 12 attempts to recover possession.
On 4 December 1997, the applicant repossessed the premises with the assistance of the police.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about her prolonged inability to recover possession of her apartment.
2. The applicant further complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that her inability to recover possession of her apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
The Government argue that the arrangements for staggering the police assistance were an administrative issue, entirely separate from and independent of the judicial process and therefore out of the scope of Article 6.
The Court recalls that it has already held that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable to the tenants eviction proceedings (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 62-63, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This exception should therefore also be rejected.
On the merits, the Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy