THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 40182/98
by Marianna TCHÓRZEWSKA
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 18 April 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrG. Ress, President,
MrJ. Makarczyk,
MrP. Kūris,
MrB. Zupančič,
MrJ. Hedigan,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrK. Traja, judges,
and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 14 July 1994,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Marianna Tchórzewska, a Polish citizen born in 1925, is a pensioner residing in Wojcieszków.
In 1991 the applicant and her neighbour G.S. signed a settlement by which the applicant agreed to a house being built on G.S.’ plot adjacent to hers, a distance of 3 metres being respected between the wall of the house and the boundary between the plots. He received a building permit on 5 March 1984.
G.S. subsequently built the house, putting eight windows in the wall facing the applicant’s plot, contrary to the terms of the permit. The applicant repeatedly complained thereof to the competent authorities.
In July 1992 the Siedlce Regional Office, in reply to the applicant’s complaint, decided that G.S. had failed to comply with the terms of the building permit. The Office also acknowledged that he had failed to take steps, pursuant to the Construction Law 1974, in order to rectify the situation in conformity with the law.
On an unspecified date, the applicant’s son obtained a building permit for the construction of a house on her plot. This permit expired on 15 December 1993 as the building had not been started within two years from the date on which it had been given.
On 14 December 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court, upon the applicant’s appeal, quashed the 1992 administrative decision by which the administrative authorities had allowed G.S. to use the house built in breach of the permit. The court noted that the applicant’s protests about the discrepancies between the building permit and the actual state of the house had been to no avail. The court further observed that the administrative authorities had given G.S. retrospective permission to use the building, contrary to the requirements of the Construction Act 1974. Under this Act, such a decision could only be taken after orders had been given to comply with the permit. The court noted no such orders had been given in the present case. Therefore the legal requirements for giving a permit allowing to use the house in its actual state had not been fulfilled.
The court considered that the administrative authorities, having entirely ignored the applicant’s submissions, had breached basic principles of administrative procedure, such as respect for the rule of law and for the legitimate interests of individuals, as well as the obligation to act speedily and to examine cases thoroughly. The court finally stated that the decision complained of, insofar as it suggested how the applicant could now amend the use her land in the light of the breaches of the permit, amounted to an unacceptable interference with her rights as the owner of the property.
By a decision of 12 July 1994 the Łuków Regional Office ordered G.S. to brick up the windows in question by 15 August 1994. This decision apparently remained unenforced.
On 2 September 1994, in reply to the applicant’s complaint, the Łuków Regional Office acknowledged that there had been an unacceptable delay in the proceedings in that its decision of 12 July 1994 had been given four months after the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court had been served on the Office. This was explained by the complexity of the case. Apologies were presented to the applicant.
On 3 September 1994 the Siedlce Governor upheld the decision of 12 July 1994. G.S. lodged an appeal against this decision with the Supreme Administrative Court. At the same time, he requested that the enforcement of the decision be stayed until the final judgment of that court.
By a letter of 20 September 1994, in reply to the applicant’s complaint, the Łuków District Office apologised for the significant delay in reaching a decision in the case. It was stressed that this was due to its complexity. However, the delay could not be considered justified. In particular, it was regretted that the parties had not been informed within the statutory time-limit of one month about the reasons for delay.
The case-file was transmitted to the Supreme Administrative Court on 9 November 1994. It appears that subsequently the Siedlce local administration imposed fines on G.S. three times in order to ensure his compliance with the decision of 3 September 1994. On 1 March 1995 the court granted his request to have the enforcement of the decision stayed.
On 22 May, 10 July and 26 September 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court requested information about the present state of the case. In reply, the local administration informed the court registry, by letters of 6 June, 20 July and 18 October 1995, that the case had been lying dormant because, in view of the decision of 1 March 1995, no enforcement proceedings in respect of the decision of 12 July 1994 could be conducted.
In reply to the applicant’s complaint that the windows had not been bricked up, the registry of the Supreme Administrative Court, in a letter of 6 December 1995, explained that the judgment of 15 December 1993 did not amount to an order to that effect. It had been limited to the quashing of decision which had allowed him to use the house in its present state. The administrative order to brick the windows up had only been given on 12 July 1994, but it was not final or binding, given that the proceedings were still pending, following G.S.’s appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court. The date of the hearing had not yet been fixed.
On 20 March 1996 the Siedlce Regional Office informed the applicant that no further administrative measures could be taken in the case, given that the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court were pending.
On 17 June 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 12 July 1994 and 3 September 1994, ordering that the case be reconsidered. This judgment was served on the applicant, who was considered to be a party to the proceedings.
Apparently on 10 October 1996 the Łuków District Office ordered G.S. to make certain changes to the building, pursuant to Article 40 of the Construction Act 1974. This decision remained unenforced.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains, without invoking any provisions of the Convention, that the proceedings in which she sought her neighbour’s compliance with his building permit, lasted unreasonably long.
THE LAW
The Court notes that the applicant failed to submit within the time-limit his reply to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 11 September 2000. The applicant also failed to respond to the further communications from the Registry of the Court, the last of which was a registered letter dated 8 March 2002.
Having regard to Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention, the Court notes that the applicant does not intend to pursue the application. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the examination of the application to be continued.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases.
Vincent BergerGeorg Ress
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy