Information Note on the Court’s case-law 210
August-September 2017
Tekin and Arslan v. Belgium - 37795/13
Judgment 5.9.2017 [Section II]
Article 2
Article 2-2
Use of force
Death of mentally ill prisoner after being restrained in a stranglehold by a prison officer: violation
Facts – The applicants were the parents of a prisoner suffering from psychiatric disorders who had been placed in an individual cell in the ordinary wing of a prison.
Three prison wardens went to his cell to read out certain specific security measures that were to be adopted. Having been provoked by the applicants’ son, they decided to restrain him, for fear of being attacked and in order to place him in an isolation cell. However, he died as a result of the “arm lock” restraint technique used by one of the wardens, assisted by his two colleagues.
The three wardens were prosecuted for voluntary assault resulting in unintentional death. However, the proceedings ended in their acquittal.
Law – Article 2 (substantive aspect): The use of force by the prison wardens fell within the grounds set out in Article 2 § 2 (a) of the Convention, namely “in defence of any person from unlawful violence”.
(a) The relevant legal and administrative framework – While the domestic legal framework governing the use of use of coercive measures by wardens against prisoners authorised the use of force only where the same objective could be achieved by no other means and with due regard to the principle of proportionality, it was nonetheless worded in very general terms and did not contain sufficient clarification as to which coercive measures were authorised and which were prohibited. In particular, the Belgian authorities had not issued any directive prohibiting techniques using physical restraint that could obstruct the airways or, more specifically, cause strangulation, as recommended by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).
(b) Staff training – The training provided to the prison staff in Belgium at the relevant time had been deficient. The prison staff involved in the present case had received relatively limited training, none of it specifically concerning prisoners suffering from psychiatric disorders. Since the prisoner’s death, a six-day training course had been specifically introduced to address the issue of mentally ill prisoners.
(c) The necessity and proportionality of the force used – The intervention had not been necessary to restrain an individual who posed a threat to human life and limb, whether his own or that of others.
In addition, the prison staff had known the prisoner and been aware of his state of mental health; he was not held in an ordinary prison wing but in a cell in the prison’s psychiatric wing, which was staffed by a workforce that was better trained to deal with individuals who were mentally ill.
In any event, the applicant had been particularly vulnerable on account of his mental illness and the fact that he was deprived of liberty. Yet the criminal court gave this factor no consideration when analysing the necessity and proportionality of the force used by the prison wardens. On the contrary, the applicant’s son seemed to have been dealt with as an ordinary prisoner in full possession of his mental faculties.
There had been no discussion by the prison wardens on how best to proceed in informing the prisoner about the measures in question and in dealing with a potentially negative or aggressive response on his part. Despite the unpredictability of human conduct, the present case had not concerned a random intervention which developed in an unexpected way, thus requiring the prison wardens to respond without preparation. Equally, no measure other than immobilisation and placement in an isolation cell had been envisaged by the three wardens or their superiors.
The risk that a stranglehold could prove fatal was not taught in the training course followed by R. Yet there was no doubt that such a measure could lead to asphyxiation and was therefore potentially lethal.
Despite the fact that once immobilised on the ground and bound by his hands and feet the applicants’ son no longer presented a danger to others, the numerous prison wardens present at the incident failed to carry out even a superficial examination to verify his state of health.
In those circumstances, the use of force had not been “absolutely necessary”. The lack of clear rules could also explain why R. had acted in a way that had endangered the applicant’s son’s life, which would perhaps not have been the case had he received adequate training on how to react in situations such as that with which he was faced.
It did not follow from this finding of the respondent State’s responsibility under the Convention that the Court was expressing an opinion on the acquittal of the three prison wardens by the domestic court on grounds relating to their individual criminal responsibility.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
(See also Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], 50385/99, 20 December 2004, Information Note 70; Saoud v. France, 9375/02, 9 October 2007, Information Note 101; Renolde v. France, 5608/05, 16 October 2008, Information Note 112; and W.D. v. Belgium, 73548/13, 6 September 2016, Information Note 199)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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