AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 19804/92
by T.G.H.
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 2 December 1992, the following members being present:
MM. J.A. FROWEIN, President of the First Chamber
E. BUSUTTIL
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the First Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 31 January 1992
by T.G.H. against the United Kingdom and registered on 7 April 1992
under file No. 19804/92;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British national, born in 1942. He is
represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Mr. Alexander
Cameron, a barrister practising in London.
The facts, as submitted by the applicant and which may be deduced
from the documents lodged with the application, may be summarised as
follows.
The applicant was involved in making and supplying illegal drugs.
As a result, from October 1987, he was kept under continuous
observation by the police until January 1988 when he was arrested.
The applicant was arrested together with other people at the
premises where the drugs were being manufactured. He unsuccessfully
tried escaping in his car, in which was found a bag containing
12.1 kilos of amphetamine sulphate.
The applicant appears to have a serious previous criminal record
and has been an escape risk. Whilst on remand for the drugs offence,
he was tried and convicted for an offence of armed robbery, for which
he was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.
He suffered considerable anxiety as a result of these two sets
of proceedings and received treatment for a stomach ulcer. According
to defence counsel, this anxiety impaired his ability to give adequate
instructions.
On 17 April 1989 his Crown Court trial on the drugs charges
began. It involved several other defendants.
The trial precipitated an apparent worsening of the applicant's
state of anxiety and on 24 April 1988 defence counsel raised the
problem of the applicant's mental state with the trial judge.
By 27 April 1989, at the judge's request, reports were prepared
by the prison medical authorities. They confirmed that the applicant
was suffering from stress and anxiety but did not support the
suggestion that the trial should not continue. Defence counsel then
successfully applied for the applicant to be seen by an independent
psychiatrist. His report concluded that the applicant was suffering
from paranoid psychosis. The applicant's interpretation of reality was
said to be grossly distorted. On the basis of this report, defence
counsel applied to discharge the jury and adjourn the trial. It was
not contended by the defence that the applicant was not fit to plead
or that he was insane. The judge directed that the prison doctors
should prepare further reports after having seen that of the defence.
After the first few days of his trial the applicant voluntarily
decided not to attend court or give evidence, saying that "it was too
much for him".
In a separate hearing before the judge on 8 June 1989 all the
three medical experts were heard. On the one hand, the defence doctor,
who had examined the applicant for a little more than one hour, stated,
inter alia, that the applicant was suffering from serious paranoid
psychosis which could be characterised by delusions. These delusions
of persecution led the applicant to suppose that he was under permanent
police surveillance and that there was a conspiracy against him.
Accordingly this doctor was of the opinion that there was considerable
doubt whether the applicant was capable of conducting his defence.
However, the defence doctor also pointed out that this abnormal state
may have started in 1987, from when the applicant was in fact under
police surveillance. The applicant had no previous history of mental
illness or treatment.
On the other hand, a psychiatrist of H.M. Prison Wandsworth, who
had met the applicant several times, considered that the applicant was
indeed anxious, but not such as to amount to abnormal beliefs or
paranoid delusions. He found that the applicant did not suffer from
any serious mental illness and was fit to plead and instruct counsel.
The Senior Medical Officer of the prison also stated that during their
several hours of talks he found no sign to support the suggestion that
the applicant was not sane.
On 9 June 1989 the trial judge held as follows:
"Both doctors from Wandsworth agree that, with his long history
of peptic ulcers, (the applicant) is an anxious man, and always
has been. Both of them have considerable experience of the
strains and stress that facing extremely serious charges may have
on a prisoner.
In (the applicant's) case, that strain and stress has been
magnified by the fact that he is facing very serious drug charges
in this case, having less than six months ago received a sentence
of 18 years' imprisonment.
I think that he may well be suffering from paranoid psychosis,
although the belief that the Police have been looking for him,
and then watching him, is more of a reality than a delusion....
It is submitted that, although (the applicant) was fit to plead,
his condition has deteriorated during the course of the trial -
although this is rather contrary to what the psychiatrist said,
that he found him rather calmer in June than in April - and I
should, nevertheless, discharge the Jury from returning a verdict
in (the applicant's) case... . (The defence psychiatrist)
thought that he would have difficulty in instructing Counsel, and
on concentrating on the course of the trial, and conducting
himself appropriately in the witness-box. (The defence
psychiatrist) said that (the applicant) can talk rationally for
quite a while, and then he goes back to the view that he is being
persecuted. Notwithstanding all this, he knew where he was, what
he is accused of and he could recall events chronologically....
In my judgment, the occasions when a Judge should discharge a
Jury from returning a verdict on an accused person, who was
admittedly fit to plead, and who has not deteriorated in the
course of the trial, and who declines to have the issue of his
sanity determined by the Jury who is trying him, must be very
rare... .
I am left with the clear belief that (the applicant) is of
sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings
of the trial, and to make a proper Defence, and to understand the
details of the evidence.
Therefore, I would not discharge the Jury from returning a
verdict."
The judge also refused a defence application on 13 June 1989 to
call the defence doctor to explain his opinion to the jury and the
reason why the applicant had not given evidence and had been absent
from the dock.
On 11 July 1989 the Crown Court convicted the applicant and he
was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment.
On 7 August 1991 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal,
finding that the Crown Court judge had not wrongly assessed the medical
evidence or improperly exercised his discretion.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 3 (b), (c) and (d)
of the Convention that due to his mental ill health his rights to
adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence, to defend himself
through legal assistance, and to have witnesses against him examined
were denied him.
He contends that the domestic law on fitness to plead is too
narrow and itself in breach of the Convention. The fact that he had
had a full opportunity to put forward his mental state to the courts
through his legal representatives is not enough to satisfy the fair
trial guarantees of Article 6.
THE LAW
The applicant complains of a breach of his defence rights.
He invokes Article 6 para. 3 (b), (c) and (d) (Art. 6-3-b,
6-3-c, 6-3-d) which provide as follows:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
... .
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence;
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require;
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ..."
The Commission has had regard to the facts of the present case
and notes that there was no suggestion before the trial that the
applicant had been unable to instruct defence counsel adequately or
that he needed more time or facilities to prepare his case. No
adjournment of the trial date was requested by the applicant. It seems
that the start of the trial itself aggravated the applicant's state of
anxiety.
The trial judge immediately ordered medical reports when the
matter was raised by the applicant's representatives. He was then
faced with conflicting medical opinions, which both the prosecution and
defence had the opportunity of examining and cross-examining. There
is no evidence in the case-file that the applicant was unable to defend
his standpoint properly through competent legal representatives of his
own choosing. The Commission finds nothing arbitrary in the decision
of the trial judge that the applicant was of sufficient intellect to
have understood what was going on at his trial and to defend himself
properly. It also finds nothing arbitrary in the English law standards
concerning the fitness of the individual to plead his case.
There is no evidence that the handling of the rest of the case
by the applicant's representatives was deficient or that the principle
of equality of arms concerning the attendance and examination of
witnesses was in any way infringed.
In these circumstances, the Commission concludes that the present
case does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention,
in particular of Article 6 para. 3 (b), (c) or (d) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c
6-3-d).
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber a.i. President of the First Chamber
(M. de SALVIA) (J.A. FROWEIN)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy