AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 19994/92
by Walter THALER
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber)
sitting in private on 7 April 1994, the following members being
present:
MM. A. WEITZEL, President
C.L. ROZAKIS
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 20 February
1992 by Walter Thaler against Austria and registered on 14 May
1992 under file No. 19994/92;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may
be summarised as follows.
The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1952 and now
residing in Niederau (Tyrol, Austria). In 1982 he emigrated to
the USA and ran a car repair shop in Hampton (Virginia, USA).
Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. C. Horwarth, a
lawyer practising in Innsbruck.
A. Particular circumstances of the case
On 4 February 1989 the Austrian police were informed via
Interpol that on 30 January 1989 in Poquoson (Virginia, USA)
E.P., a German citizen and H.S., an Austrian citizen had been
killed and that F.W., an employee of the applicant in his car
repair shop, was suspected of having killed them. At that time
F.W. had already left the USA.
On 17 February 1989 the applicant called the Innsbruck
police from the United States and had a telephone conversation
with police officer A. in which he gave his version of events and
implicated F.W. in the murder. The applicant's statements were
tape recorded by police officer A. and subsequently transmitted
to the investigating judge who conducted the preliminary
investigations against F.W.
On 14 July 1989 the applicant returned to Austria from the
United States.
On 26 July 1989 he was heard as witness
(Auskunftsperson) by the Innsbruck police. He stated that F.W.
had admitted to him that he had killed E.P. and H.S. and that he
had helped F.W. to search the luggage of the victims and to get
rid of it.
On 27 July 1989 the investigating judge of the Innsbruck
Regional Court (Landesgericht) opened preliminary investigations
against the applicant on suspicion of murder.
On 28 July 1989 the applicant was heard as suspect by the
investigating judge. The investigating judge ordered the
applicant's detention on remand, finding that a serious suspicion
existed against the applicant as his statements were in
contradiction to the investigations carried out by the United
States' police. The investigating judge further held that no
reasons existed which would exclude the grounds of detention.
On 2 August 1989 the investigating judge extended the
preliminary investigations against the applicant to the suspicion
of having aided F.W. after the fact (Begünstigung).
On 3 August 1989 the applicant was released from detention
on remand.
On 25 June 1990 the public prosecutor drew up a bill of
indictment against F.W. accusing him of murder and aggravated
robbery. The public prosecutor further requested the
investigating judge to discontinue the preliminary investigations
against the applicant as regards the suspicion of murder but to
maintain these proceedings as regards the suspicion of having
aided F.W. after the fact.
On 4 July 1990 the preliminary investigations against the
applicant, as regards the suspicion of murder, were discontinued.
On 13 December 1990 the applicant was heard as a witness in
the trial of F.W. As the bench of the Court of Assizes found
that the applicant's statements contradicted his prior versions
of the events and the applicant had been incriminated by another
witness, he was arrested in court.
On 14 December 1990 the investigating judge decided that the
preliminary investigations against the applicant for suspicion
of murder should be re-opened and that he should be placed in
detention on remand.
On 19 December 1990 the Judges' Chamber quashed the decision
of 14 December 1990 on the re-opening of the investigations as
it found that it lacked a formal request by the public
prosecutor. On the same day the Judges' Chamber, upon a formal
request by the public prosecutor, decided to re-open
investigations against the applicant. The Judges' Chamber found
that in the trial against F.W. from 11 to 13 December 1990 the
applicant had been heard as witness and had made statements which
were in contradiction to statements he had given earlier. In
particular, he had admitted that his earlier statements as
regards the weapons with which the victims were killed and where
this weapon could be found were wrong and he had given
instructions after the crime had been committed that fingerprints
should be wiped off the car in which the victims had been
presumably driven and that its tyres should be changed.
Furthermore witness E.B., a close friend of B.W., the applicant's
fiancee had incriminated the applicant. As E.B.'s statements
constituted new evidence, the investigations against the
applicant had to be re-opened.
On 27 December 1990 the Judges Chamber dismissed a request
by the applicant for release from detention. It found that a
serious suspicion existed against the applicant, as he was now
suspected not only of having aided F.W. after the crime but of
having assisted in the killing. He also had been seriously
incriminated by witness E.B. Furthermore, there was a danger of
absconding as the applicant, according to results of police
observation, taken steps to emigrate to Canada.
On 31 January 1991 the Innsbruck Court of Appeal
(Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the applicant's appeals against the
Judges' Chamber's decisions of 19 and 27 December 1990.
Upon a request by the public prosecutor the Innsbruck Court
of Appeal extended on 18 June 1991 the applicant's detention on
remand to a maximum duration of 12 months. The Court of Appeal
found that investigations were complicated because numerous
foreign witnesses had to be heard and expert evidence taken in
the United States.
On 18 July 1991 the applicant was summoned again by the
Court of Assizes as a witness in the trial of F.W. However, he
refused to give evidence and submitted that criminal proceedings
have been instituted against him in respect of the same offence.
The Court of Assizes did not accept the applicant's refusal as
it found that the applicant's evidence was indispensable because
of its special importance to the proceedings against F.W. On the
same day a coercive fine of 5000 AS was imposed on him.
On 7 August 1991 the Court of Appeal rejected the
applicant's appeal against the imposition of the coercive fine,
as no appeal lay against such an order.
On 8 August 1991 the Court of Assizes imposed a coercive
detention of six weeks imprisonment on the applicant for having
refused to give evidence. The applicant's detention on remand
was interrupted while he served the period of coercive detention.
On 19 September 1991 the applicant was again placed in detention
on remand.
On 24 September 1991 the applicant asked the Attorney
General (Generalprokurator) to introduce a plea of nullity for
the preservation of the law (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde zur Wahrung
des Gesetzes) with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) as
regards the coercive measures.
On 16 October 1991 the trial against F.W. before the Court
of Assizes was closed and the jury delivered a verdict of not
guilty. The bench of the Court of Assizes set aside the jury's
verdict for error.
On 24 October 1991 an oral hearing took place before the
Judges' Chamber on a request by the applicant for release from
detention on remand. The applicant challenged the Presiding
Judge for bias, submitting that the judge had taken part in the
trial against F.W. and in the arrest of the applicant in court.
He also had taken part in the decision to re-open the
investigations against the applicant. The Judges Chamber allowed
the applicant's challenge and adjourned the hearing to 31 October
1991.
On 31 October 1991 the Judges' Chamber dismissed the
applicant's request for release from detention on remand. It
found that, notwithstanding the latest development in the trial
against F.W., a serious suspicion against the applicant existed.
On 20 November 1991 the Supreme Court decided that a re-
trial of F.W. should take place before another Court of Assizes
at the Innsbruck Regional Court.
On 25 November 1991 the public prosecutor drew up a bill of
indictment against the applicant, accusing him of murder,
aggravated robbery and handling stolen goods. The public
prosecutor also requested the Court of Appeal to find that the
applicant's detention could be extended to up to 15 months
because of the complex nature of the investigations.
On 29 November 1991 the Court of Appeal dismissed the
applicant's appeal against the Judges' Chamber decision of 31
October 1991. It found that, though there was now some evidence
more favourable to the applicant's position, the circumstantial
evidence as a whole still amounted to a serious suspicion against
him. It dismissed the public prosecutor's request to extend the
detention on remand to 15 months as such a decision could only
be taken in the last six weeks before the expiry of the time
limit for the detention. This was not the case as the period of
the applicant's coercive detention could not be taken into
account.
On 18 December 1991 the Court of Appeal decided on the
applicant's appeal against the bill of indictment. The Court of
Appeal granted the bill of indictment as regards the charge of
murder and robbery, but not as regards the charge of handling
stolen goods (Hehlerei). The Court of Appeal also extended the
applicant's detention on remand to a maximum duration of 15
months. It found that the extension of the period was justified
as the investigations were complicated because numerous witnesses
from the United States had to be heard.
On 16 January 1992 the Supreme Court quashed the Regional
Court's decision of 18 July 1991 by which a coercive fine had
been imposed on the applicant for having refused to give evidence
and the decision of 8 August 1991 by which a coercive detention
had been imposed on the applicant for the same reason. The
Supreme Court held that in imposing these coercive measures the
Regional Court had only taken into account the importance of the
charge laid against F.W. and had failed to balance properly the
interest in obtaining a statement from the applicant against his
own interests in refusing to give evidence. Since the applicant
might have been forced to incriminate himself in a serious crime
which would violate Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, the
balancing of interests must be in his favour. Therefore, the
coercive measures were unlawful.
On 17 January 1992 the Regional Court decided to join the
proceedings against the applicant and F.W. The applicant
appealed against this decision.
On 4 March 1992 the trial of the applicant and F.W.
commenced before a Court of Assizes of the Innsbruck Regional
Court sitting with a jury (Geschwornengericht).
On 26 March 1992 and 13 April 1992 the Regional Court
dismissed further requests by the applicant to be released from
detention on remand.
On 3 June 1992 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
appeals against the Regional Court's decisions of 26 March 1992
and 13 April 1992. The Court of Appeal confirmed that a serious
suspicion against the applicant existed and referred to its
earlier decisions of 31 January 1991, 29 November 1991 and 18
December 1991.
On 17 June 1992 the Court of Assizes acquitted the applicant
of the charge of murder and armed robbery, but convicted the
applicant of handling stolen goods. The bench sitting with the
jury set the applicant's sentence at one year's imprisonment.
On the same day the applicant was released from detention on
remand.
On 1 September 1992 the applicant introduced a plea of
nullity and an appeal with the Supreme Court.
On 25 March 1993 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant's
plea of nullity and quashed his conviction as regards the charge
of handling stolen goods.
On 10 May 1993 the Innsbruck Regional Court discontinued the
criminal proceedings against the applicant.
On 10 May 1993 the Innsbruck Regional Court asked the
applicant whether he wished to claim compensation for detention
under the Criminal Proceedings Compensation Act (Strafrechtliches
Entschädigungsgesetz).
On 28 May 1993 the applicant filed his claim for
compensation for detention.
On 17 November 1993 the Regional Court dismissed the
applicant's compensation claim based on Section 2 para. 1 (b) of
the Criminal Proceedings Compensation Act. It found that the
applicant had only been acquitted because the evidence was not
sufficient but not because his innocence had been proved. The
Regional Court held further that as regards the applicant's
claims under Section 2 para. 1 (a) of the Criminal Proceedings
Compensation Act and in particular his coercive detention, the
Innsbruck Court of Appeal had to decide.
On 3 December 1993 the applicant appealed against the
Regional Court's decision.
On 20 January 1994 the Innsbruck Court of Appeal decided to
submit the case to the Supreme Court. It found that the Supreme
Court was competent to decide on the applicant's compensation
claim under Section 2 para. 1 (a) of the Criminal Proceedings
Compensation Act. Proceedings are still pending before the
Supreme Court.
B. Relevant domestic law
Compensation regarding pecuniary damages resulting from
detention on remand
The Criminal Proceedings Compensation Act (Strafrechtliches
Entschädigungsgesetz) provides for compensation for pecuniary
loss resulting from detention on remand. The conditions to be met
are laid down in SS. 2 and 3. S. 2 para. 1 (a) relates to the
case of unlawful detention on remand. S. 2 para. 1 (b) specifies
as conditions that the accused has been acquitted, or that the
proceedings against him have been otherwise discontinued and that
the suspicion that he has committed the offence in question no
longer subsists, or that there is a bar to prosecution which
already existed at the time of his detention.
As regards the proceedings, S. 6 stipulates in particular
that the court of second instance regarding the order or
prolongation of the detention on remand is competent to decide
upon whether the conditions under SS. 2 and 3 are met, whether
the detained person has to be heard and, if necessary, whether
evidence has to be taken. The detained and the Prosecutor's
Office have a right to appeal to the superior court which can
take, if necessary, further evidence. The final decision in these
proceedings is binding.
If the said courts find that the conditions under S. 2 and
3 are met, the injured person has to file a request with the
Department of Finance (Finanzprokuratur) for acknowledgment of
his claim. If there is no decision upon his request within six
months or if his claim is partly or fully refused, the person
concerned has to institute civil court proceedings against the
Republic of Austria (SS. 7 and 8).
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 5 paras. 1, 3 and 4
of the Convention of the unlawfulness of his detention on remand
and its length. He submits that at no time did any concrete
suspicion of murder and robbery exist against him. He further
submits that his detention was unlawful as the same judge decided
as a member of the Judges' Chamber in August 1989 on his
detention on remand, presided over the bench of the Court of
Assizes in the trial against F.W. in the course of which the
applicant had been heard as a witness, decided as a member of the
Judges' Chamber on the re-opening of the preliminary
investigations against him and participated in the hearing of the
Judges' Chamber on 24 October 1991 on the applicant's request for
release from detention on remand. He also submits that, although
he had been taken into detention on 13 December 1990, the
prosecution waited for more than one year before drawing up a
bill of indictment, apparently awaiting the result of the trial
against F.W.
2. The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 5 of the
Convention that, although the Supreme Court by decision of 16
January 1992 had declared his coercive detention unlawful, he has
not received compensation for this detention. He further submits
that he is entitled to compensation for his detention on remand
as this detention was also unlawful.
3. He complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 of the
Convention that the criminal proceedings against him were unfair.
He submits that the judges were biased, that he was forced to
incriminate himself and that secret recordings of telephone
conversations between the applicant and police officers were used
in the trial. He also submits that his lawyer could not assist
him while he was heard as a witness on 13 December 1990. He
further submits that a virulent press campaign against him
rendered the proceedings unfair.
4. He complains that the criminal proceedings instituted
against him were not concluded within a reasonable time as
required by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
5. He complains under Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention about
a violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence in
that on 13 December 1990 the Presiding Judge at the trial against
F.W. when hearing him as witness took a hostile attitude towards
him.
6. He complains under Article 8 of the Convention that
telephone conversations of B.W., his life companion, with E.B,
her friend had been recorded by the police and that also his
telephone conversations with police officers had been recorded
by them.
7. He complains under Article 13 of the Convention that no
effective remedy against the imposition of the coercive fine and
the coercive detention was available to him. He also complains
under this provision that he could not challenge in the Supreme
Court the Court of Appeal's decision to re-open criminal
proceedings against him. He submits further that neither against
the decision to commit him to trial nor against the decision to
join proceedings against him and F.W. he had an effective remedy.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 5 paras. 1, 3 and 4
(Art. 5-1, 5-3, 5-4) of the Convention of the unlawfulness of his
detention on remand and its length. He submits that at no time
did any concrete suspicion of murder and robbery exist against
him. He further submits that his detention was unlawful as the
same judge decided as a member of the Judges' Chamber in August
1989 on his detention on remand, presided over the bench of the
Court of Assizes in the trial against F.W. in the course of which
the applicant had been heard as a witness, decided as a member
of the Judges' Chamber on the re-opening of the preliminary
investigations against him and participated in the hearing of the
Judges' Chamber on 24 October 1991 on the applicant's request for
release from detention on remand. He also submits that, although
he had been taken into detention on 13 December 1990, the
prosecution waited for more than one year before drawing up a
bill of indictment, apparently awaiting the result of the trial
against F.W.
The Commission considers it cannot, on the basis of the
file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it
is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 48 para. 2 (b)
of the Rules of Procedure, to give notice of this complaint to
the respondent Government.
2. The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5)
of the Convention that, although the Supreme Court by decision
of 16 January 1992 had declared his coercive detention unlawful,
he has not received compensation for this detention. He further
submits that he is entitled to compensation for his detention on
remand as this detention was also unlawful.
Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention reads as
follows:
"Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or
detention in contravention of the provisions of this
Article shall have an enforceable right to
compensation."
The Commission recalls that Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of
the Convention is only applicable if the Convention organs
themselves or a national authority have established that the
detention of a person constituted a violation of his rights under
Article 5 paras. 1 to 4 (Art. 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4) (No. 6821/74,
Dec. 5.7.76, D.R. 6, p. 65 at p. 70; No. 10371/83, Dec. 6.3.85,
D.R. 42, p. 128; Eur. Court H.R. Brogan and others judgment of
29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-b, p. 35, para. 66).
However, the Commission is not required to decide whether
or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance
of a violation of Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) as, under Article
26
(Art. 26) of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter after
all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the
generally recognized rules of international law.
The Commission notes that on 28 May 1993 the applicant filed
his claim for compensation for detention, that this claim,
insofar as it was based on Section 2 para. 1 (b) of the Criminal
Proceedings Compensation Act was dismissed by the Regional Court
against which decision the applicant appealed and that the
applicant's claim under Section 2 para. 1 (b) of the Criminal
Proceedings Compensation Act was submitted on 20 January 1994 by
the Innsbruck Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court and is still
pending before the latter.
The applicant's complaint under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5)
of the Convention is therefore premature. The applicant has not
complied with the conditions of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention in this respect, and this part of the application must
accordingly be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of
the Convention.
3. He complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-3)
of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him were
unfair. He submits that the judges were biased, that he was
forced to incriminate himself and that secret recordings of
telephone conversations between the applicant and police officers
were used in the trial. He also submits that his lawyer could
not assist him while he was heard as a witness on 13 December
1990. He further submits that a virulent press campaign against
him rendered the proceedings unfair.
The Commission recalls that any procedural defects which may
have existed at the time of an accused's trial must be considered
to have been rectified by the accused's subsequent acquittal (see
No. 5575/72, Dec. 8.7.74, D.R. 1 p.45; No. 8083/77, Dec. 13.3.80,
D.R. 19 p. 226; No. 15831/89, Dec. 25.2.91, D.R.69 p.317).
The Commission notes that on 17 June 1992 the Court of
Assizes acquitted the applicant of the charges of murder and
robbery, that on 25 March 1993 the Supreme Court quashed the
applicant's conviction by the Court of Assizes as regards the
remaining charge of handling stolen goods and that on 10 May 1993
the Innsbruck Regional Court discontinued the criminal
proceedings against the applicant. It follows that the applicant
cannot now claim to be a "victim" of a violation of the
Convention as required by Article 25 (Art. 25) since he has
sought and regained redress for his complaints in this respect.
This part of the application, therefore, is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2)
of the Convention.
4. The applicant further complains that the criminal
proceedings instituted against him in July 1989 were concluded
within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art.
6-1) of the Convention.
The Commission considers it cannot, on the basis of the
file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it
is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 48 para. 2 (b)
of the Rules of Procedure, to give notice of this complaint to
the respondent Government.
5. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 2
(Art. 6-2) of the Convention about a violation of the principle
of the presumption of innocence in that on 13 December 1990 the
Presiding Judge at the trial against F.W. when hearing him as
witness took a hostile attitude against him.
The Commission recalls that the presumption of innocence
will be violated if, without the accused's having previously been
proved guilty according to law, a judicial decision concerning
him reflects an opinion that he is guilty (Eur. Court H.R.,
Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo judgment of 6 December 1988, Series
A no. 146, p. 31, para. 67 et seq.).
In the present case, it does not appear from the evidence
that at the applicant's hearing as witness on 13 December 1990
by the Court of Assizes in the trial against F.W. the Presiding
Judge took decisions or attitudes reflecting such an opinion.
The Commission finds that the applicant has not sufficiently
shown in what respects his questioning by the Court of Assizes
or the conduct of the Presiding Judge could be said to amount to
an infringement of the presumption of innocence.
It follows that there is no appearance of a violation of the
applicant's right under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the
Convention.
This part of the application, therefore, is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2)
of the Convention.
6. The applicant further complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of
the Convention that the police intercepted telephone calls
between B.W., his life companion, and E.B, her friend and that
his telephone conversations with police officers were also
recorded by them.
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
"2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others."
a) As regards the applicant's complaint about the interception
of telephone calls between B.W and E.B. the Commission notes that
these telephone calls took place between third persons and that
the applicant himself was not a party to the calls.
Consequently, the applicant cannot, in this respect claim to be
a victim of an alleged violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention in
accordance with Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
b) As regards the applicant's further complaint that his own
telephone calls to police officers had been recorded by them, the
Commission recalls that the claim to respect for private life is
automatically reduced to the extent that the individual himself
brings his life into contact with public life (Brüggemann and
Scheuten v. Germany, Comm. Report 12 July 1977, para. 56, D.R.
10 p. 100).
In this respect the Commission notes that on 17 February
1989 the applicant called the Innsbruck police from the United
states and had a telephone conversation with police officer A.
in which he recounted his version of events and implicated F.W.
in the murder. These statements were tape recorded by police
officer A. and subsequently transmitted to the investigating
judge who conducted the preliminary investigations against F.W.
The Commission finds that from the subject of the telephone
conversation it must have been clear to him that such information
would not be treated as a private telephone conversation but
would become part of the criminal investigations. The Commission
therefore finds that the recording of this conversation does not
constitute an interference with the applicant's private life
within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the
Convention.
This part of the application, therefore, is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2)
of the Convention.
7. The applicant also complains under Article 13 (Art. 13) of
the Convention that no effective remedy against the imposition
of the coercive fine and the coercive detention by the Regional
Court was available to him. He also complains under this
provision that he could not challenge in the Supreme Court the
Court of Appeal's decision to re-open criminal proceedings
against him. He submits further that he had no effective remedy
against the decision to commit him to trial or against the
decision to join proceedings against him and F.W.
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention reads as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in
this Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity."
Even assuming that the applicant had an arguable claim
within the meaning of Article 13 (Art. 13), the Commission notes
that the applicant's complaints are directed against decisions
of courts, namely the decision of the Judges' Chamber of the
Innsbruck Regional Court of 19 December 1990, the Innsbruck Court
of Appeal's decision of 31 January 1991, the Court of Appeal's
decision of 18 December 1991, the Regional Court's decision of
17 January 1992 taken in the course of proceedings at first
instance and the Court of Assizes' decisions of 18 July and 8
August 1991 by which coercive measures were imposed on the
applicant.
It follows that a remedy against a violation of the
Convention allegedly committed by these courts would require the
possibility to appeal against their decisions. However, the
right to appeal is not as such guaranteed by Article 13 (Art. 13)
of the Convention (see Eur. Court H.R., Delcourt judgment of 17
January 1970, series A no. 11, p. 14, para. 25). It follows
therefore that this provision cannot be relied upon in
circumstances where the alleged violation lies in the decision
of a court (see No. 11508/85, Dec. 17.7.86, not published; Nos.
12629 and 13965/88, Dec. 9.11.89, not published).
This part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-
founded in accordance with Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECIDED TO ADJOURN its examination of the complaint as
regards the lawfulness and length of the applicant's
detention on remand and the complaint as regards the length
of the criminal proceedings;
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First
Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (A. WEITZEL)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy