Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 163
May 2013
The Professional Trades Union for Prison, Correctional and Secure Psychiatric Workers (POA) and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) - 59253/11
Decision 21.5.2013 [Section IV]
Article 35
Article 35-2
Same as matter submitted to other procedure
Trade union officers closely associated with previous procedure of international investigation instituted by the applicant trade union: inadmissible
Facts – In 2004 the first applicant, a trade union, lodged a complaint in respect of a statutory ban on industrial action by prison officers with the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labour Organization (ILO), alleging a breach of the right to strike under ILO Convention No. 87. The Committee concluded that the State was required to compensate prison officers for the otherwise justified limitation of their right to strike and has also periodically reviewed the situation, most recently in 2012.
In their application to the European Court, the first applicant, joined by the second and third applicants, two trade-union officers, complained under Article 11 of the Convention that the ban was an unjustified restriction on the exercise of their right to freedom of association and that there were no adequate measures in place to compensate them for the restriction.
Law – Article 35 § 2 (b): Even though the Government had not raised a preliminary objection to this end, the Court first examined of its own motion whether the applicants’ complaint was “substantially the same as a matter ... already ... submitted to another procedure of international investigation”. For this admissibility criterion to apply, the application to the Court must be “substantially the same” as a complaint brought before another international procedure as regards the substance and the complainant. In this case the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association was already recognised as constituting another international procedure for the purposes of this admissibility criterion and the applicants’ complaint before the Court was virtually identical to the one raised before that body. However, that complaint had only been raised by the first applicant – the trade union – whereas the second and third applicants were not, and could not be, parties to that previous complaint, as the procedure was collective in nature with standing confined to trade unions and employer organisations. Nonetheless, the second and third applicants had to be seen as being closely associated with the proceedings and the complaints brought before the ILO by virtue of their status as officers of the first applicant. Their individual situations were in no way unique, but instead exemplified the effects of the statutory ban complained of both before the ILO and before the Court. Allowing them to maintain their action before the Court would therefore have been tantamount to circumventing Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention.
Conclusion: inadmissible (same as matter submitted to other procedure).
(See also Fédération hellénique des syndicats des employés du secteur bancaire v. Greece (dec.), no. 72808/10, 6 December 2011; Cereceda Martín and Others v. Spain, no. 16358/90, Commission decision of 12 October 1992)
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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