FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 21302/13
Georgi Vasilev TONKEV and Viktoria Vasileva TONKEVA
against Bulgaria
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 30 September 2014 as a Chamber composed of:
Ineta Ziemele, President,
Päivi Hirvelä,
George Nicolaou,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Faris Vehabović, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 19 March 2013,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicants, Mr Georgi Vasilev Tonkev and Ms Viktoria Vasileva Tonkeva, are Bulgarian nationals. Mr Georgi Vasilev Tonkev was born in 1990 and lives in Varna, while Ms Viktoria Vasileva Tonkeva was born in 1996 and lives in Pazardzhik. The applicants were represented before the Court by Mr L. Takov and Mr H. Donchev, lawyers practising in Sofia.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The applicants are the children of Mr Vasil Tonkev, who was killed on 1 May 2011 during a police operation aimed at apprehending him.
1. The police operation of 30 April-1 May 2011 and the death of Mr Tonkev
3. About twenty luxury cars were stolen in the Plovdiv region in April 2011. Mr Tonkev was one of the suspected perpetrators of the thefts.
4. On 30 April 2011 the head of the Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior in Plovdiv ordered an operation aimed at apprehending the perpetrators. He selected twenty police officers to participate in the operation, scheduled for that evening. The officers were briefed in advance; they were advised, in particular, that the individuals they were seeking to apprehend were dangerous and armed and would be unlikely to obey police orders.
5. At about 8 p.m. on 30 April 2011 the officers, in two police cars and a minivan, left Plovdiv for the city of Veliko Tarnovo, where, according to operational intelligence data, a theft was planned for that evening. They arrived in the city at around 11 p.m. At about 1 a.m. on 1 May 2011 they were informed that a car, a BMW X5, had been stolen and was heading towards Plovdiv. It transpired subsequently that the car had been stolen and was being driven by Mr Tonkev. Once in Plovdiv, he stole another car together with an accomplice.
6. The police officers returned to Plovdiv, where they were informed that the two stolen cars were taking the motorway to Sofia. Four police cars and a minivan followed them. At about 5 a.m. the two stolen cars left the motorway and entered nearby fields. The police officers set up four roadblocks, obstructing roads in the area.
7. At about 7 a.m. the two cars left the fields and headed towards the first roadblock. Once the drivers had seen it, they made a U-turn. One of the cars, driven by Mr Tonkev’s accomplice, took a dirt road back towards the fields, followed by several officers. The car was subsequently found, but the driver managed to escape. Mr Tonkev remained on the road in the other stolen car, driving at high speed towards the second roadblock. The officers who were there tried to stop him, placing the police car in the middle of the road. However, Mr Tonkev did not stop but managed to drive round the car, hitting it. Then he continued towards the third roadblock.
8. Having been told on the radio by their colleagues that Mr Tonkev had driven past the second roadblock, had hit the police car and was driving towards them, the officers at the third roadblock made preparations to stop him. They parked their police minivan in the middle of the road and stood around it.
9. Mr Tonkev approached at high speed. With their hands raised, the officers signalled to him to stop. He did not do that, but instead directed the car at the officer who was standing to the left of the minivan and who had to jump hastily into the ditch to escape. The other officers from the group stated later that they had thought the car had knocked him down, as they had not been able to see him. Mr Tonkev then drove towards the other officers, who were standing in a group to the right of the minivan. The first two of them, after once again making gestures indicating that he should stop, jumped out of the way. This left the third officer, Mr K.A., alone in front of the speeding car. Mr K.A. was armed with an AK-47 assault rifle, set to semi-automatic fire. He fired two warning shots aimed to be into the air. However, at that very moment he had to jump hastily out of the way to avoid being hit by the car and fell to the ground. This changed the direction of the shots, which instead hit the front right-hand door of the car driven by Mr Tonkev. Already on the ground, Mr K.A. fired one more shot, which hit the car’s right rear tyre. One of the other officers attempted to deploy a spike strip to stop the car, but did not succeed. Mr Tonkev continued driving and headed towards the fourth roadblock.
10. Approaching the roadblock at high speed, he once again directed the car at the police officers trying to stop him and they had to jump to one side to escape. They managed to deploy a spike strip, but despite passing through it, Mr Tonkev continued driving and soon after that turned off onto a small dirt road. The police officers started searching the area. Sometime later they found the abandoned car. They heard Mr Tonkev cry for help and found him close by, wounded. They called an ambulance, but Mr Tonkev died before its arrival.
2. The investigation of Mr Tonkev’s death
11. Criminal proceedings concerning a possible offence under Article 119 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 25 below) were instigated on 1 May 2011. The investigation was conducted against an “unknown perpetrator” until its conclusion.
12. On 1 May 2011 the scene of the incident was visited by an investigator from the investigation service in Pazardzhik. He also inspected the car which had been driven by Mr Tonkev. Two bullet holes were found in its front right-hand door, but only one of the bullets had pierced the door and penetrated the interior. Stains of dry blood were found on the left-hand front seat. A bag of tools including pliers and screwdrivers was found on the back seat.
13. A post mortem of Mr Tonkev’s body was carried out on 3 May 2011. A gunshot wound measuring 2.5 to 3 cm was found in the right lower part of the thorax. The bullet, which had penetrated horizontally, had caused a laceration of the liver. This had resulted in a severe intra-abdominal haemorrhage, which had caused the death. The expert concluded that the lethal shot had not been fired at close range.
14. A ballistic expert report was drawn up on 11 May 2011. It established that the lethal shot had been fired from the AK-47 rifle used by Mr K.A.
15. Many of the officers who took part in the operation on 30 April and 1 May 2011, including all of those who had been stationed at the third roadblock, were interviewed on different dates. Mr K.A. was interviewed on 4 May 2011. He said that he had fired into the air and immediately after that had jumped back to escape the speeding car. He also stated that his aim had been to preserve the life and physical integrity of his colleagues and of Mr Tonkev.
16. A combined medico-ballistic expert report was drawn up on 26 June 2011. It established that the lethal shot which had killed Mr Tonkev had been fired from between 0.8 and 3.8 metres. Whoever fired the shot had been positioned to the right and slightly in front of the victim. The shot had been fired while he was falling, staggering or jumping backwards and the gun had been in a horizontal position. The victim had been sitting in the driver’s seat, leaning against the backrest in the normal way.
17. Another medico-ballistic expert report, drawn up on 6 April 2012, concluded that, while firing the first two shots, Mr K.A. had been moving to the right, attempting to escape the approaching car. It was possible that at the time the second of these shots was fired he was no longer supporting the rifle with his left hand, which was thus in a position close to horizontal. The experts were of the view that it was impossible for shots fired into the air to have the trajectory observed in the case.
18. On several occasions in the course of the investigation the applicants’ representatives requested the replacement of the investigator and the prosecutor in charge of the case, arguing that they were not carrying out a thorough and independent investigation. In particular, the applicant’s representatives considered that the investigator and the prosecutor, by commencing an investigation concerning a possible offence under Article 119 of the Criminal Code, had predetermined the course of the criminal proceedings and had allegedly unjustifiably sought to discontinue the proceedings (see below). On all occasions the requests for replacement of the investigator and the prosecutor were refused by their superiors, it being found that the investigation was being carried out in a thorough and vigorous manner and that the allegations made by the applicants could not justify the conclusion that the investigator and the prosecutor were not independent.
3. Discontinuation of the criminal proceedings
19. On 30 December 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the case decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings, finding, on the basis of Article 12 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 24 below), that no offence had been committed in connection with Mr Tonkev’s death. The prosecutor considered that Mr Tonkev’s actions, namely his directing of the powerful car he had been driving at high speed towards the police officers, represented an unlawful direct attack that placed their health and lives at risk. It therefore justified self-defence on their part, in particular the firing of the two shots by Mr K.A.
20. Upon an appeal by the first applicant, on 24 January 2012 the Pazardzhik Regional Court quashed the prosecutor’s decision, considering that she had not examined in a thorough manner the particular circumstances in which Mr K.A. had fired the lethal shot, such as the position of his body and the possible trajectory of the bullet.
21. The prosecutor collected further evidence, in particular the expert report mentioned in paragraph 17 above, and on 27 June 2012 decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings, relying once again on the provision contained in Article 12 § 1 of the Criminal Code. She considered that Mr Tonkev had launched a “direct and unlawful attack” on the police officers at the second, third and fourth roadblocks, using the car he was driving “as a weapon” capable of injuring or killing any one of them. Thus, Mr K.A. had “no longer aimed at apprehending” Mr Tonkev, but had acted in self-defence, in order to protect his own life, and also the lives of his colleagues. Given Mr Tonkev’s aggressiveness, the action taken in self‑defence had not been disproportionate. Mr K.A. had used his firearm after all other attempts to halt the attack had proved futile.
22. Upon an appeal by the first applicant, on 3 August 2012 the Pazardzhik Regional Court upheld the prosecutor’s decision, confirming her conclusion that Mr K.A. had acted in self-defence, and finding that the investigation of Mr Tonkev’s death had been objective and thorough. The court dismissed the first applicant’s argument that it had been necessary to examine as witnesses all officers who had participated in the operation of 30 April-1 May 2011, pointing out that all the eye-witnesses to the relevant events had been interviewed. The domestic court dismissed a further argument put forward by the first applicant that Mr Tonkev had not been armed, that his actions had been predictable and that he had not posed a danger to the officers. The court pointed out that Mr Tonkev had used the car driven by him “as a weapon” and that he had aimed at injuring or even killing the police officers trying to stop him. Thus, it did not appear that the use of lethal force was unjustified. Lastly, the domestic court dismissed the argument that the police officers’ actions had been “inadequate” and that they could have halted the car’s movement by using spike strips at a point earlier than the fourth roadblock. It noted that the place where Mr Tonkev and his accomplice had been hiding and the route they were intending to take had been unclear and that, moreover, the situation had unfolded very quickly.
23. Upon a further appeal by the first applicant, in a final decision of 19 October 2012 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal upheld the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings. It noted that Mr Tonkev’s death had occurred within the framework of a police operation organised with the aim of apprehending him after he had stolen a car. It observed also that Mr Tonkev’s actions had created “a real and immediate danger” for the police officers at the third roadblock and that in firing the shot which had killed Mr Tonkev, Mr K.A. had acted in self-defence. The Court of Appeal noted further that at the moment when the shots were fired, the attack carried out by Mr Tonkev had not ceased and that the actions taken in defence had been aimed at repelling it. This was illustrated by the fact that the shots fired by Mr K.A. had been directed at the front right door of the car, and not at the side windows; thus, he had aimed to halt the car’s movement and prevent its running over him and his colleagues. Lastly, the Court of Appeal concluded that the self-defence manifested in the case had been within the necessary limits, seeing that the attack launched by Mr Tonkev had been strongly violent. For the self-defence to be considered disproportionate, it would have to have clearly exceeded what had been necessary to repel the attack, and this had not been the case.
B. Relevant domestic law
24. Article 12 § 1 of the Criminal Code of 1968 provides that an act committed in self-defence and not causing disproportionate harm to the attacker is not criminal.
25. Under Article 119 of the Criminal Code, causing death by a disproportionate reaction to an attack is punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.
COMPLAINTS
26. The applicants raise two complaints under Article 2 of the Convention.
(a) They argue that the State was responsible for the death of their father, who was killed as a result of the use of lethal force by the police when trying to escape arrest. They contest the authorities’ conclusion that his actions amounted to an attack on the police officers justifying self‑defence, pointing out that he had not been armed and that the officers had taken “completely inadequate action to halt the car’s movement”. They consider that in the circumstances it was unnecessary to resort to the use of firearms against their father, because there were many police officers who were equipped with spike strips, which they failed to use at an earlier stage. Referring to the judgments in the cases of Tzekov v. Bulgaria (no. 45500/99, 23 February 2006) and Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria ([GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, ECHR 2005-VII), the applicants point out that the Court has previously criticised the domestic legislation which allowed the use of firearms by the police to effect an arrest, regardless of the seriousness of the offence allegedly committed or the danger which the person concerned represented.
(b) The applicants also complain of the effectiveness of the investigation into their father’s death, which they consider “superficial”. They argue that the fact that the object of the investigation was from the very beginning a possible offence under Article 119 of the Criminal Code meant that the investigation was biased and that numerous relevant issues remained unexamined. They consider that the investigator and the prosecutor in charge of the case failed to collect the necessary evidence and duly examine the question of whether or not the force used against their father had been necessary. The applicants argue that the investigator and the prosecutor were thus not impartial, also because during the investigation they expressed the opinion that no offence had been committed.
THE LAW
27. The applicants complain under Article 2 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law ...
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
28. The applicants raise two separate complaints under that provision (see paragraph 26 above), which the Court will examine below.
A. Whether the use of lethal force was justified
29. The principles governing the use of force by the authorities have been summarised in the Court’s judgment in the Grand Chamber case of Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy (no. 23458/02, §§ 174-82, ECHR 2011 (extracts)).
30. In particular, the Court has noted that Article 2 ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention and that together with Article 3 it enshrines some of the most basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.
31. Paragraph 2 of Article 2 describes the situations where it is permitted to use force which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life. Such use of force, however, must be no more than “absolutely necessary” for the achievement of one of the purposes set out in sub‑paragraphs (a), (b) or (c).
32. The use of the term “absolutely necessary” indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed than that normally applicable when determining whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society” under paragraphs 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2(a), (b) and (c) of Article 2. Furthermore, in keeping with the importance of this provision in a democratic society, the Court must, in making its assessment, subject any such deprivation of life to the most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, §§ 147-50, Series A no. 324; Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, 9 October 1997, § 171, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI; Musayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 57941/00, 58699/00 and 60403/00, § 142, 26 July 2007; and Shchiborshch and Kuzmina v. Russia, no. 5269/08, §§ 205-6, 16 January 2014).
33. Nevertheless, detached from the events at issue, the Court cannot substitute its own assessment of the situation for that of an officer who was required to react in the heat of the moment to avert an honestly perceived danger to his life (see Bubbins v. the United Kingdom, no. 50196/99, § 139, ECHR 2005-II (extracts)).
34. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicants’ father died in the course of a police operation involving the use of lethal force against him. The authorities concluded eventually that he had launched an attack against the police officers and that one of them, Mr K.A., had fired in self-defence. The applicants contest these findings, pointing out that their father had not been armed.
35. The Court notes that, indeed, no firearm was found on Mr Tonkev following his death. However, this fact alone does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that he did not launch an attack on the police officers. The Court notes that Mr Tonkev was driving a powerful car at high speed and that, using it ‒ as described by the domestic authorities ‒ “as a weapon”, he tried to knock down the officers at the third and fourth roadblocks, forcing them to jump aside or run out of its path (see paragraphs 9-10 above). The Court does not doubt, as also concluded by the domestic authorities in their decisions to discontinue the investigation, that by doing so he endangered in a real and immediate manner the officers’ physical integrity and life. In addition, the Court does not see any reason to call into doubt the domestic authorities’ conclusion that the force used against Mr Tonkev was resorted to in response to the attack, with the aim of halting it and preserving the health and life of those endangered. Accordingly, the Court considers that in the instant case the police used force “in defence of any person from unlawful violence”, as provided for under paragraph 2(a) of Article 2 of the Convention. It will thus have to determine whether the force was “absolutely necessary” with a view to achieving that aim.
36. In that regard the Court notes, first, that Mr Tonkev’s attack on the police officers was violent and showed no sign of ceasing or diminishing in intensity at the time when Mr K.A. fired the lethal shot. In this regard it is significant that Mr Tonkev continued his attack even after he had been shot, directing it against the officers at the fourth roadblock (see paragraph 10 above). As already noted, that attack placed the police officers in real, immediate and serious danger; what is more, some of them believed that he had managed to knock down one of their colleagues, namely the officer who had been standing on the left side of the road at the third roadblock (see paragraph 9 above). Mr K.A. was thus entitled to use appropriate means to halt the attack and defend himself and his colleagues (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, § 189).
37. The Court also observes that the attack was clearly unlawful, as Mr Tonkev was refusing to obey police orders to stop and was, more generally, seeking to avoid arrest after having committed a serious offence.
38. It is also significant that the force used against Mr Tonkev was not intended to be lethal and cause his death. Mr K.A.’s apparent intention was to fire in the air, but as at that very moment he had to jump back hastily to avoid being hit by the car driven by Mr Tonkev, the direction of the shots changed and one of them hit Mr Tonkev’s body. These circumstances appear to be sufficiently established on the basis of the expert reports commissioned by the investigation (see paragraphs 16-17 above). Moreover, it is significant that once Mr K.A. regained full control of his rifle, after he had fallen to the ground, he fired one more shot which, once again, was not aimed at Mr Tonkev’s body and was not intended to injure him, but was directed at the car’s rear tyre (see paragraph 9 above).
39. Accordingly, the Court is of the view that the actions of the police officers ‒ and in particular of Mr K.A., who fired the lethal shot that hit Mr Tonkev ‒ do not, in themselves, result in the conclusion that the force used was not absolutely necessary.
40. The Court must also examine whether the police operation of 30 April-1 May 2011 was planned and carried out in such a way as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, the use of lethal force (see paragraph 32 above; see also Dimov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 30086/05, § 75, 6 November 2012). In carrying out this assessment, the Court must have particular regard to the context in which the incident occurred as well as the way in which the situation developed (see Andronicou and Constantinou, cited above, § 182).
41. The Court observes that the operation was organised and carried out with the aim of apprehending Mr Tonkev and his alleged accomplices, and that, once it commenced, the officers were being given timely and correct information concerning Mr Tonkev’s intention to steal a car in Veliko Tarnovo and his subsequent movements with that car (see paragraph 5 above). This thus allowed them to follow him and set up the four roadblocks around the exact place where he and his accomplice had been hiding. Moreover, it appears that the officers had been correctly informed that Mr Tonkev would be dangerous and unlikely to obey police orders.
42. The police officers made preparations to stop Mr Tonkev at the roadblocks by placing the police cars in the middle of the road and standing around them. The applicants argue that the officers should also have deployed spike strips, which, in their view, would have avoided the use of firearms (see paragraph 26(a) above). The Court notes that such a strip was deployed at the fourth roadblock. It takes note of the Pazardzhik Regional Court’s finding that the police could not have used the strips earlier because the exact route to be taken by Mr Tonkev and his accomplice was unclear and the situation unfolded very quickly (see paragraph 22 above in fine). The Court likewise finds this reasoning of relevance. Thus, it cannot agree with the applicants’ assertion that the police’s actions in attempting to stop the car driven by Mr Tonkev were “completely inadequate”. It reiterates that the applicants’ father was refusing to comply with lawful police orders to stop and that he launched a violent attack which threatened the health and life of the police officers; in such a situation it cannot be accepted that the officers should not have had or used firearms to counter such an attack (see, mutatis mutandis, Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, § 216).
43. Lastly, the Court observes that the applicants refer to previous cases against Bulgaria in which it has criticised the domestic legislation, which at the time allowed the use of firearms by the police in order to effect an arrest regardless of the danger the person concerned represented and the nature of the offence he had been suspected of committing (see paragraph 26(a) above and the cases referred to therein; see also Vasil Sashov Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 63106/00, §§ 43-47, 10 June 2010; Karandja v. Bulgaria, no. 69180/01, §§ 56-60, 7 October 2010; and Vlaevi v. Bulgaria, nos. 272/05 and 890/05, § 79, 2 September 2010). However, the Court points out that the present case is not concerned with the application of the rules criticised in these cases, which related to the use of force for the purposes of effecting an arrest, but is rather about legitimate self-defence, to which a different legal provision is applicable, namely Article 12 § 1 of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, the Court’s conclusions in the above cases, which contributed to its findings of violations of Article 2 of the Convention, are not transposable to the situation in the instant case.
44. In view of the above, the Court concludes that the applicants’ complaint under the substantive aspect of Article 2 is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Effectiveness of the investigation
45. Having regard to its fundamental character, Article 2 of the Convention also contains a procedural obligation for the State to carry out an effective investigation into alleged breaches of its substantive limb. The relevant principles governing this obligation have been summarised in the Court’s judgment in the case of Giuliani and Gaggio (cited above, §§ 298‑306). In particular, the investigation must be capable of resulting in the determination of whether or not the force used was justified in the circumstances (see also Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, § 87, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I) and of identifying and bringing those responsible to justice. The authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident. In addition, the investigation’s conclusions must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. Furthermore, the persons who are responsible for the investigation and carry it out must be independent and impartial (see Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no. 1108/02, §§ 192-3, 5 November 2009).
46. Turning to the circumstances of the case at hand, the Court observes that the investigation of Mr Tonkev’s killing started promptly and that numerous important investigative steps were taken in the days and weeks that followed it (see paragraphs 11-17 above). The evidence collected established the direct cause for Mr Tonkev’s death, the circumstances in which the lethal injury had been inflicted on him and the relevant circumstances of the police operation of 30 April-1 May 2011. Moreover, in their decisions regarding the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings, the prosecution and the courts examined in detail whether Mr Tonkev had launched an attack on the police officers, whether the force used against him had been resorted to in self-defence and whether it had been proportionate to the danger he had represented (see paragraphs 21-23 above).
47. Thus, the Court cannot agree with the applicants’ assertions (see paragraph 26(b) above) that the investigation of their father’s death was “superficial” and that the authorities failed to collect necessary evidence. The applicants do not specify which circumstances have, in their view, remained unexplored. It addition, the Court does not see why the fact that the investigation was carried out with an apparently “working” legal qualification under Article 119 of the Criminal Code (disproportionate reaction to an attack) would have necessarily undermined its effectiveness, as argued by the applicants. As a matter of fact, given the circumstances of the case as submitted to it by the applicants, the Court is satisfied that the investigation’s conclusions were based on a thorough and objective analysis of the evidence collected and that the investigation effectively determined whether the force used by the police was justified.
48. The applicants’ additional allegation is that the investigation lacked impartiality (see paragraph 26(b) above). The reasons given in support of this are that the investigator and the prosecutor in charge of the case failed to collect the necessary evidence and that they expressed the opinion that no offence had been committed and sought to discontinue the proceedings (ibid., see also paragraph 18 above). However, the Court finds these arguments insufficient to cast doubt on the impartiality of the investigator and the prosecutor since they refer in essence to the evidence collected during the investigation and its interpretation. Moreover, the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings was upheld by two levels of jurisdiction, which examined the applicants’ arguments and objections. The applicants do not call into question the courts’ impartiality. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to conclude that investigation in the instant case lacked impartiality.
49. It follows that the applicants’ complaint under the procedural aspect of Article 2 is likewise manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Françoise Elens-PassosIneta Ziemele
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy