SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 27641/10
Kinga TÓTH
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 30 September 2014 as a Committee composed of:
Helen Keller, President,
András Sajó,
Robert Spano, judges,
and Abel Campos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 10 May 2010,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Kinga Tóth, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1964 and lives in Kalocsa.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 4 December 2002 the applicant brought a civil action against two private individuals before the Pest Central District Court, requesting the court to declare null and void a lifetime annuity contract concluded between her predecessor and the respondents. The court gave judgment on 21 October 2008.
This judgment was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 8 October 2009. This judgment was served on the applicant on 5 November 2009.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings.
THE LAW
The applicant complained that the length of the civil proceedings to which she was a party had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement” of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Government submitted that the beginning of the running of the six-month time-limit for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention was the service of the second-instance judgment on the applicant on 5 November 2009. Therefore, the application had been introduced out of time.
The applicant contested these views in general terms.
The Court points out that the six-month rule is aimed at, inter alia, providing the prospective applicant with sufficient time to consider whether to lodge an application and, if so, to decide on the specific complaints and arguments to be raised (see O’Loughlin v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23274/04, 25 August 2005), as well as facilitating the establishment of facts in a case, the passage of time rendering problematic any fair examination of the issues raised (see Nee v. Ireland (dec.), no. 52787/99, 30 January 2003).
Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the second-instance judgment was served on the applicant on 5 November 2009. However, she introduced the application only on 10 May 2010, that is, more than six months later. There is nothing in the case-file exculpating the applicant of this delay.
It follows that the application must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Abel CamposHelen Keller
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy