FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 27429/16
Michal TRUBAN
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 16 February 2021 as a Committee composed of:
Péter Paczolay, President,
Alena Poláčková,
Gilberto Felici, judges,
and Attila Teplán, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 11 May 2016,
Having regard to the decision of 16 September 2019,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Michal Truban, is a Slovak national, who was born in 1964 and lives in Banská Bystrica. He was represented before the Court by Mr F. Sedlačko, a lawyer practising in Bratislava.
2. The Slovak Government (“the Government”) were represented by their their Co-Agent, Ms M. Bálintová, from the Ministry of Justice.
The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. In 2010 the applicant, a well-known judicial figure in Slovakia, lodged an action for protection of his personality rights against a publishing house which had published an article about his hunting activities. His claim for apology was granted by two levels of courts and the defendant’s appeal on points of law was dismissed.
5. On 14 March 2014 the defendant lodged a constitutional complaint, invoking its rights to judicial protection and freedom of expression.
6. On 26 March 2015, the Constitutional Court accepted the complaint for further examination.
7. Having learned about that decision from a press release, the applicant asked the Constitutional Court, on 14 May 2015, to associate him to the proceedings, to send him a copy of the constitutional complaint and enable him to comment on it. A power of attorney was joined to that request.
8. On 21 May 2015, the Constitutional Court sent a copy of the constitutional complaint to the applicant’s lawyer, setting him a time-limit of 15 days for any comments he might wish to submit. No response was received from the applicant or his lawyer.
9. By a judgment of 11 November 2015 (no. II. ÚS 184/2015-66), the Constitutional Court found a violation of the defendant’s right to freedom of expression, quashed the decision of the appellate court and remitted the case to the latter. It is not known to the Court whether those proceedings have already ended.
COMPLAINT
10. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Constitutional Court quashed the appellate court judgment, which was favourable to him, without informing him and giving him a chance to participate in the proceedings. He further complained that by doing so and without taking any evidence, the Constitutional Court reached conclusions which were binding for the appellate court.
THE LAW
11. The applicant complained of a violation of his right of access to a court, guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
12. The Government submitted several documents extracted from the Constitutional Court’s file, from which it follows that the applicant had, upon his request, been served with the defendant’s constitutional complaint and given the opportunity to comment on it but had failed to do so (see paragraphs 7-8 above). The Government contented that, in this way, the Constitutional Court had complied with section 51 of the Constitutional Court Act as amended in the framework of the execution of the Court’s judgment in López Guió v. Slovakia (no. 10280/12, 3 June 2014). As from 1 January 2015, this section provides that persons who were parties to the proceedings having led to a final decision which is challenged before the Constitutional Court shall be informed of the constitutional complaint and given the right to comment on it. In the present case, however, the applicant did not take advantage of the possibility to submit his views to the Constitutional Court.
13. The applicant admitted the facts as described by the Government but noted that he had been served the constitutional complaint only upon his request, after he had learned about the Constitutional Court proceedings from the media. He further observed that he had been set a time-limit to present his comments if considered necessary and decided to exercise his right not to react. Lastly, neither the Constitutional Court nor the appellate court had sent him the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 November 2015, so he again learned about the outcome only from the media.
14. The Court notes that although the Constitutional Court’s judgment did not constitute a final decision on the applicant’s case, it was likely to have a bearing on the determination of his rights by the lower court, the extent of which is however hard to appreciate given that the Court has not been informed about the outcome of the appellate proceedings. In any event, the Court is of the view that the applicant had a legitimate interest in participating in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court.
15. It is however not disputed that the applicant was aware about the Constitutional Court proceedings, be it first from a press release, that he had been sent a copy of the constitutional complaint lodged by the other party to the proceedings before the lower courts and had been given the opportunity to influence their outcome (see, conversely, López Guió, cited above, § 105). His decision not to avail himself of this opportunity is not imputable to the State. The fact that the Constitutional Court’s judgment was allegedly not served on the applicant must be appreciated in this context. Besides, it seems highly unlikely that the appellate court would at no time have informed the applicant about that judgment given that the appellate proceedings were bound to resume as a result of the quashing decision of the Constitutional Court.
16. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 1 have been observed. His complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 18 March 2021.
Attila TeplánPéter Paczolay
Acting Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy